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Abstract

Until the global financial crisis in 2008, hedge funds had relied on various safe
harbor rules to remain unregulated. Since then, various subprime mortgage crisis-driven
regulatory reforms have been made worldwide. Through the implementation of
registration and reporting obligations the hedge fund regulatory framework has been
changed to reinforce regulations that may provide financial stability, making hedge funds
more like other regulated entities.
Current hedge fund regulations are based on the policy grounds, on one hand, that
macro-prudential regulations are necessary due to the potential adverse effects on the
market from hedge fund size and leverage positions, and on the other hand, that
conventional micro-prudential regulations are necessary due to the rising exposure of
unaccredited and unsophisticated investors to the market (necessitating governmental
protection).
Based on observations of the hedge fund regimes in the U.S., the U.K., and Korea,
this article concludes that the current regimes have succumbed to the pressure to
overregulate: It would be prudent for future regulatory efforts to focus on making the
hedge fund market accessible to only accredited investors, and the role of a visible
regulatory hand in this market should be refrained from to the extent necessary to
promote market competition and financial innovation, while mitigating potential systemic
risk from hedge fund failures.
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I.

Introduction

A. Background
In late 2011, the Korean Financial Services Commission passed a set of
rules for the introduction of Korea based hedge funds.12 Under the new regime,
Korea based hedge funds were first launched in December 2011. This was an
interesting legislative development given that other major jurisdictions such as the
US and the UK introduced much more stringent regulations to curtail the activities
of hedge funds since the global financial crisis of 2008.3
Unsurprisingly, many differences can be found between the Korean hedge
fund regulations and those in foreign jurisdictions. For instance, there is a clear
distinction in place between private funds4 and so-called qualified purchaser funds5,

As illustrated infra, “hedge fund” is not a legally defined term, but it is a commonly used term
referring to certain unregulated or lightly regulated fund or pooled investment vehicle around the
world. In this article, I will use the term “hedge fund(s)” broadly to include any type of private
pooled investment vehicles, regulated or not, but to exclude private equity funds and venture capital
funds.
1

2

See Jabon sijang gwa geungyung tujaeobe gwanhan beobryul sihaengryung [Enforcement Decree
of the Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act], Presidential Decree No. 25050, Dec.
30, 2013, art. 271-2, as amended (S. Kor.) [hereinafter PD], available at
http://www.moleg.go.kr/english/korLawEng.
3

The Korean hedge fund regime was introduced first in Korea by amending the then-existing
qualified purchaser fund provisions in the Presidential Decree of the Financial Investment Services
and Capital Markets Act, and later it was codified into the FSCMA in 2013. See Jabon sijang gwa
geungyung tujaeobe gwanhan beobryul [Financial Investment Services and Capital Markets Act],
Act No. 11758, May 28, 2013, art. 249-2, as amended (S. Kor) [hereinafter FSCMA], available at
http://www.law.go.kr/engLsSc.do?menuId=0&subMenu=5&query=자본시장법#liBgcolor0.
4

See FSCMA, art. 249.

5

See id. art. 249-2.

1

and only the qualified purchaser funds are legally classified as a category of hedge
fund under the Korean regime.
Other jurisdictions, such as the US and the UK, treat both funds the same as
hedge funds or unregulated funds. 6 There is a clear distinction between hedge
funds and private equity funds made under the Korean regime. By contrast, both
funds have remained unregulated in the US and the UK by utilizing various safe
harbor rules, and as a result, have not been legally differentiated.7
Furthermore, private funds,8 including hedge funds and private equity funds,
and the fund managers

9

are both regulated under the Korean regime.

10

6

This regulatory difference may arise because Korea defines the two terms (i.e., private fund and
qualified purchaser fund) separately and differently to regulate them more lightly than mutual funds,
and designate only qualified purchaser fund as hedge fund, while both the US and the UK define
the terms as safe harbors for hedge funds to avoid the regulation. See infra Chapter VI, Part B.1,
Chapter V, Part B.3; Chapter VI, Part C.2.
7

For instance, the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940 provides leeway for the hedge funds to
avoid registration requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7). The U.K. fund regime also does
not require onshore or offshore hedge funds to be authorized by the Financial Services Authority
(currently Financial Conduct Authority) unless these funds are offered or sold to the investing
public. See Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, pt. XVII, c. 2, art. 8, 238(5) (U.K.)
[hereinafter FSMA], available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/8.
Privately placed venture capital funds are not classified as ‘collective investment schemes’ (i.e.,
funds) under the FSCMA and are regulated under a separate statute due to special policy
considerations in Korea even though those funds are still subject to certain provisions under the
FSCMA to a very limited extent. See FSCMA, art. 6(5).
8

9

The term, fund manager, is not a legal term, but it usually means investment adviser providing
investment advisory services on a discretionary basis for the pooled investment vehicles. The fund
manager is different from the adviser for segregated accounts in that the latter provides the advisory
services to each individual account on a segregated basis while the former does so on a pooled basis.
Therefore, both managers are similar in nature because the services they provide. The US and the
UK regimes provide the same license and regulatory requirements on fund managers and on
advisers although the fund manager is subject to additional fund-specific regulatory obligations.
Korea provides separate licensing and regulatory requirements on them and treats them differently
from the beginning. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11), 3(b); FSMA, art. 19; FSCMA, art. 6(5)-(7),
12(1).

2

Alternatively, it is more common in the US and the UK that only the fund
managers are regulated - even under the new regulatory regimes promulgated after
the financial crisis of 200811 - and the funds can remain unregulated as long as they
satisfy certain safe harbor requirements.12

Understanding the hedge fund regulations and underlying principles of
major jurisdictions is essential to ensuring harmonious regulatory environments
around the world and to minimizing the regulatory arbitrage problem. It is
critically important to have a level playing field (in terms of hedge fund regulation)
among these countries because certain regulations may be easily avoided by
establishing the funds and the fund managers in offshore jurisdictions that provide
lighter regulation, allowing those funds to be marketed to potential investors on a
transnational basis through local private placement regimes.13

10

Private equity fund managers used to be exempted from direct regulation under the FSCMA until
the FSCMA was amended to impose registration obligations on them from May 2013. But, they are
still subject to relatively lighter regulation than hedge fund managers in Korea. See FSCMA, art.
272-2(1).
11

As further discussed infra, the US fund regime used to provide safe harbor rules for the private
fund advisers, and they are exempted from registration and other compliance requirements if they
satisfy the so-called “fewer than 15 clients” threshold condition until it was repealed and replaced
by the foreign private adviser exemption under the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3);
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 408,
124 Stat. 1376, 1575 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act].
12

See infra Chapter IV, Part B, C and Chapter V, Part B, for the details of the safe harbor rules
available for the hedge funds and their managers in the U.S. and in the U.K.
13

Considering the global nature of hedge funds in particular, it is more likely that the regulatory
arbitrage problem will inevitably arise if a jurisdiction puts a very stringent regulatory regime in
place while other jurisdictions provide relatively lenient regulatory environments. See e.g., Saeed
Azhar & Parvathy Ullatil, Seeking Less Scrutiny, Hedge Fund Flock to Asia, REUTERS, May 17,
2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/17/us-asia-hedgefunds-analysisidUSTRE64G31W20100517.

3

For decades, there have been many discussions or debates going on in the
US and in the UK on whether to and how to regulate hedge funds and their
managers, culminating in mandatory registration requirements for the hedge fund
managers through the enactment of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (hereinafter as “Dodd-Frank Act”) and the Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter as “AIFMD”).14 Thus, it is worth
exploring these regulatory and/or legislative developments in the US and in the
UK in particular, because it would be extremely helpful for Korea in best
redesigning the hedge fund regime in the future.

B. Purpose and Scope of this Study

The purpose of this dissertation is to explore and identify desirable
regulatory models to consider in the future, based on a comparative analysis of the
regulations and underlying rationales in the US, UK, and Korea. While each
country may have different views or different regulatory frameworks relating to
hedge funds and their managers, there are some issues in common, among other
things, to be revisited and resolved going forward.15

14

See generally Dodd-Frank Act, supra note 11; Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1
(EC) [hereinafter AIFMD], available at http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2011:174:0001:0073:EN:PDF.
15

See generally Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Final Report, The Regulatory Environment for Hedge Funds: A Survey and Comparison (Nov.
2006), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD226.pdf.

4

First, given the fact that private funds are either unregulated or lightly
regulated in many jurisdictions, 16 and that both retail investors and accredited
investors are allowed to invest (both directly or indirectly) 17 in the funds,
controversies have arisen as to what governmental or regulatory protections should
be afforded to such investors. At issue is whether, from the investor protection
perspective, the unaccredited investors should be treated differently from the
accredited investors who are presumably in the position to “fend for themselves”18,
or if no further regulatory interventions are necessary to protect unaccredited
investors, why not.19

It is a well-known fact that hedge funds have been unregulated or
minimally regulated, based on the ground that they are offered or sold on a private
placement basis, and are not marketed to the investing public. 20 As a consequence,
target investors (i.e., accredited investors) need to rely on their own financial
16

See id.

17

As further discussed infra, for example, the U.S. securities and fund regimes (i.e., the Securities
Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940) provide that a limited number (up to 35
persons) of retail investors are able to invest in hedge funds directly with sophistication test, and
non-sophisticated investors are also allowed to indirectly invest in hedge funds through fund of
hedge funds. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–12(d)(1); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b).
18

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 126 (1953).

19

Even under the pre-Dodd-Frank Act regimes, hedge fund advisers have been regulated to some
extent in the U.S. That is, they owe fiduciary obligation to the fund and its beneficial owners and
they are also subject to anti-fraud rules although they previously remained outside direct regulatory
oversight by relying on various safe harbor provisions. See e.g. 15 U.S.C. § 80b–6(4); 15 U.S.C. §
78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Hedge fund advisers are also obligated to check the sophistication
status of the unaccredited investors before accepting capital from them. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b).
20

See generally SEC Staff Report, Protecting Investors: A Half-Century of Investment Company
Regulation, May 29, 1992, at 103-118 [hereinafter SEC Staff Report], available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guidance/icreg50-92.pdf.

5

expertise or on third party professionals when making investment decision
regarding the hedge funds.

Thus, it is very important issue whether those retail investors in the private
funds should be treated differently from accredited investors, and whether more
governmental protections should be provided, in case where retail investors is also
limitedly accessible to the hedge fund market. 21 Alternatively, it is also worth
exploring the feasibility of completely barring the unaccredited investors’ access to
the hedge funds, and allowing only indirect investment through fund of funds or
other intermediating investment vehicles, such as segregated accounts or trust
accounts. 22 This alternative scenario is premised on the belief that hedge funds
should be lightly regulated going forward. To do so, it is necessary to make the
hedge fund markets purely private market for accredited investors to ensure that no
investor protection concerns are raised.23

21

Due to this controversy, there is no private fund (i.e. something like Section 3(c)(1) fund under
the U.S. regime) exemption available to the hedge fund and no unqualified purchaser-investor is
allowed to invest in such hedge fund in Korea. In other words, there are no the private fund ideas in
Korea regarding hedge funds, and only qualified purchasers-investors are allowed to invest in the
hedge funds albeit limited number of non-professional investors are legally permissible to invest in
the hedge funds subject to a suitability test. See FSCMA, art. 46, 249-2.
22

Fund of funds, segregated account, or trust account (especially unspecified trust account) are
some of the examples how the retail investors should be allowed to invest in hedge funds indirectly
through financial intermediaries and it is based on the belief that the financial intermediaries are
deemed financially sophisticated and they are obligated to invest in the hedge fund in the best
interest of the underlying retail investors as a fiduciary. See e.g., FSCMA, art. 37, 79, 96, 102.
23

Interestingly and confusedly, existing Korean hedge fund regulation provides that only qualified
investors including certain wealthy individuals meeting the threshold requirement (i.e. minimum
investment amount of 0.5 billion Korean Won or more) are permitted to invest in hedge funds, but
some of the individual-qualified purchaser investors (i.e. wealthy individuals) are still classified
unsophisticated investors and thus fall under the protections of the FSCMA suitability rule. Because
of these apparently contradictory rules, as further explored infra Chapter VI, Part C, it is unclear

6

Second, another area of interest is how to best to regulate hedge funds and
their managers. As aforementioned, Korea regulates both hedge funds and their
managers, while the U.S. and the U.K. regulate hedge fund managers only. 24
Given the disparity in the way of regulating hedge funds and their managers
between countries, it is worth exploring the policy rationales for why each
jurisdiction takes different regulatory approaches in regulating hedge funds and
their managers. This analysis is important because the more narrowing the
regulatory gap between the countries, the more likely to minimize the possible
regulatory arbitrage or regulatory shopping problem.

Further, it should be also explored the extent of the hedge fund regulation
assume that it is necessary to regulate them. That is, how differently hedge funds,
private equity funds, and venture capital funds should be treated is another issue to
explore. While some similarities exist between them as private funds, each fund
category may still retain distinct features which merit different respective levels of
regulation. Accordingly, it is difficult (or perhaps impossible) to apply a uniform
set of regulatory standards given that various and different types of funds are
available even within the hedge fund industry itself.

what the underlying rationale is for the government to protect some qualified purchasers-wealthy
individuals and not others. See FSCMA, art. 47, 279-2.
24

What is interesting and noteworthy is that, unlike hedge fund managers, private equity fund
managers were exempted from registration or licensing requirement while the private equity fund
itself is subject to registration and other regulatory obligations until the FSCMA was amended in
2013 to require them to register with the FSC. Accordingly, it may be concluded that Korea takes a
two-tiered or phased approach in regulating hedge funds and private equity funds based on the
principle of proportionality. See FSCMA, art. 12(1), 249-2(1), 272-2(1).

7

Third, another area focus should be on is how differently onshore and
offshore hedge funds are regulated from country to country.25 As a matter of fact,
hedge funds are global in nature, and can very easily be moved offshore. As a
result, the hedge fund market is the very market that various cross-border
regulatory issues, such as licensing, marketing, and market manipulation,
inevitably arise.

Without a doubt, hedge fund related transnational regulatory issues are dealt
with differently from country to country. There is no reason, however, why we
should not explore ways in which to apply the same regulatory standards in
between jurisdictions, assume that the investment objective and target investors are
same. In that regard, it is worth exploring how to promote a hedge fund regulatory
regime that would treat both onshore and offshore hedge funds the same to the
extent possible.26

In addition, I will also compare and contrast the level of regulation that
existed before the global financial crisis of 2008 and how these regulations have
evolved after the crisis focusing on the US, UK, and Korea respectively. As the
evolution of these regulations would undoubtedly vary from country to country
25

For instance, the real estate funds or commodities funds are not regulated in the U.S., while such
funds are typically regulated in the U.K. and Korea, among other countries. It is mainly due to the
facts that U.S. fund regulation is applied only to the fund (i.e., investment company) primarily
investing in securities, while other countries like the U.K. and Korea regulate any pooled
investment vehicles whether or not they invest in securities. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA,
art. 235; FSCMA, art. 6(5), 9(18).
26

EU Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive may be one of the landmark regulatory
attempts to make hedge fund regime among the jurisdictions even and consistent although it has a
binding force only to EU member states. See AIFMD, explanatory note 4.

8

and from fund to fund (i.e. hedge fund vs. private equity fund vs. venture capital
fund), I will explore their similarities and differences, and the underlying policy
justifications of each.
Furthermore, based on the observations and discussions outlined above, I
will make certain recommendations for a future hedge fund regulatory scheme that
will bring about a more equal treatment of hedge funds regardless of whether they
are domiciled onshore or offshore from a transnational regulatory perspective.

C. Composition of This Dissertation
This dissertation is composed of nine chapters. Chapter II illustrates general
features about hedge funds and their managers. It is important to understand this
first because it would help us have better understanding about hedge fund related
regulatory concerns and policy rationales which will be discussed in the following
chapters.
Chapter III explores major issues about hedge fund regulation. In this
chapter, I will cover the issues of whether or not to regulate hedge funds, how and
to what extent to regulate them, and the underlying policy rationales for doing so.
It is critically important to understand these issues first because hedge fund
regulatory regimes across countries should be implemented based on these
discussions and on policy grounds in general.
Chapter IV provides an overview of hedge fund regulation in the US. In
this chapter, I will explore the hedge fund related regulatory developments made

9

before and after the global financial crisis of 2008 and the underlying policy
justificationations for the then-existing regime.
The US hedge fund regime is very important because the US used to be,
and currently is, the number one country around the world in the hedge fund
industry, and because the US regime used to be regarded by hedge funds as
friendly because it provides various safe harbor rules for a long time. In that regard,
it is worth observing how the US hedge fund regime has been changed after the
2008 global financial crisis and what made the US legislators and regulators
change their regulatory philosophy.
Chapter V explores the UK hedge fund regimes. It will be demonstrated
and analyzed in the order of time sequence, including before and after the AIFMD
was transposed to the UK regime. As one of the two major hedge fund
jurisdictions in the world, it is also important to take a close look at the UK hedge
fund regimes and how the UK regulators have responded to the 2008 financial
crisis, as well as how they justify the change in their regulatory position.
Chapter VI deals with Korean hedge fund regimes. Korea is a relatively
young country in the global hedge fund market because it introduced its hedge
fund regime just a few years ago in the wake of 2008 global financial crisis. In this
chapter, I will illustrate about what the Korean hedge fund regulatory model looks
like and under what policy grounds the Korean regulators justify the regulation.
Chapter VII explores the regulatory similarities and differences between
the three countries, based on the observations in Chapters IV through VI. In so
doing, I will point out both strong points and weak points in each jurisdiction, and

10

address about which country’s regulatory approach is more appropriate and under
what policy grounds.
In chapter VIII, I will suggest some regulatory recommendations for a
future hedge fund regulation based on the foregoing discussions and observations.
To do so, I will use some hypothetical situations to illustrate how the hedge fund
regimes in the three countries apply, and what regulatory gaps or regulatory
loopholes may exist in each jurisdiction.
Chapter IX concludes with a summary of this dissertation. I will also
briefly discuss other relevant issues not thoroughly dealt with in this dissertation
and potential limitations or counterarguments I may face in this dissertation.

11

Overview of Hedge Fund Regulation

II.

A. What Does the Term “Hedge Fund” Mean?
Hedge fund has been defined in various ways and from various
perspectives over the decades mainly because there has been no generally accepted
definition, nor has a statutory definition been available. 27 Nonetheless, the term
“hedge fund” can be generally defined, in part, as “an investment vehicle that
pools the monetary contributions of multiple investors and employs a variety of
investment strategies.”28
After the global financial crisis of 2008, there have been regulatory efforts to define “hedge fund”
for the purpose of having them under the regulatory purview, but the concepts of “private fund” and
“alternative investment fund” are also insufficient to clearly identify who they are and what they do.
See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 402(a); 15 U.S.C. § 80b–2(a)(29) (defining private fund as “an issuer
that would be a investment company, as defined in Section 3 of the Investment Company Act of
1940, but for Section 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) of that Act); AIFMD, art. 4(1)(a) (defining alternative
investment funds as “collective investment undertakings, including investment compartments
thereof, which:
27

(i) raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance with a defined
investment policy for the benefit of those investors; and
(ii) do not require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC”).
28

See Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail Investors in
(Funds- of) Hedge Funds, Feb. 2003, at 1 [hereinafter IOSCO Hedge Fund Report], available at
http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/IOSCO%20PD142.pdf. Similarly, the SEC defines hedge
fund as “an entity that holds a pool of securities and perhaps other assets, whose interests are not
sold in a registered public offering and which is not registered as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act.” Staff Report to the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
Implications of the Growth of Hedge Funds, Sept. 2003, at 3 [hereinafter SEC Hedge Fund Report].
The IOSCO also defines hedge fund, focusing more on its practical characteristics, as “institutions
which are significant traders for their own account in financial instruments and which take on
significant leverage, subject to little or no direct prudential regulation, and subject to limited
disclosure requirements as they are seldom public companies.” Technical Committee of the
International Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge Funds and Other Highly Leveraged
Institutions, Nov. 1999, at 4, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD98.pdf. See also Erik J. Greupner, Hedge
Funds are Headed Down-Market: A Call for Increased Regulation?, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1555,
1559 (2003) (defining hedge fund as “privately offered, relatively unregulated pooled investment
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It should be noted, however, is that it is difficult to uniformly define “hedge
funds”, and it is almost impossible to do considering the diverse and different
nature of hedge funds. That may be the very reason why thus far there have been
no recommendations or regulatory trials on how to legally define them. In that
regard, it may be concluded that some current definitions of “hedge fund”, such as
a private fund in the US or alternative investment fund in the European Union,
may be regarded as regulatory efforts to indirectly define them so that they fall
under regulatory purview to some extent.29
As seen in its definition, hedge funds were originally devised with a view
to hedging the risks inherent to the investment portfolio.30 That is, when the first
hedge fund was created in late 1940s by Alfred W. Jones, it was recognized as
relatively low-risk private investment vehicle, which made use of various hedging

vehicles in the form of limited partnership or limited liability company that have the flexibility to
invest in a broad range of securities and commodities using broad range of trading techniques.”);
Leon M. Metzger, Recent Market Events and the Foundation for Global Market Crises: Hedge
Funds, 4 FORDHAM FIN. SEC. & TAX L. F. 5, 6 (1999) (defining hedge fund as “private investment
companies, usually in the form of limited partnership, limited liability company, or offshore
corporation, that may or may not employ “hedging strategies; they are largely, but not entirely,
unregulated; sometimes use leverage; use a variety of alternative investment techniques; such as
such selling and derivatives, and often pay handsome compensation to those who run them.”); Rory
B. O’Halloran, An Overview and Analysis of Recent Interest in Increased Hedge Fund Regulation,
79 TUL. L. REV. 461, 464 (2004) (defining hedge fund as “any pooled investment vehicle that is
privately organized, administered by professional investment managers, and not widely available to
the public”).
29

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 126.

30

Hedging typically means doing something to insure against potential loss or to mitigate the risk
of loss, and accordingly the leveraged positions current hedge funds take in common is in a way
deviated from the original meaning of hedging. But it has been a more familiar term in the
marketplace for a long time regardless of the fact that its substance is a lot different from its name
or its face, and because of that it is still commonly referred to that way. See e.g., Managed Fund
Association, Comments for the SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds, May 6, 2003, at 2 [hereinafter
MFA Comments], available at http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-mfa.htm.
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strategies to insure the invested portfolio against any possible drop in price of the
portfolio assets, albeit the derivatives contract may be also utilized for speculative
purpose.31 However, over time the hedge fund has evolved and transformed into a
highly risky investment vehicle making the most of various speculative leveraged
transactions.32

B. What Are the Common Features of Hedge Funds?
Hedge funds can be characterized in many different ways. Among other
things, the International Organization of Securities Commissions (hereinafter as
“IOSCO”) summarizes the main characteristics of hedge funds as follows:33
• Borrowing and leverage restrictions, which are typically included in CIS regulation, are not
applied, and many (but not all) hedge funds use high levels of leverage;
• Significant performance fees (often in the form of a percentage of profits) are paid to the
manager in addition to an annual management fee;
• Investors are typically permitted to redeem their interests periodically, e.g. quarterly, semiannually, or annually;
• Often significant ‘own’ funds are invested by manager;

31

It have been publicly known and accepted that the first hedge fund was created in 1949 by Alfred
W. Jones to achieve absolute return regardless of market ups and downs. He believed the theory
that “within the universe of the efficient market, there exists at any given time considerable pockets
of inefficiency which can be profitably exploited without incurring unacceptable risks.” Also he
was the first manager to put a performance-based fee in place and make substantial commitments of
his own capital to the fund he managed. See e.g., Greupner, supra note 28, at 1560; Douglas W.
Hawes, Hedge Funds-Investment Clubs for the Rich, 23 BUS. LAW. 576, 577 (Jan. 1968).
32

It should be noted, however, that the original hedge fund-like investment strategy (namely, longshort equity or market neutral investment strategy) can be commonly observed in the marketplace,
and they typically do not have highly leveraged positions. But it is also true that these are just part
of the various hedge fund categories, and many of the hedge funds have been engaging in different
types of leveraged transactions to a large extent. See MFA Comments, supra note 30.
33

IOSCO Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 3.
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• Derivatives are used, often for speculative purposes, and there is ability to short sell
securities;
• More diverse risks or complex underlying products are involved.

First and foremost, hedge funds used to remain unregulated or lightly
regulated, until new regimes were implemented after the 2008 financial crisis. As
pointed out above, all the aforementioned unique features of hedge fund are
derived from the fact that they have been outside direct regulatory supervision. For
instance, the US has provided various safe harbor rules in the securities statutes,
such as private offering, private adviser, and private fund exemptions, and hedge
funds used to enjoy their unregulated status by relying on those safe harbor rules.34
The UK also provides private placement safe harbor rules for onshore and
offshore hedge funds, but not for UK based hedge fund managers, and let them
stay outside the paternalistic fund regulation if they are not offered or sold to the
general public.35
Second, hedge funds have full discretion to enter into borrowing or other
leveraged transactions, and it is possible because they are free from the leverage

34

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d-(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1),(7); 15 U.S.C. § 80b- 3(b)(3). Among the
safe harbor rules, private adviser exemption (namely, “fewer than 15 clients” exemption) has
become available only to foreign private advisers, and US based private advisers become subject to
registration and other compliance requirements, subject to narrow size-based exemptions under the
Dodd-Frank Act. But, what is clear is that even under the Dodd-Frank Act private fund exemptions
are still available, and all the hedge fund’s unique features are to be observed generally although
they become subject to regulatory supervision directly (namely, hedge funds designated by the
FSOC as a systematically important non-financial institution) or indirectly (through private adviser
regulation) under the Dodd-Frank Act. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113, 403.
35

See FSMA, art. 21, 238. This private fund or private offering exemption is still temporarily
available for some more years to come even after the AIFMD is in force in July 2013. See AIFMD,
explanatory note 10.
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restrictions applicable to mutual funds.36 As a result, hedge funds may have highly
leveraged portfolios depending on the investment strategies they utilize.37As noted
above, while hedge funds are allowed to take on significant leverages, hedge funds
and/or their managers are subject to little or no direct prudential regulation, and opt
to provide no or limited disclosure.38
Undoubtedly, high-leverage and low-transparency are the most commonly
well-known features of hedge funds, and compared to registered and regulated
mutual funds, hedge funds’ portfolios are much less diversified and less

36

For instance, among other countries, the US provides express safe harbor rules for private fund to
avoid the registration requirement and other investment restrictions including borrowing and
leveraged transactions applicable to the registered investment company, and the U.K. also provides
an unregulated scheme if the fund interests are not offered or sold to the general public, and
offshore based funds are also free from investment restrictions applicable to the authorized scheme
under the UK regime. In contrast, Korea provides no safe harbor rule for domestic hedge funds, and
they are subject to certain level of borrowing and leverage restrictions. By contrast, offshore funds
are free from the leverage restriction although they are subject to registration obligation under the
Korean regime in connection with the offer and sale of the fund interests to certain Korean
professional investors. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1; Chapter V, Part B.3; Chapter VI, Part C.2.
37

For example, fixed income arbitrage fund may have much more leverage ratio due to the unique
nature of their investment strategy, while long-short equity funds are more likely to have by far less
exposure in leveraged transactions. See e.g., Fin. Serv. Auth., Assessing the Possible Sources of
Systemic Risk from Hedge Funds: A Report on the Findings of the FSA’s Hedge Fund Survey and
Hedge Fund as Counterparty Survey, Aug. 2012, at 3 [hereinafter FSA Systemic Risk Report],
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/hedge_funds.pdf.
38

For instance, in the US there used to be a private adviser exemption available for the hedge fund
managers to avoid the registration requirement, as a result they are also free from prudential
regulation, and at the same time they are free from mandatory disclosure requirements by relying
on the private offering exemption. Korea also provides special exemptions for hedge fund managers
not to be subject to the prudential regulation applicable to mutual fund managers, although they are
still subject to authorization and other obligations like having internal control and risk management
system in place, while they are relying on the private offering exemption to be free from the
disclosure obligations. By contrast, the UK requires hedge fund managers, instead of the funds, to
get authorization and be in compliance with broad principle based regulations, but it is relatively
lightly applied to them compared to other regulated entities considering the fact that they carry on
the business on a limited basis. See Infra Chapter IV, Part B.4; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part
C.1.
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transparent. All of this is possible because they are basically free from any
investment restrictions (e.g., leverages and concentration limitations) imposed on
the mutual funds relying on various safe harbor rules.39
This has been justified on the grounds that hedge funds are accessible only
to certain accredited investors, and that they are presumed to be sophisticated
enough to protect themselves vis-à-vis the managers.40
Third, performance based fee is a unique characteristic, commonly
observed in hedge funds, that is generally unavailable to mutual fund managers.41
What that means is that hedge fund managers typically charge 20% of the capital
gain or capital appreciation of the fund portfolio as a performance fee, in addition
to the general management fee (typically 1 or 2 percent of the assets under
management), subject to some hurdle rate and/or high-water mark conditions.42

39

See supra text accompanying note 36.

40

See e.g., S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 125.

41

Interestingly, Korean regime provides express rules for mutual fund managers to charge
performance-based fee in addition to the basic asset management fee based on the assets under
management on a limited basis. But it is practically unworkable due to very stringent threshold
conditions for that. See FSCMA, art. 86. See also SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 237-48
(illustrating in detail about how the performance-based fee works in the fund industry).
42

For instance, the US Investment Advisers Act prohibits any investment adviser from receiving
performance fee from the client unless the client is limited to “qualified client”. Thus, practically
speaking, under the US regime hedge fund manager is allowed to charge performance fee only to
qualified clients because they are now subject to the Advisers Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5(b)(2)(B);
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(d)(1). For the definition of hurdle rate and high
water mark, see e.g., Sangheon Shin et al., For whom hurdle rate and high-watermark exist?, Sept.
30, 2012, at 2, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2154639.
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It may be mutually beneficial for the investors and the managers as well in
that it may align the economic interests between them, 43 and may provide the
incentive for the managers to try to maximize the return. However, flipside here is
that it may create potential conflicts of interest problem inherent in the
compensation scheme particularly in terms of the valuation of portfolio assets.44
Fourth, hedge funds often limit the right of investors to redeem the fund
shares although it is basically up to mutual agreement, and it is not completely
barred. This is different from mutual funds because in principle mutual fund
investors are legally guaranteed the right to redeem the fund shares at any time at
their discretion.
It is also different from the private equity funds in that the private equity
funds usually have lock-up periods of 2 years or longer to ensure the success of the
private equity investment strategy; alternatively, hedge funds usually allow the
investors the right to redeem the fund shares at intervals.45
Both performance fee arrangements and seeding managers’ capital into the funds they manage
are pointed out as two primary tools to align economic interests between the managers and the
investors; this encourages the managers to exercise investment discretion that is in the best interests
of the investors. See e.g., Robert G. Grucht et al., No Direction: The Obama Administration’s
Financial Reform Proposal and Pending Legislation Proposing the Registration and Further
Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Pools of Equity are Overbroad and Fail to Address the
Actual Risks That These Funds Pose to the Financial System, 29 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 157, 16466 (Fall 2009).
43

44

See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20.

45

This two-year lock-up period provision has been used as a decisive indicator to distinguish
private equity funds from hedge funds, and it has been used in defining investment company under
the U.S. Investment Company Act. This distinction, however, has been under criticism in that
hedge funds are also able to utilize this 2-year lock-up safe harbor to avoid their registration
obligations if they intend to do so, and provide regulatory loophole accordingly. See e.g., Dissent of
Commissioners Cynthia A. Glassman and Paul S. Atkins to Proposing Release No. IA-2266:
Proposed Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/ia-2266.htm#dissent.
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Fifth, hedge fund is generally organized as a limited partnership or as a
limited liability company to avoid burdensome corporate regulation (e.g. corporate
governance) and double taxation onshore or offshore. 46 Special tax treatment is
usually available to limited partnerships or limited liability companies, and hedge
funds just make the most of the tax structure in choosing a jurisdiction as a fund
base.
This minimizes the potential negative tax implications for the managers
and investors, which is the primary reason why most of the hedge funds choose
these offshore “tax havens”. 47 That is, limited partnerships or limited liability
companies help hedge funds operate as a pass-through vehicles to avoid being
subject to double taxation, even if they are not registered or authorized as required
by the relevant rules and regulations.48
Sixth, the hedge fund market could be characterized as a so-called
“accredited investors” market in terms of the investor pools. It is a very important
46

Because of regulatory and/or tax reasons, it is very common to see hedge funds set up offshore,
which typically raises no or little regulatory concern in particular because, as explained infra, hedge
funds are free from regulation in the US and in the UK based on the private offering and/or private
fund safe harbor rules. As a result, there should be no serious jurisdictional conflict or jurisdictional
shopping/ regulatory evasion issues whether or not the onshore or offshore manager chooses an
offshore location for the fund base. However, it is more likely that extraterritorial application issue
should arise depending on the factual circumstances if there is a regime that directly regulates the
funds. See generally Douglas Cumming & Sofia Johan, Hedge Fund Forum Shopping, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 783 (Summer 2008).
47

See id. It should be noted, however, that it is not the only reason for hedge fund to choose
offshore, but rather regulatory or privacy consideration may be also taken into account. Many times,
offshore funds have been set up as a feeder fund to accommodate foreign investors’ needs and raise
capital from both onshore and offshore investors. See MARTIN CORNISH & I AN M ASON, U NITED
K INGDOM , IN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO HEDGE F UND REGULATION, (co-eds 2009), at 483.
48

See e.g., Donald J. Marples, Taxation of Hedge Fund and Private Equity Managers, June 20,
2013, at 2-3, available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS22689.pdf.
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feature that vividly distinguishes hedge funds from mutual funds, and one that is
closely interconnected with the private offering or private fund exemption.
Hedge funds have been able to avoid regulation primarily because of the
fact that they are permitted to offer or sell their shares only to accredited investors,
who are deemed financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves without
regulatory intervention.49
These safe harbor rules remain generally unchanged in the U.S. and the
U.K., and around the globe; the unique features of hedge funds illustrated above is
likely to be maintained without significant fundamental change, at least in terms of
the hedge fund itself.50
These features of hedge funds are not legally defined or legally recognized;
rather these are some of the characteristics observed in common in their actual
practices. Basically, all of these characteristics are the result of being unregulated,
and serve to clearly distinct from more heavily regulated funds like mutual funds.

C. How are Hedge Funds Distinct from Other Pooled Investment Funds?
To understand why hedge funds should be regulated and/or how to regulate
them, it is useful and important to figure out first how hedge funds are similar or
different from other pooled investment vehicles, and if they should be treated same

49

See infra Chapter III, Part B.1.

50

Some countries like Korea or Hong Kong provide regimes of directly regulating hedge funds in
some degree, but offshore funds domiciled in tax haven jurisdictions are also available. In that
sense, the hedge fund’s feature as an unregulated investment vehicle is still valid in general. For the
details of hedge fund regulation around the countries, see Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, Hedge Funds Oversight: Consultation Report, March
2009, at Annex 5, available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf.
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or differently accordingly. Below I will explore the similarities and differences
between hedge funds and other pooled investment vehicles focusing on the mutual
funds, private equity funds, and venture capital funds, among others.51

1. Hedge Funds versus Mutual Funds
Hedge funds and mutual funds are the same in substance in that they are
pooled investment vehicles specially established for securities investment purposes
on a collective basis.52 Thus, from a functional perspective, it goes without saying
that both should be subject to the same type of regulations, unless there are other
sufficient justifications for regulating them differently or for not regulating one and
heavily regulating the other.53 However, as further illustrated below, hedge funds
are different from mutual funds in many respects.

51

Hedge funds could be compared and contrasted with commodities pools or REITs (namely, Real
Estate Investment Trusts) as well in that they all are also pooled investment vehicles, but the main
difference between hedge funds and commodities pools or REITs is whether the invested assets are
primarily composed of securities or not. This paper will not be further explored the comparison
between hedge funds and commodities pool or REITs because commodities pools or REITS are
also subject to securities regulation because the funds’ interests should fall within the definition of
securities under the securities statutes, and they are outside the fund regulation under the US
Investment Company Act at the outset while they are also subject to fund regulation under the UK
and Korean fund regimes respectively. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA, art. 238; FSCMA, art.
6(5), 9(18).
52

See id.

53

From a functional regulatory standpoint, the UK (EU) and the Korean fund regimes seem more
reasonable compared to the US fund regime, because both broadly define the fund to cover every
type of collective investment fund (including commodity pools and REITs), while the US fund
regime (namely, the Investment Company Act) defines investment company narrowly to only cover
certain pooled investment funds that have been set up primarily for a securities investment purpose.
The UK and Korean regulatory approaches seem more desirable in terms of public interest and
investor protection because there is little doubt that the same rules and regulations should be evenly
applied to funds functioning equivalently in the market place, and investors should be protected
equally under the same or comparable regime(s). See id.
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First, hedge funds are similar to “mutual funds” (also known as regulated
“investment companies” or “collective investment schemes”) 54 in that both are
basically collective investment vehicles that raise capital from a pool of investors
by issuing securities, investing the capital in various assets such as securities or
derivatives, and doing so to provide investors with ample benefits such as portfolio
diversification and professional asset management by investment professionals
who are responsible for the day-to-day management of the funds.55 Some mutual
funds strive to mimic the hedge fund investment strategy, further making them
look similar to hedge funds.56
Unsurprisingly, however, hedge funds are different from mutual funds in
many respects. 57 The most distinguishable feature between them is that hedge

54

Typically, mutual funds refer to open-ended funds only, however, sometimes the term refers
more generally to regulated investment companies including closed-end funds. In this article, the
more general “regulated investment companies” will be used for mutual funds.
55

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3(a)(1); FSMA, art. 235; FSCMA, art. 6(4), 9(18).

In reality, many mutual fund advisers follow or refer to hedge funds’ investment strategies in
order to ensure stable return regardless of market fluctuation and to attract investors’ attention
accordingly. For example, fixed-income arbitrage or long-short equity investment strategies are
options for mutual fund advisers to pursue something comparable to absolute return or alpha
strategy which hedge funds typically pursue. See generally Citi Fund Services Inc., The
Convergence of Traditional and Alternative Investment Products: Regulatory and Operational
Considerations, in 17 INVESTMENT LAWYER 1 (Dec. 2010), available at
http://www.transactionservices.citigroup.com/transactionservices/home/securities_svcs/docs/71491
_eprint.pdf.
56

57

Alan L. Kennard, for example, summarized the differences between mutual fund and hedge fund
as follows: First, hedge funds are basically unregistered and thus are unregulated investment
vehicles, while mutual funds are heavily regulated. Second, investment minimums for hedge funds
are very large, while investment minimums for mutual funds are small and are not legally required.
Third, the number of investors is limited and certain investor eligibility tests are required for hedge
funds, while there are neither investor limitations nor investor eligibility tests are required for
mutual funds. Fourth, active and aggressive management through short selling and leverage is
available for hedge funds, while passive and defensive management are strongly recommended for
mutual funds through limitations on short selling and leverage limitation. Finally, hedge funds
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funds are typically free from onerous rules and regulations by relying on the safe
harbor rules while mutual funds are not.58 What that means is that hedge fund is
not typically subject to mandatory registration requirements and other regulatory
requirements such as periodic reporting, valuation, conflict of interest and asset
custody under the securities/fund regimes which are fully applicable to mutual
funds.59
In addition, although it varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, hedge funds
are different from mutual funds in terms of the manager regulation in that hedge
fund managers used to be not regulated or relatively lightly regulated while mutual
fund managers are to be registered with or authorized by the relevant regulatory
authorities and subject to full scope of regulation.60 Both are also different in terms
of fund governance because hedge funds typically have neither board of directors
nor independent directors while mutual funds are compelled to have board of
directors comprising the majority of independent directors.61

usually pursue absolute return strategy, while mutual funds pursue relative return strategy (i.e.,
mutual fund advisers typically try to beat the overall market index while hedge fund advisers
typically try to achieve highest return regardless of market condition). Kennard, The Hedge Fund
versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX LAW. 133, 133-34 (2003).
58

See supra text accompanying note 7.

59

See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1; Chapter V, Part B.3.

60

This private adviser exemption used to be the case observed in the U.S. regime before the DoddFrank Act has been in force since 2012, and under the Dodd-Frank Act this distinction becomes not
that clear because large hedge fund managers have become subject to the Advisers Act to the full
like mutual funds unless they are able to satisfy much more stringent private adviser exemptions
available for the mid-sized private advisers. See Dodd-Frank Act § 403.
61

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–16; Collect Investment Schemes Sourcebook 6 [hereinafter COLL],
available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COLL/6; FSCMA, art. 197-99.
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Additional difference can be found between them in terms of the scope of
investors’ pool. That is, hedge funds advisers are strictly restricted to offer or sell
the funds’ securities only to institutional investors or ultra-wealthy investors in
order to comply with the private placement safe harbor rule, while mutual fund
advisers have no problem selling the funds’ interests to unsophisticated and
unwealthy investing public.62
Based on this distinctive feature of hedge funds in terms of investor pools,
as indicated above, hedge funds have been able to avoid a set of securities and
fund regulation and no fundamental regulatory changes have been made even after
the new financial regulatory reform measures have been taken in the wake of the
global financial crisis of 2008.63

2. Hedge Funds versus Private Equity Funds
Both hedge funds and private equity funds are similar in that both are
unregulated or lightly regulated private pooled investment vehicles.
First, both are structured in a way to avoid fund regulation by relying on
various safe harbor rules. 64 The alternative investment strategies they operate
62

See supra text accompanying note 57.

63

See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.

64

It is true that they both may be subject to fund regulation to some extent depending on the
jurisdictions (e.g. Korea or Germany), but it is also true that both are supposed to be structured to
avoid the regulation as much as possible, and as a result they are subject to much lighter regulation
even where they are subject to regulation under certain jurisdictions. Furthermore, the fund
managers have flexibility to choose offshore as fund bases providing regulatory friendly
environments, so it should not be misleading to state that both hedge funds and private equity funds
are unregulated or unregistered fund in general.
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become possible just because they are not subject to the paternalistic fund
regulation typically applicable to mutual funds. To do so, they make their best
efforts to avoid registration or other regulatory requirements by relying on private
offering or private fund safe harbor rules although it varies from country to
country.65
Second, both are similar in that they are private funds. What that means is
that they are supposed to only market the funds to certain sophisticated investors
on a limited basis. That is the very reason why the regulators in many countries,
such as the US and the UK, have left them free from securities and/or fund
regulations, and why the regulators do not monitor the funds’ investment activities.
As such, they are not clearly distinguishable legally because there is no positive
legal definition available for them, and because they both rely on the same safe
harbor rules.66 Because of their private nature, it is generally understood that no
public advertisement or public solicitation is permitted for the funds because they
both have to satisfy the registration exemption rules.67 As a corollary, both need to
65

For example, both the US and the UK provide private placement and/or private fund safe harbor
rules for both onshore and offshore private funds to rely on, while Korea simply provides a lighter
regulatory regime in terms of onshore hedge fund regulation. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.1, 2;
Chapter VI, Part B.2, 3; Chapter VI, Part C.2.
66

What it implicates is that both funds are likely to become converged at some times depending on
the market circumstances, and this convergence phenomenon is possible because they are outside
the regulation and there is no clear and express legal distinction available for them. See e.g.
Houman B. Shadab, Coming Together after the Crisis: Global Convergence of Private Equity and
Hedge Funds, 29 NORTHWESTERN J. OF INT’L L. & BUS. 603 (2009) (demonstrating the trend of
convergence between the two major alternative investment markets especially after the global
financial crisis of 2008).
67

Section 506 of Regulation D under the Securities Act requires that public solicitation or public
advertisement be strictly prohibited in order to satisfy the private placement exemption. It is
noteworthy, however, that a new rule (i.e. Section 506(c) of Regulation D) provides additional and
more flexible safe harbor rules under the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (hereinafter JOBS
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offer or sell their securities by directly contacting affluent individuals or
institutional investors, or through a broker-dealer who has a pre-existing
relationship with the affluent investors to not violate the private offering or private
fund threshold conditions.68
Private equity funds are, however, different from hedge funds in some
respects.
First, private equity funds are more like closed-end funds, while hedge
funds are more like open-ended funds. All of the structural differences between
private equity funds and hedge funds may arise from this basic distinction. Openended funds (i.e., hedge funds here in this case) are funds that have flexibility in
raising capital from existing or new investors any time during the lifespan of the
fund, and at the same time get ready to redeem their shares on a periodic basis
upon investors’ request.

Act) that general solicitation or general advertisement be permitted on the conditions that the
purchase is limited to accredited investors only, and the issuer takes reasonable steps to make sure
that all purchasers are accredited investors. This new rule may affect a lot about the hedge fund
marketing practice because hedge funds can raise capital utilizing public media without particular
legal or regulatory concern about registration requirements under Section 5 of the Securities Act.
The U.S. SEC expressly confirmed that this new safe harbor provision will apply to hedge funds
without any limitations and consequently they can sell or offer the funds’ interests while
maintaining their 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) based exempted fund status under the Investment Company Act
if they meet this new safe harbor requirements. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General
Solicitation and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, Release No. 33-9354
(Aug. 29, 2012) [17 C.F.R. Pts 230, 239 and 242], at 31-32, availablea at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2013/33-9415.pdf.
68

The implication is that there should be little ground to treat them differently from an investor
protection regulatory perspective because their target investors are same in scope and there is little
need for direct regulatory intervention to protect them. See infra Chapter III.
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Because of this characteristic, hedge fund portfolios are typically
comprised of tradable assets and thus are more comparable to mutual funds.69 In
contrast, closed-end funds including private equity funds are funds that limit
investors’ right of redemption during the term of the fund to accommodate a
strategy of investing primarily in illiquid assets such as private companies’
securities.70
Second, private equity fund investors put their money into the fund for the
life of the fund, and additional contributions from the investors are made only in
response to the fund adviser’s request (commonly known as “capital call”). By
contrast, hedge fund investors, in principle, can liquidate their shares any time and
put all the capital in the fund initially. This difference arises because private equity
funds typically raise capital from investors each time they find a target company to
invest in, while hedge fund investors are free to choose when and how much to
invest in the fund.
In addition, private equity funds may distribute cash to its investors at the
end of its terms by selling its portfolio assets or by sometimes distributing portfolio

69

There is no legal requirement for the hedge funds to be structured as open-ended funds, and in
reality some of the hedge funds may have some limitation in place especially in terms of the
availability of the redemption in the private placement memorandum or their constituent documents.
However, hedge funds are typically structured in the form of an open-ended fund, and the structural
deviations have been made intentionally to maintain an unregulated fund status by having the 2
year lock-up provision in place under the U.S. Investment Advisers Act for some while until the
Dodd-Frank Act eliminated this provision. See infra Chapter IV, Part B.4.
70

For the legal definition of the closed-end fund, see 15 U.S.C. § 80a–5(a).
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securities directly to investors, while hedge funds may repurchase or redeem
investors’ securities at intervals during the life of the fund.71

3. Hedge Funds versus Venture Capital Funds
Both hedge funds and venture capital funds are of similar nature in that
basically they are unregulated private pooled investment vehicles, and their target
investors are limited to so-called accredited investors such as high net-worth
individuals and institutional investors. Venture capital funds, unlike hedge funds,
require investors to contribute capital over the life of the fund and to remain in the
fund for a certain period of time. That is, hedge fund investors can receive
distributions of capital at intervals by requesting that the adviser redeem their
shares, or dissolve the fund and liquidate assets.
Venture capital fund investors typically need to wait until the term of the
fund is due. In addition, venture capital funds have no secondary markets available
for their investors due to the illiquid nature of the invested portfolio (namely,
primarily investing in private and closed startup companies), and investors can
receive distributions only by liquidating the assets in the portfolio.72 By contrast,
hedge funds may hold some liquid assets (i.e., exchange traded securities) in
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For more detailed discussions about private equity funds, see e.g., Joseph W. Barlett & W. Eric
Swan, Private Equity Funds: What Counts and What Doesn’t?, 26 J. CORP. L. 393 (2001); T HOMAS
P. LEMKE, ET AL., HEDGE FUNDS AND O THER P RIVATE FUNDS: REGULATION AND COMPLIANCE ,
at 282-84 (2009-2010 ed. 2009).
72

See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 8; LEMKE, ET AL., supra note 71, at 284-85.
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addition to illiquid assets, and thus can dispose of the assets to distribute the
proceeds to investors relatively easily.73
Another distinguishable feature of venture capital funds is that venture
capital fund advisers are often actively involved in the target companies’ day-today operations because they sit on the board of directors of the companies they
invest in.74
Further, under the US Dodd-Frank Act, venture capital funds have been
legally defined in a way that exempts them from registration and other compliance
requirements formerly required of them under the Advisers Act, making venture
capital funds more clearly distinct from other private funds like hedge funds or
private equity funds.75
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See id.

74

In this regard, venture capital funds are more like private equity funds, but remain different from
them in that the former typically invest in small or mid-sized startup companies while the latter are
more likely to invest in mature companies. See id.
Rule 203(l)-1(a) under the Investment Advisers Act defines venture capital fund as “any private
fund that:
75

(1) Represents to investors and potential investors that it pursues a venture capital strategy;
(2) Immediately after the acquisition of any asset, other than qualifying investments or short-term
holdings, holds no more than 20 percent of the amount of the fund's aggregate capital contributions
and uncalled committed capital in assets (other than short-term holdings) that are not qualifying
investments, valued at cost or fair value, consistently applied by the fund;
(3) Does not borrow, issue debt obligations, provide guarantees or otherwise incur leverage, in
excess of 15 percent of the private fund's aggregate capital contributions and uncalled committed
capital, and any such borrowing, indebtedness, guarantee or leverage is for a non-renewable term of
no longer than 120 calendar days, except that any guarantee by the private fund of a qualifying
portfolio company's obligations up to the amount of the value of the private fund's investment in the
qualifying portfolio company is not subject to the 120 calendar day limit;
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4. Private Equity Funds versus Venture Capital Funds
As indicated above, both venture capital funds and private equity funds are
similar in nature because they are private pooled investment funds, and because
they used to rely on the private fund exemptions to avoid regulation. They are also
similar in that they both target private companies for investment on a long-term
basis, and are actively involved in the management of the companies they invest
in.76
On the other hand, venture capital funds are still distinguishable from
private equity funds in that the former typically invest in early stage startup
companies, while the latter usually invest in mature companies. Because of this
distinctive investment nature, some differences can be observed between them in
terms of target companies, deal structure, liquidity, and the like.77
As indicated above, the demarcation between hedge funds, private equity
funds, and venture capital funds are not legally made – rather, it has been made
from the practical business perspectives. It has been traditionally perceived that in
many respects private equity funds are more like venture capital funds, than hedge
(4) Only issues securities the terms of which do not provide a holder with any right, except in
extraordinary circumstances, to withdraw, redeem or require the repurchase of such securities but
may entitle holders to receive distributions made to all holders pro rata; and
(5) Is not registered under section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, and has not elected to
be treated as a business development company pursuant to section 54 of that Act. See 17 C.F.R. §
275.203(l)-1(a).
76

Due to this nature of investment, a venture capital fund may be referred to as being part of a
private equity fund in a broad sense of meaning. See LEMKE , ET AL., supra note 71, at 284.
77

For the detailed comparisons between them, see David M. Freedman, The Difference between
Private Equity and Venture Capital, available at
http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/article/the-difference-between-private-equity-venturecapital/.
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funds, although the boundary between them is not entirely clear. Also, there is a
tendency for the funds to converge depending on the market situations.78

D. What Benefits Hedge Funds May Provide to the Market?

It has been generally acknowledged and accepted that hedge funds provide
significant meaningful benefits to both investors and the financial market at large,
as summarized below.79
From an investor’ standpoint, the portfolio diversification effect, achieved
through hedge fund investment, is very useful because unlike regulated mutual
fund advisers, the hedge fund advisers typically pursue absolute returns regardless
of whether market condition is bullish or not.
The absolute return investment strategy utilized by hedge funds has been
gaining more attention from potential investors - particularly when the market is
bearish and mutual fund performance is not favorable - because hedge funds
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Venture capital fund has been newly and legally defined under the Dodd-Frank Act intentionally
for the purpose of exempting them from registration requirement under the US Advisers Act while
the former two years of lock up safe harbor provision in place for the private equity fund has been
eliminated, and they are also in principle subject to registration requirement. In so doing, there was
a regulatory effort made intentionally to classify private equity funds into private funds, and treat
private equity funds more like as hedge funds, rather than like venture capital funds, and this
legislative or regulatory distinction has been justified on the ground that private equity funds have
also the potential to pose systemic risk like hedge funds, while venture capital funds does not. That
is, in terms of economic substance, private equity funds are more similar to venture capital funds,
but legally and intentionally are treated more like hedge funds placing them under the regulatory
purview similar to hedge funds. See Dodd-Frank Act § 403, 407, 408.
79

See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 4-5; MFA Comments, supra note 30, at 4-6;
P HOEBUS ATHANASSIOU , HEDGE F UND REGULATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: CURRENT
T RENDS AND FUTURE P ROSPECTS 91-99 (2009).
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achieve relatively positive returns regardless of market condition. In other words,
hedge funds provide the investors with the opportunity to mitigate the portfolio
volatility risk by diversifying the investors’ portfolio to achieve stable portfolio
returns, and by actively participating in a wide variety of financially innovative
products and markets typically unavailable in traditional financial markets.80
Another advantage to investing in hedge funds is that hedge funds advisers
typically contribute their own capital into the funds they manage, and their
compensation is closely linked to the funds’ return via a performance-based fee.
Consequently, the interest between investors and fund advisers is aligned,
providing an incentive for the fund advisers to manage the fund in the best
interests of the investors.81
From the financial market standpoint, hedge funds also play a constructive
role in various ways. 82 First of all, hedge funds can function as buffer against
market shock because hedge fund investment strategies such as arbitrage, hedging
or other counter-market approaches help absorb market disruption.83 In so doing,
hedge funds may provide liquidity to the market irrespective of the market
80

See id.

81

Mutual fund advisers also put their capital into the fund when they organize funds. But the
amount of contribution is usually minimal and they are able to at any time redeem or resell their
shares in the fund by selling the shares in the market or exercise redemption right to the fund.
Additionally, their fee structure is typically flat or fixed to a certain percentage of the assets under
management. Thus, it is likely that mutual fund advisers have fewer incentives to do their best in
the management of the fund compared to hedge fund managers. See supra text accompanying note
43.
82

See supra note 79.

83

For the details of a variety of hedge fund investment strategies in general, see e.g., LEMKE, ET
AL., supra note 71, at 2-6.
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condition, may play an affirmative role as market stabilizer, and may reduce the
possibility of severe price fluctuation in extremely serious market conditions.
Second, hedge funds could also play a positive role in the market in that
they might enhance market liquidity by actively participating in global financial
markets on a continuous basis. For the same reason, they are also in the position to
help improve pricing systems and to mitigate market instability by active trading
based on extensive market research and capital commitment. Hedge Fund trading
signals to other market participants that the price currently quoted in the
marketplace may be distorted, which eventually helps narrow the price spread and
mitigate the then existing pricing inefficiency and illiquidity.
Third, hedge funds are likely to take contrary positions to those taken
during the herding market behavior, which drives prices down to a reasonable
market price, by serving as a counterbalance to the price bubbles and inflated
market prices typically created by the herding market behavior.84
Fourth, hedge funds can supply liquidity to illiquid markets. Hedge fund
investors typically are not allowed to liquidate their investments for a certain
period of time under their subscription agreement. During that time period, hedge

All these hedge funds’ market activities are possible because hedge funds are flexible enough to
sell or buy the portfolio assets at any time to adjust the portfolio whenever they perceive other
market participants’ unreasonable behavior. By contrast, mutual funds are not flexible enough to
switch the fund portfolio in a timely manner because they are generally subject to buy-and-hold
strategy as disclosed in the prospectus and their advisers have no discretion to change the fund
investment policy without investors’ advance approval. See supra note 79.
84
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fund advisers are able to invest in illiquid assets such as unlisted securities,
speculative securities (e.g., junk bonds), or OTC derivative contracts.85
In sum, it has been widely acknowledged that hedge funds play positive
roles in the market in various ways leading many countries to decide not to
regulate the hedge funds directly or to lightly regulate them, even after the 2008
financial crisis. There has also been increasing sentiment worldwide that reinforces
the position against regulating hedge funds directly.86

85

Compared to hedge funds, mutual funds are usually limited to invest in illiquid assets because
they have to be always ready to redeem their shares in response to the existing investors’ request.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–22.
86

It would be the best and most efficient resolution to regulate hedge funds directly and restrict
their investment activities in the marketplace like regulated mutual funds if their potentially
negative impacts on the market were greater than the potential benefits from them. However, major
jurisdictions like the US and the UK, where many hedge fund managers are based, choose not to
regulate hedge funds directly because those countries acknowledge that the benefits from hedge
funds far outweigh any negative impacts on the market. See infra Chapter III, Part B.2.
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Main Issues Regarding Hedge Fund Regulation

III.

Unsurprisingly, hedge funds have been a regulatory “hot potato” over
several decades partly because of their rapid growth in size and their bad
reputations caused by some high-profile hedge fund episodes. But, nearly all the
concerns and arguments about them have been derived from the fact that they have
been outside the regulatory purview during a time when their role in the market
continues to rise, and thus, when their potential impacts on the market at large
have become substantial.87 Before having a closer look at the specific hedge fund
regulatory regimes of the US, UK, and Korea, it is worth first exploring some of
the fundamental issues underlying hedge fund regulation.

A. Should Hedge Funds be Regulated or Not?
It has been a controversial issue whether or not hedge fund should be
subject to securities or fund regulation in full or in part. Various relevant parties
have expressed their views, but there has been no consensus made about this issue
among the countries worldwide or even within a particular country.88
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See generally Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Hedge Funds Oversight: Consultation Report (March 2009) [hereinafter Hedge Fund Oversight],
available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD288.pdf; SEC Hedge Fund Report,
supra note 28.
88

See e.g., Troy A. Paredes, Hedge Funds and the SEC: Observations on the How and Why of
Securities Regulation, Seminar on Current Developments in Monetary and Financial Law (Oct. 2327, 2006), available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/seminars/eng/2006/mfl/tap.pdf; Andrew
Crockett, The Evolution and Regulation of Hedge Funds, In Financial Stability Review – Speicial
Issue on Hedge Funds 19 (April 2007).
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However, in the wake of high-profile hedge fund scandals and financial
crises, the trend in the recent decades is toward pro-regulation. 89 Nonetheless,
major jurisdictions like the U.S. and the U.K., where most hedge fund managers
are currently domiciled, have not changed their previous regulatory position that,
despite the financial scandals that occurred in the past decades intermittently,
hedge funds should not be directly subject to the heavy-handed securities or fund
regulations applicable to mutual funds.90
The position in the U.S. and the U.K. against direct fund regulation is based
on the fundamental belief that fund regulations should focus on protecting
unaccredited and unsophisticated investors from the potential risk of frauds and on
ensuring their informed investment decisions through the use of mandatory
disclosure requirements.91
Considering the facts that hedge funds typically have been offered or sold
only to sophisticated investors, such as affluent individuals and institutional
investors, and that hedge funds have played an overall positive role in the global

89

For example, LTCM near-collapse in 1998 and financial market crises in late 1990s and late
2000s were catalysts for this debate, and pro-regulatory efforts have been made in one way or
another among the jurisdictions based on these empirical observations. It was premised on the
belief or observation that those incidents were possible because hedge funds have not been tightly
regulated or closely monitored although it is not clearly proven whether they really caused the
systemic risk or overall market instability. See e.g. Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87, at Annex
5; FSA Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37. See also Crockett, supra note 88; Robert J. Bianchi &
Michael E. Drew, Hedge Fund Regulation and Systemic Risk, 19 GRIFFITH L. REV. 6 (2010). See
contra Barbara Crutchfield George, et al., The Opaque and Under-Regulated Hedge Fund Industry:
Victim or Culprit in the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 5 N.Y.U.J.L. & BUS. 359 (Summer 2009).
90

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); AIFMD, explanatory note 10.

91

See e.g., Phillip A. Loomis, Jr., The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment
Advisers Act of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 214, 226 (1959-1960).
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marketplace, there are not many persuasive grounds for regulating hedge fund
directly.9293
However, there may be counter arguments in support of regulation from
investor protection, functional regulation, and market stability perspectives.94
First, due to changes in market circumstances compared to the times when
the relevant laws and regulations after the relevant laws and regulations were
enacted, many substantively unaccredited investors have been exposed to the
hedge fund market based on the lower accredited investor threshold conditions, or
through pension funds or fund of hedge funds (commonly known as a
“retailization” concern or problem).95
92

It should be noted that the private adviser exemption clause is a bit different from other safe
harbor provisions under the US securities or fund regime. Other safe harbor provisions, like private
offering exemption or private fund exemption, are based on the policy rationale that sophisticated
investors are in a position to “fend for themselves”, and accordingly that there is no practical need
to regulate the fund and its offering or sale of fund interests vis-à-vis so-called accredited investors
or comparable financially sophisticated investors. Private adviser exemptions are based the
rationale that private adviser’s client base is very limited and the size of the fund they manage is
also insubstantial, and as a result they may have little impacts on the market and cause no serious
concern for investor protection, although they may have a limited number of retail investors as their
clients. In essence the private adviser safe harbor rule should be understood in the same way as
private offering or private fund safe harbor rules in the hedge fund regulation context because it is
premised on the fact that only accredited investors or comparable investors are accessible to the
hedge fund market, and assumes that they engage in hedge fund business only. See S.E.C. v.
Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40. See also Testimony Concerning Regulating Hedge Funds and
Other Private Investment Pools Before the Subcommittee on Securities, Insurance, and Investment
of the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009)
(statement of Andrew J. Donohue, Director, Division of Investment Management, U.S. SEC),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2009/ts071509ajd.htm.
93

For more detailed discussions why not to regulate hedge funds and their managers, see e.g., Troy
A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC’s Regulatory Philosophy, Style,
and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975, 989, 997, n. 91 (2006).
94

See id. at 991-92; Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of
Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1 (2004).
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See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 80-82.
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Based on this observation, it has been argued that the same rules and
regulations applied to mutual funds should be applied to the hedge funds, at least
to some extent; on the ground that hedge fund investors are not genuinely
sophisticated enough to protect themselves, making direct regulatory intervention
is necessary.96 In reality, in countries such as Germany, Hong Kong, and Korea,
private funds are also subject to fund regulations; however, they are lighter
regulations than those applied to mutual funds.97
In addition, increasing hedge fund regulation may be argued from a
functional regulatory standpoint as well. That is, even under the US or Korean
private fund regimes, unaccredited or unsophisticated retail investors are likely to
be involved in one way or another.98
Thus, private fund advisers should be subject to regulation because they
may have unaccredited or unsophisticated investors as their clients and because
they provide essentially the same investment advisory services as mutual fund
managers.99
96

See id. See also Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions, Regulatory and Investor Protection Issues Arising from the Participation by Retail
Investors in Hedge Funds (Feb. 2003), available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD142.pdf; Athanassiou, supra note 79, at 52-59;
Wolf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund Valuation: Retailization, Regulation, and Investor Suitability, 28 REV.
B. & FIN. L. 581, 601-11 (2008-2009).
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See CORNISH & M ASON, supra note 47, at 131-43, 187-210; FSCMA, art. 249-2.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2007); FSCMA, art. 249-2(1).
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See e.g., Anita K. Krug, Institutionalization, Investment Adviser Regulations, and the Hedge
Fund Problem, 63 HASTINGS L. J. 1 (2011); Steven M. Davidoff, Paradigm Shift: Federal
Securities Regulation in the New Millennium, 2 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COMP. L. 339 (Spring 2008)
(exploring about why investment adviser regulation is necessary especially from the
institutionalization perspective).
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Second, from a market stability or systemic risk standpoint, there are
concerns about and arguments made for more stringent and mandatory rule-based
hedge fund regulations - particularly since the subprime mortgage crisis of 2008 and these concerns and arguments have been legislatively reflected in the DoddFrank Act in 2010 in the US and the AIFMD in 2011 in the EU, among other
countries.100
Interestingly, systemic risk and financial market stability issues were
initially discussed in the U.S. after the near-collapse and subsequent bailouts of
Long Term Capital Management (hereinafter as “LTCM”) back in 1998, but
regulatory concerns at that time were centered more on the investor protection or
mandatory disclosure side, not on the systemic risk side.101
From the systemic risk control standpoint, there was a broad consensus
among local U.S. regulators and market participants that reinforcing market
discipline through best practices, and not through direct governmental intervention,
would be a more cost-efficient resolution for mitigating the systemic risk and for
preventing the reoccurrence of LTCM-like incidents going forward.102
100

See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.
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The SEC issued a staff report about hedge fund problems in 2003, some years after LTCM
episode in 1998, but the primary concern in the report was that many securities fraud cases had
occurred where inadequate disclosure had been made by the hedge fund managers due to lack of
regulation or safe harbor rules (i.e., private adviser exemption) despite the retailization problem.
See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-88.
102

See e.g., Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management, Report
of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, April 1999, at 25-26 [hereinafter PWG
Report], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Documents/hedgfund.pdf;
General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional Requesters, Long-Term Capital Management:
Regulators Need to Focus Greater Attention on Systemic Risk (Oct. 1999) [hereinafter GAO
Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/230/228446.pdf; General Accounting Office,
Report to Congressional Requesters, Hedge Funds: Regulators and Market Participants are Taking

39

However, after the subprime mortgage market collapse and the following
global financial crisis of 2008, together with the securitization and regulatory gap
problems with the over-the-counter derivatives market, hedge funds were
pinpointed as the source of direct or indirect systemic risk despite having no clear
empirical evidences for that.103
Legislators and regulators around the world began paying attention to the
hedge funds as one of the systematically important financial institutions, and have
tried to regulate hedge funds and/or their managers accordingly.

104

As a

consequence, the U.S. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was amended by the
Dodd-Frank Act, and mandatory registration regime for hedge fund advisers was

Steps to Strenghthen Market Discipline, but Continued Attention is Needed (Jan. 2008), available
at http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-200;Technical Committee of the International
Organization of Securities Commissions, Mitigating Systemic Risk: A Role for Securities
Regulators (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter IOSCO Systemic Risk Report], available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD347.pdf.
For example, the Amaranth Adviser’s case, i.e. another high-profile hedge fund’s collapse, took
place in 2006 after the LTCM debacle in 1998. Unlike in LTCM, there was no public or private
bailout occurred to deal with this incident, and the shock was absorbed by the market itself. For
more information, see Hillary Till, The Amaranth Case : Early Lessons From The Debacle,
EDHEC Risk & Asset Management Research Centre, October 2, 2006. Bear Sterns’ affiliated two
hedge funds’ failures in 2007 are examples directly linked to subprime mortgage related financial
product like CDOs, but it was also resolved among the relevant parties and there was no subsequent
systemic risk related event resulting from this hedge fund failure. For the details about the Bear
Sterns’ hedge funds’ failure, see Kate Kelly et al., Two Big Funds at Bear Sterns Face Shutdown,
WALL ST. J., June 20, 2007, available at
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB118230204193441422.
103
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For instance, the U.S. tried to deal with hedge fund related systemic risk concerns indirectly
through regulating hedge fund advisers and designating some hedge funds or their advisers as
systematically important non-financial institutions, among other things. The EU also made
regulatory efforts to put special regimes in place focusing on the alternative investment fund market,
regulating hedge fund market indirectly by regulating the advisers. See Dodd-Frank Act § 113;
Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies, 12
C.F.R. § 1310, Release No. 70, 70 Fed. Reg. 21637, (April 11, 2012); AIFMD, explanatory note 2,
10, 49.
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introduced in the U.S., and a similar regulatory regime targeting alternative
investment fund managers was also put in place in the EU.105
Insufficient regulatory access to the hedge fund market and a lack of
regulatory monitoring tools over it were reasons why mandatory registration was
necessary from the regulatory standpoint in the U.S.106 Many arguments have been
made from this regulatory perspective, and hedge fund market monitoring was
perceived to be essential to proactively preventing potential market disruptions
from the hedge fund failures.107
Third, the size of the hedge funds and their activities in the global financial
market have become more notable over the recent decades, together with the
institutionalization phenomenon, and there were increased concerns and pressures
from both investors and legislators to more strictly regulate them than ever.108
The then-existing “fewer than 15 clients” safe harbor rule under the
Advisers Act was considered insufficient to effectively regulate hedge funds and
mitigate their potentially negative impacts on the financial market, in part, because
105

More precisely speaking and as further discussed in infra Chapter IV, the mandatory registration
requirements for the hedge fund advisers in the U.S. were firstly introduced in 2004 and
implemented in 2006. However, it was short-lived until the Federal circuit court invalidated SEC’s
amendment of the Rule under the Advisers Act based on the ground of lacking legislative authority.
For more details, see Goldstein v. S.E.C., 451 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
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See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 74-75, 94-95.
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As pointed out supra, systemic risk based policy consideration was not taken into account when
the SEC first endeavored to introduce a mandatory hedge fund adviser registration regime in 2003.
Rather, this hedge fund information access concern was raised based more on other policy grounds,
such as investor protection or fraud detection. See id. at 92-96.
108

For example, Professor Troy A. Paredes illustrates the reasons why SEC has continuously made
an effort to regulate hedge fund advisers over decades particularly based on these observations. See
Paredes, supra note 93, at 989.

41

the “look through” rule was no longer in force after the court’s invalidation of the
SEC’s 2006 hedge fund rule,109 and fund size, rather than the number of clients,
became more important from the systemic risk regulatory perspective. In that
regard, it seems appropriate for both legislators and regulators to seek to regulate
hedge funds and their managers based on their size and/or leverage, not by their
number of clients.110
It should be noted, however, that no one-size-fits-all approach (i.e. an
almost all inclusive rule-based registration requirement) would be appropriate,
particularly in terms of hedge fund regulation, because of the heterogeneous nature
of the private fund market, and because assessing and preventing systemic risk
from hedge funds by the regulators (especially securities regulators) may not be an
easy mandate to undertake. Further, it is likely that high-profile financial incidents
will happen occasionally even with a rigorous regime in place.111

B. How to Regulate Hedge Funds?
Despite many conflicting opinions and arguments raised thus far, it appears
that global consensus has been made since the global financial crisis of 2008 that
more stringent regulation of hedge funds is necessary, despite the hedge fund
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See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105.
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See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102.
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As a matter of fact, many big-sized and heavily regulated financial institutions such as Lehman
Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and AIG were bailed out or merged in the turmoil of the
subprime mortgage related financial crisis of 2008 in the US. See e.g., Steve Denning, Lest We
Forget: Why We Had a Financial Crisis, FORBES, Nov. 22, 2011, available at
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2011/11/22/5086/ (summarizing the background history
of the crisis of 2008).
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regulatory framework varying from country to country, and that this regulatory
reform has been justified mainly from a macro-prudential or a systemic risk
regulatory perspective.112 That being said, at issue now is how to regulate hedge
funds and to what extent they should be subject to regulation. With regard to these
issues, several different regulatory approaches may be taken into consideration as
follows:113

1. No Direct Regulation Approach
The first possible regulatory alternative is to maintain the then-existing
regimes and keep hedge funds and their managers outside the regulatory purview,
as observed in the U.S. before the global financial crisis of 2008, and to take no
further regulatory action to directly regulate them, basically counting on market
participants to be self-disciplined.
This regulatory approach used to be generally supported and was reflected
into the regulatory regime in the U.S. before the Dodd-Frank Act came into effect
in 2011. 114 Basically, securities regulators refrain from directly exercising their
regulatory power or authority and wait see what the relevant market players do in
112

See Dodd-Frank Act, preliminary note; AIFMD, explanatory note 2, 3; IOSCO Systemic Risk
Report, supra note 102, at 12-13.
113

For more detailed overview about possible regulatory alternatives, see e.g., Paredes, supra note
88, at 4-15; ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, at 191-265.
The U.K.’s regulatory model is somewhat similar to that of the U.S., at least from the fund
regulatory perspective, in that onshore private funds are exempted from regulatory oversight
provided that the fund units are not offered or sold to the general public and that their managers are
subject to licensing and ongoing obligations, and offshore private funds are also outside the local
regulatory purview unless they are marketed to the investing public. For more details, see infra
Chapter V, Part B.
114
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the marketplace, encouraging them to regulate themselves by relying on best
practices or guidelines for the funds, fund managers, and their counterparties,
made and released by (quasi) self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”) in cooperation
with the regulators, effectively minimizing the regulators’ direct intervention.115
This regulatory approach is based on the premise and belief that the thenexisting regulation and safe harbor rules, as well as the general anti-fraud rules,
had sufficiently functioned without serious regulatory problems or concerns
despite the fact that high-profile financial scandals took place occasionally.116
In fact, hedge funds and their managers have been regulated to some extent
even under the then-existing regime in the U.S.: They have been subject to antifraud rules under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, and they owe fiduciary duties-like disclosure, avoidance of
conflicts of interest, and managing the fund assets in the best interest of the funds
or their beneficial owners (i.e., underlying shareholders).117 In addition, they are
subject to various securities related rules and regulations such as reporting
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More precisely speaking, under the then-existing US regime, hedge funds and their managers are
almost completely able to avoid regulatory oversight relying on the then-available safe harbor rules,
and the securities regulators were in the position to enforce them on an ex-post basis against their
malpractices under the general anti-fraud rules. For the detailed U.S safe harbor rules available to
the hedge funds and their managers before the Dodd-Frank Act was in force in 2011, see infra
Chapter IV, Part B.
116

See supra note 103.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. Regarding the broad applicability of the antifraud rule (i.e., Rule 10b-5), see generally DONNA M. N AGI ET AL., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND
ENFORCEMENT: C ASES AND MATERIALS (M AR. 2013).
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requirement for the holdings of the reporting companies and insider trading or
market manipulation rules under the Securities Exchange Act. 118
Overall, this approach is based on the conventional belief that the hedge
fund market should be well-functioning even without direct governmental
intervention119 because it is a market for accredited investors only and they are
legally deemed sophisticated enough to “fend for themselves”.
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Further,

institutional investors like pension funds or financial institutions participate in the
hedge fund market as investors, creditors and/or counterparties. There is little
doubt that they are in the position to negotiate with the hedge fund managers on an
arm’s length basis, and that they are economically self-incentivized and bestpositioned to oversee the managers’ activities themselves or with the help of third
party service providers such as fund rating agencies.121
Thus, at least in terms of a micro-prudential regulatory perspective (i.e.,
from investor protection and/or deterrence of market fraud standpoint), it appears
that existing regimes may be working relatively well and there may not be
sufficient changes in factual or regulatory circumstances to the extent necessary to
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See infra Chapter IV, Part B.
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See e.g., Houman B. Shadab, The Law and Economics of Hedge Funds: Financial Innovation
and Investor Protection, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 240, 295-97 (2009) (arguing that flexible
regulation allowing financial innovation together with performance based fee and managerial coinvestment would enhance investor protection even without further regulation).
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See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40.
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See Paredes, supra note 88. See contra Schwarcz, supra note 94 (arguing that the deemed
sophisticated investors are not sophisticated enough to understand certain complex financial
products, and accordingly need governmental protection).
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justify changing the existing rules and underlying principles for various safe harbor
rules.122
This approach, however, may have inherent problems in that unaccredited
investors can access the hedge fund markets in some ways.123 In addition, due to
the increasing complexity of innovative financial products, even accredited
investors may have difficulty completely understanding about the hedge funds they
invest in and their investment strategies or potential risks.124
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Some may argue that with the institutionalization phenomenon on one hand, and the
securitization phenomenon together with the increase in hedge fund exposure from retail investors
on the other hand, the direct regulation of the funds and their managers may be justified. See e.g.,
Krug, supra note 99. However, these phenomena may not necessarily justifying the direct
regulation of the funds market because in principle these ideas may be reflected implicitly in the
original legislation and dealt with even under current regulatory regime based on mandated
disclosure for the general public (i.e., unsophisticated investors) from investor protection standpoint.
Even from a systemic risk perspective, although it has not reflected in the original securities
regulation, it could be dealt with in a different way (by regulating products, counterparties, and/or
investors as well as by market discipline), and accordingly it could not be concluded that the
securities regulation must be shifted fundamentally to directly and fully regulate them to ensure the
financial stability. See e.g., Crockett, supra note 88, at 19 et seq.
123

For instance, unaccredited investors are directly accessible to the hedge funds subject to
sophistication test under the US Regulation D on a limited basis, and they are also able to invest in
the hedge funds indirectly via fund of funds, trust or segregated management account. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506(b)(ii). See also supra text accompanying note 22.
This problem could be resolved by limiting unaccredited investors’ direct access to hedge funds
or making higher threshold conditions for accredited investors. Nobody, including institutional
investors, is sophisticated enough to understand everything for sure about the hedge funds and their
investment strategies as well as investment risks, but assume that current securities regime based on
mandated disclosure should be maintained and it is necessary and inevitable to distinguish private
market from public market, accredited investors concept is necessary and they should be deemed
financially sophisticated enough to be outside direct regulatory intervention. Otherwise, it is
practically impossible to comply with the rules or it is more likely very time and cost inefficient.
Recent SEC’s rulemaking under the JOBS Act that permits hedge funds to market to the investing
public on the condition that the actual purchaser are strictly limited to accredited investors only
may be regarded as one of the significant regulatory efforts made in this direction. See infra text
accompanying note 227.
124
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More than anything else, this regulatory option is problematic because it is
not ready to answer for the systemic stability concerns raised in the wake of the
global financial crisis of 2008; this is not what the then-existing securities and fund
regimes had taken into consideration when they were originally enacted.125

2. Regulating Funds only Approach
Another option is to regulate the hedge fund directly, while leaving the
managers unregulated or lightly regulated. This alternative should be based on the
belief that the best way to deal with hedge fund problems in terms of investor
protection, deterrence of market abuse, and market stability, is to directly regulate
hedge funds’ highly risky and leveraged investment activities. 126 Regulatory
concerns - such as insufficient disclosure, market frauds and market instability posed by the hedge funds may be handled more effectively and efficiently if they
are regulated directly.
By imposing various disclosure and diversification requirements, business
conduct rules, and leverage limitations, regulators will directly respond to the
regulatory concerns raised, which is the very way that regulators deal with the
mutual fund market.127
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See supra note 107.
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Mutual fund-like regulation such as restricting leveraged transactions and/or mandating portfolio
diversification would be the best way to directly regulate hedge funds, and it would be the most
effective way to regulate them particularly from the systemic risk-based regulatory perspective.
127

All these regulatory restrictions and governmental preemptive regulatory measures have been
justified because the investing public may be directly exposed to the market, and they are the very
persons that should be protected under the governmental regulatory umbrella. See e.g., 15 U.S.C. §
80a–1(b).
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This regulatory alternative cannot be commonly observed in many
countries around the world, but Korea may be an example of a country adopting
this approach.128 Under the FSCMA, both private equity funds and hedge funds
have been subject to direct regulatory supervision while managers of the private
equity funds had been exempted from direct regulations such as licensing or
registration requirement. 129 That is, on the one hand, there are some regulatory
requirements about leverage, code of business conduct, valuation and reporting
requirements in place governing private equity funds under the FSCMA, while, on
the other hand, no registration or licensing obligation is required for the managers.
As a consequence, the managers are allowed to do almost everything
themselves without regulatory concerns, such as the fund establishment, the fund
marketing, and the fund assets custody on the condition that their investment
activities are made in compliance with the so-called management participatory
investments such as 10% or more of the target company’s equity holdings with
voting right and they raise capital on a private placement basis.130
128

What should be noted is that Korean regime took this fund regulation only approach vis-à-vis
private equity funds, not hedge funds. But it is still somewhat meaningful in contemplating how to
design hedge fund regulatory architecture in that they both are of similar nature in many respects
and there is an increasing tendency to regulate them under the same regulatory regime. In
accordance with this global regulatory consensus, the Korean regulator changed its position and
now regulates the managers as well as the funds in terms of Private equity Fund regulation by
amending the relevant rules and regulations in May 2013. See FSCMA, art. 272-2.
129

As indicated in supra note 127, this fund only regulatory approach has been repealed in Korea,
and the managers for private equity funds are now subject to registration and reporting
requirements under the revised FSCMA, which took effect in May 2013, although they are subject
to somewhat different and lighter regulation than hedge funds’ managers. See FSCMA, art 249-2,
272-2.
130

This is somewhat uncommon approach in that the manager, not the fund itself, is the very person
responsible for day-to-day management of the fund’s investment activities. Thus it would be a very
rare and exceptional case, and not easy to take this position in general in designing the regulatory
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This regulatory option, however, has somewhat inherent critical limitations
and accordingly is difficult to consider as a viable regulatory option, in part
because fund-focused regulation may be easily avoided by establishing the fund
offshore.131 Undoubtedly, the manager is also a more important and more relevant
regulatory target in that the manager is a real entity, the very person in charge of
day-to-day activities of the fund, while the fund itself is a kind of a special purpose
investment vehicle utilized by the manager to achieve their goals.
In addition, A fundamental problematic part of this option is that it may
confuse the distinction between the mutual funds and the private funds; also, there
are few justifiable grounds to regulate them directly, at least from the microprudential regulatory standpoint, assuming that they are only marketed to a limited
pool of accredited investors and that they are strictly prohibited from marketing to
the investing public. Further, it is also problematic to only regulate the funds
because doing so is likely to deter the financial innovation and market efficiency,
promoted by a friendlier regulatory environment.132

framework vis-à-vis private funds including hedge funds and private equity funds. See
ganjeobtuzajasanunyongebbeob [Indirect Investment Asset Management Business Act], Act. No.
7221, Gwanbo 15811, Oct. 5, 2004, at 19.
131

The extraterritorial application issue may arise in this situation, but it may be extremely difficult
for the local regulators to detect these law evasion cases, largely because basically the funds and
their managers both are out of the regulator’s oversight.
132

That is the very reason why the U.S. and the EU take regulatory positions not to regulate the
private funds directly, but to regulate the managers instead. See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V,
Part C.
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3. Regulating Fund Managers Only Approach
A third regulatory alternative is to regulate the hedge fund managers, while
the funds remain unregulated. This approach is predicated on the belief that it
would be better to leave hedge funds unregulated, considering the overall market
benefits they create are derived from the fact that they have been unregulated.133 It
is also premised on the ground that their negative impacts on the market could be
controlled and manage by regulating fund managers, rather than the funds
themselves, because the managers are the very persons that have unlimited
direction in investing and managing the funds’ assets on a continuous basis.134
This regulatory model has been adopted by some jurisdictions, such as the
U.S. (post-Dodd-Frank Act), the EU (including the U.K., pre-AIMFD), and
Singapore.135 This approach may be assessed as a less drastic regulatory measure
than direct fund regulation or fund/manager regulation because it strikes a
regulatory balance. It acknowledges that hedge funds have provided many benefits
to the overall market and to investors, but that the funds have done so largely by
staying outside direct regulatory intervention. By regulating the managers, the
potentially negative impacts that the funds may pose to the market and to investors
is minimized.136
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See supra Chapter II, Part D.
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See e.g., Michael McDonald, Notes and Comments, Containing Systemic Risks: New
Developments in Trans-Atlantic Hedge Fund Regulation, 34 LOY. L. A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 237,
241 (Fall 2011).
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See Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87.

The U.K. used to prefer this regulatory option, and the U.S. takes the U.K.’s lead under the
Dodd-Frank Act. In so doing, they expect to maintain their competitive edge against other
136
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Regulating fund managers allow them to set up hedge funds onshore or
offshore at their discretions without any legal limitation, and as a result they are in
the position to pursue absolute return (i.e., maximization of the fund’s potential
return regardless of market situation). The fund managers can them utilize various
alternative investment strategies including leveraged transactions (i.e., borrowing,
short sale, and/or over-the-counter derivatives transactions) because they can avoid
the stringent investment restrictions imposed on the mutual funds.137
However, highly leveraged investment activities by the hedge funds may be
restricted indirectly. That is, under this scenario, hedge fund managers are under
regulatory oversight and are required to implement risk management policies and
procedures, and to report their holdings and highly risky leveraged transactions to
the regulators periodically. Regulators can take regulatory action against fund
managers if they believe it is necessary.138
This regulatory approach may also be justified from the investor protection,
anti-market abuse, and financial market stability perspectives.
First, in terms of investor protection, hedge fund investors may be better
protected than ever because the managers are directly subject to onerous regulatory
jurisdictions, and they believe this would keep the local market efficient, competitive and
financially innovative. See e.g., Callum McCarthy, FSA Chairman, Speech at European Money and
Finance Forum, Hedge Funds: What Should be the Regulatory Response?, Speech at the European
Money and Finance Forum (Dec. 7, 2006), available at http://www.mondovisione.com/media-andresources/news/hedge-funds-what-should-be-the-regulatory-response-speech-by-callum-mccarthycha/.
See e.g., Alexander Ineichen & Kurt Silverstein, AIMA’s Roadmap to Hedge Funds (November
2008), at 30-31, available at
http://www.tsakunov.com/lectures/aima_sroadmaptohedgefunds2008_12205.pdf.
137
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4; AIFMD, art. 22, 24; FSCMA, art. 249-2.
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requirements; such as code of conduct, code of ethics, and performance fees, in
addition to the registration/authorization and reporting requirements.139
Investor protection may be achieved through self-regulation in the forms of
market discipline by making default rules or by providing guidance, rather than by
directly mandating that they comply with regulatory requirements. In this scenario,
hedge fund investors have less protection because best practices and guidances are
not legally binding, and also details on practices and guidances are often left
unclear and managers have discretion on whether or not to adopt it internally.140
This may not be strong argument, however, because there are no
sufficiently justifiable grounds to regulate hedge fund managers if the hedge fund
investors are limited to accredited investors or qualified purchasers meeting some
threshold test about their financial sophistication.141
Further, because the beneficial owners of the funds are deemed financially
sophisticated investors, such as accredited investors or qualified purchasers, any
unaccredited investors are tested for their financial sophistication before they
invest in the fund, there seems no practical need to directly regulate hedge fund
managers, and this accredited investor market was not originally intended to be
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These rules and regulations used to be applied to mutual fund advisers. Private fund advisers
were exempted in the U.S. based on the private adviser safe harbor rule under the Advisers Act
until the Dodd-Frank Act has been implemented. However, hedge fund advisers have become
subject to the Advisers Act in the same as mutual fund advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-3.
140

See e.g., Paredes, supra note 88, at 10-15.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51)(A); 17 C.F.R. § 230.215, 506(b)(ii).
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under direct regulatory oversight when the relevant laws and regulations was
enacted.142
Second, regulating fund managers on an anti-market fraud policy ground is
not persuasive because market fraud issue is basically a matter of law enforcement.
Hedge fund managers have already been subject to anti-fraud rules and they are
subject to administrative, civil, and/or criminal sanctions if found in violation of
the rules.143
Thus, market fraud issue can be efficiently and effectively tackled if
regulators are vigilant in bringing enforcement actions against hedge fund
managers engaging in fraudulent market activities. Considering equal negotiation
powers, many things could also be resolved between fund managers and fund
investors, and regulators could further investigate the alleged frauds if necessary.
Finally, it is inevitable that market fraud cases involving hedge fund managers
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See id. Some may argue the so-called private adviser exemption is different from private
offering or private fund exemptions, and it was based on the policy ground that their business is
relatively small and limited in nature and in scope, and their impacts to the market or investors are
not that substantial enough to governmental intervention when it was originally enacted in the U.S.
It may be true in that, at the time of the legislation (i.e., in 1940), the legislators had never
contemplated about the hedge funds as clients because hedge funds did not emerge in the market
until late 1940s. See e.g., Thomas C. Pearson & Julia Lin Pearson, Protecting Global Financial
Market Stability and Integrity: Strengthening SEC Regulation of Hedge Funds, 33 N.C.J.INT’L L. &
COM. REG. 1, 51 (Fall 2007). See also Sec. Exch. Comm., Registration under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Release No. IA-2333, 69 Fed. Reg. 72,054, 72,069 (Dec.10, 2004).
However, suppose that there is only accredited investors or qualified purchasers involved in the
hedge funds, then it becomes doubtful why regulators are necessary in the market at least from the
micro-prudential regulatory standpoint, and in that regard it may be more reasonable and consistent
to say that hedge fund managers are not the right target for direct regulation at least in terms of
investor protection.
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See e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10(b)-5; FSCMA, art. 178.
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would occur regardless of whether there are detailed and paternalistic regulatory
provisions in place.144
Third, the systemic risk or market stability-based policy argument might be
the strongest for the direct hedge fund manager regulation. With the increase of the
size of hedge funds and their role in the global financial market, it becomes crucial
to keep an eye on their asset sizes, portfolios, and leveraged positions on an
ongoing basis. By doing so, the regulators are able to take appropriate measures to
prevent or mitigate any potential market disruption on a timely basis.145
However, this argument has some weak points because of the following
reasons:
First, system risk may be not something the government can prevent
preemptively and completely because of the technical complexity involved and
because it is something that will inevitably occur even under heavily regulated
market environments.146
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See e.g., Cheryl Nichols, Addressing Inept SEC Enforcement Efforts: Lessons from Madoff, the
Hedge Fund Industry, and Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. and Global Financial Systems,
31 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 637, 683 (Summer 2011) (arguing that the Madoff’s Ponzi scheme could
have been prevented, despite the fund and fund managers being unregulated, if the regulator had
kept alert while examining the relevant regulated entities affiliated with the Madoff fund and its
managers).
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See e.g., Jon Danielson & Jean-Pierre Zigrand, Regulating Hedge Funds, in Financial Stability
Review: Special Issue on Hedge Funds 29 (April 2007), available at http://www.banquefrance.fr/fileadmin/user_upload/banque_de_france/publications/Revue_de_la_stabilite_financiere/r
sf_0407.pdf.
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See e.g., Carl Hasselbarth, How Should We Regulate Hedge Funds?, 16 PIABA B.J. 233, 263-64
(2009).
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Second, securities regulators may not be capable of monitoring systemic
risk because of the burden in undertaking this regulatory mandate. 147 Rather,
Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter as “FSOC”) under the DoddFrank Act may be a more appropriate regulatory body to undertake systemic risk
oversight. As a matter of fact, the FSOC has been contemplating taking regulatory
action to designate certain hedge funds and the managers as systematically
important non-financial institutions.148
In addition, systemic risk may be avoided or minimized if relevant
counterparties or creditors vis-à-vis hedge funds, such as investors, prime brokers,
and/or lenders, are properly monitored because most of them are also regulated
entities.149
In short, direct governmental direct intervention against the hedge fund
managers should be minimized, even if the regulators seek to gather information
and monitor hedge fund managers for systemic risk related purposes.150
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See e.g., C. George Nnona, In the Wake of the Mortgage Bubble and Financial Crisis: What
Should Securities Regulation Become?, 79 UMKC L. REV. 31, 35-41 (2010).
148

See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank Financial Companies,
supra note 104.
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See e.g., Paredes, supra note 93.
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For more detailed discussion about this, see infra Chapter VII, Part D.
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4.

Regulating Both Hedge Funds and Managers Approach
This regulatory alternative may be viewed as the most conservative and

stringent in that it aims to directly respond to all possible hedge fund problems
raised. It seems, however, practically difficult to be implemented in jurisdictions
such as the U.S. and the U.K. because those jurisdiction have traditionally
provided relatively friendly regulatory environments for hedge funds and their
managers; indeed, that is the primary reason why those two countries have
maintained an advantageous status as hedge fund habitats than other
jurisdictions.151
In countries where the hedge fund markets have not been well-developed in
the past, the governments play a more paternalistic role – preferring to regulate
both hedge funds and managers. For example, in Germany and Korea, the hedge
fund market has not come into existence for a long time; rather the governments in
those two countries took initiatives and played a leading role in promoting the
local hedge fund market.152
This regulatory alternative has strengths from a regulatory perspective
because it is more likely to accommodate every possible regulatory concerns raised,
such as investor protection, anti-market fraud, and market stability. The
government would implement rules and regulations applicable to hedge funds and
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See CORNISH & M ASON, supra note 47, at 483-521; MERYL E W EINER , UNITED S TATES , IN
INTERNATIONAL G UIDE TO H EDGE FUND REGULATION (Martin Cornish & Ian Mason eds., 2009),
at 525-84.
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See CORNISH & M ASON, supra note 47, at 131-44. See also infra Chapter VI, Part A.

56

their managers, and hedge fund regulation would become more like mutual fund
regulation in nature and in substance.
Hedge funds and their managers would be subject to specific regulatory
obligations, like those governing mutual funds and their managers, although those
regulatory obligations may be relatively lighter than those applied to the mutual
funds. In that regard, hedge funds and their managers become no more unregulated
entities, and they become somewhat regulated entities in nature.153
This regulatory approach has a fundamental weak point, however, in that it
is more likely to become a government-led market, not based on the market
demand and supply, and hedge funds and their managers may face many
regulatory hurdles in accommodating market demands, including adapting
themselves to the changes in market circumstances in a timely manner and on a
continuous basis. That is, this direct regulatory intervention is more likely to
prevent them from utilizing various absolute return strategies because this
regulatory regime is not likely to be flexible enough to accommodate the diverse
and complex nature of the hedge fund market.
Similarly, another problem with this option is that it is more likely to deter
the natural development of the private market, including the hedge fund market,
and make market participants more reliant on regulators. An overreliance on
regulators creates increased opportunities for moral hazard, while at the same time
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Any issue about hedge fund regulation may be converged into this direction eventually because
any regulatory efforts should be made to treat them more like mutual funds assume that there is
little difference between them and same regulatory concerns exist in both industries.
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giving investors the impression that they may be protected by the government in
case something bad happens.154
Further, considering the global nature of hedge funds, a regulatory regime
that governs both hedge funds and managers is likely to create serious conflict with
other jurisdictions around the world. As a consequence, the market becomes more
localized and force hedge funds and their managers are forced to move offshore in
pursuit of friendlier regulatory environments.155

5. Regulating Investors Only Approach
This approach is to regulate hedge funds and their managers indirectly,
relying on self-regulation and market discipline in combination with strict
threshold requirements in determining who is sophisticated enough to invest in
hedge funds without governmental protection.156
Undoubtedly, this regulatory approach is worth taking into consideration in
that, provided that only sophisticated investors invest in hedge funds, it provides
ample autonomy and flexibility to the market, encouraging financial innovation
and encouraging self-competence. That is, under this regime hedge funds are in the
position to police themselves by making and implementing best market practices
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See e.g., Crockett, supra note 88, at 25.
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See e.g., Barney Jopson & Peter Thal Larsen, International Watchdog to Probe Risk from Hedge
Funds, FIN. TIMES, October 6, 2005, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/8cb5e920-360611da-903d-00000e2511c8.html#axzz2ngNCe3cL.
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See e.g., Stephen Choi, Regulating Investors Not Issuers: A Market-Based Proposal, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 279 (March 2000).
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for both the managers and the counterparties, while considering changes in market
circumstances.
Regulatory concerns over investor protection can be mitigated through
fine-tuning of the threshold conditions to become an accredited investor.157 Under
this regulatory option, accredited investor and qualified purchaser eligibility
requirements are more likely to be revised reflecting the changes in market
environment and the regulators may revisit the issues of who are really financially
sophisticated enough to protect themselves and whether existing criteria or
threshold conditions for the accredited investor and qualified purchaser are
sufficient to justify the self-regulation or market discipline.158
By so doing, investor protection concern may be mitigated without serious
regulatory concern and systemic risk issue also may be able to be dealt with in
between the hedge fund managers and their counterparties/creditors by developing
and implementing appropriate internal control system including risk management
policy and procedures internally.159

157

This apparently somewhat progressive regulatory approach is premised on the assumption that if
the hedge fund market is entirely comprised of accredited or sophisticated investors, and all other
parties involved in the market such as creditor-bank or counterparty-prime broker are regulated
entities and institutional investors at the same time, then there is no practical need for the regulator
to directly intervene in the market on an ex-ante basis. Because they are all sophisticated investors,
deemed to be capable of making informed decisions themselves, and the regulator has the ability to
monitor and intervene in the market if necessary via creditor or counterparty-regulated entities. See
generally ATHANASSIOU , supra note 79, at 215-36 (neutrally illustrating about self-regulation
versus external regulation, and direct regulation versus indirect regulation as well).
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In sum, this regulatory option may be desirable - particularly from the
micro-prudential or investor protection regulatory perspective - but it seems like a
weak option from the macro-prudential or systemic risk regulatory perspective
because it is less likely that market discipline will work properly under this
scenario particularly when serious market disruptions occur because hedge funds
and other relevant market participants are most likely to behave in their own best
economic interests.160

6. Regulating Counterparties Only Approach
This counterparty oriented regulatory option is based on the idea that
regulating hedge fund counterparties, like prime brokers or other financial
institutions having a close business relationship with hedge funds, is sufficient and
more cost-efficient in dealing with hedge fund problems. These counterparties
have a good understanding of hedge funds and are in the best position to oversee
the hedge fund manager’s daily investment activities and to evaluate any
potentially negative implications.161
This approach is premised on the belief that it could be implemented
without direct governmental regulation of hedge funds because these
counterparties are all regulated entities; hedge funds could be effectively
monitored and controlled indirectly through these regulated counterparties
160

See id. at 226-36.
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See id. See also United States Government Accountability Office, Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises, House of
Representatives, Hedge Funds: Overview of Regulatory Oversight, Counterparty Risks, and
Investment Challenges (Statement of Orice M. Williams, Director of Financial Markets and
Community Investment), May 7, 2007, at 11-14, available at http://gao.gov/assets/130/122480.pdf.
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accordingly.162 In other words, counterparties’ positions and risk exposures from
hedge funds could be managed by mandating that they keep appropriate levels of
capital, and at the same time by mandating that they put proper risk management
policies and procedures in place.163
It is anticipated that excessive leverage by hedge funds would remain
within a controllable scope. 164 With this regulatory approach, governments can
minimize direct regulatory intervention into the hedge funds market by focusing on
counterparties and/or creditors as a means to prevent or mitigate their negative
impacts on the markets.165
What is problematic with this scenario is that, on the one hand, these
lenders, investors, and/or transactional counterparties are well-positioned to protect
themselves by conducting due diligence investigations before investing, lending, or
entering into transactional agreements. However, their economic interests are so
closely interconnected with the funds that they are likely to be less vigilant in
162

See supra text accompanying note 157. See also Noah L. Wynkoop, Note, The Unregulables?
The Perilous Confluence of Hedge Funds and Credit Derivatives, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 3095 (2008)
(arguing that a system of disclosure for derivatives be implemented by emphasizing the role of
traders in the derivatives market).
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For instance, the Volcker Rule under the Dodd-Frank Act, which strictly restricts banking
entities from proprietary trading and limits the banks’ stakes on the private funds such as hedge
funds or private equity funds, may be regarded as a vivid example of this counterparty regulatory
approach because it may substantially reduce the likelihood of the occurrence of systemic risk
especially arisen from the credit channel. For more details of the text of the final common rules
between the US regulatory agencies regarding Volcker Rule, see Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, Federal Reserve Board, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency & Securities and Exchange Commission, Proprietary Trading and
Certain Interests in and Relationships with Covered Funds, available at
http://op.bna.com/bar.nsf/id/cbre-9e9guh/$File/Volcker%20Reg%20Text.pdf.
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monitoring and evaluating the funds and their managers’ investment activities
because hedge funds are a primary source of their income.166
As illustrated above, this regulatory approach has some advantages in
ensuring market stability.167 However, a problem exists in that it is more likely to
work well in ordinary situations and it is not likely operate properly during highprofile financial scandals.168
Additionally, this regulatory approach will likely encounter problems
gathering the hedge fund related information (i.e., hedge fund activities, leveraged
positions etc.) on an integrated basis because multiple service providers exist to
serve hedge funds – resulting in information that may be fragmented and
ultimately insufficient to measure overall risks.169 Further, monitoring the hedge
fund market from a macro-prudential regulatory perspective is not something for
counterparties to do, rather it is what financial regulators need to undertake.170
Regulators’ role becomes more important in this regulatory regime because
regulators may be the only appropriate entities for gathering hedge fund
information on a consolidated basis - with the help of the regulated counterpartiesfinancial institutions, and as a result need to have a close eye on hedge funds’
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See id.

167

This regulatory option assumes that investor protection concerns are not critical because all of
the investors in this market must be deemed sophisticated investors before participating. See supra
Chapter III, Part B.5.
168

See PWG Report, supra note 102.

169

See supra note 161.

170

See e.g., FSA Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37, at 3-4, 20.
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activities and their leverage positions to ensure market stability, and minimize the
possibility of a hedge fund-led market dismantling.171
The success of this regulatory approach is heavily dependent on the level of
cooperation between regulators and regulated counterparties-financial institutions,
and may require technical support from key market players to fully understand the
complex and diverse nature of hedge funds involved.
Further, self-regulatory organizations are as important as regulators in this
regulatory approach for the role they play in making/implementing best practices –
ensuring that regulated counterparties-financial institutions not only put proper risk
management policies and procedures in place, but also rigorously implement
them.172

C. Summary and Comments
Every regulatory option illustrated above has strong points and limitations,
as illustrated supra. Some useful implications, however, can be garnered from each
of them. First of all, it is important to acknowledge first that both investor
protection concern and systemic risk concern are equally important, and should be
taken into consideration simultaneously when comtemplating hedge fund
regulatory architecture.173
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See supra note 159.

172

See id.

173

See e.g., Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions,
Hedge Funds Oversight: Final Report, June 2009, available at
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD293.pdf.
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Among the possible scenarios, the first regulatory option (no regulation
approach) and the fifth regulatory option (investor regulation approach) are
difficult to recommend and may be the least viable options. The sixth regulatory
option (counterparty regulation approach) is also less likely to be fully justified or
supported because it does not touch the investor protection issue directly and it
does not respond to the systemic risk issue in a convincing way.174 Therefore, the
second (fund regulation approach), third (manager regulation approach), and/or
fourth regulatory options (both fund and manager regulation approach) are worth
exploring further.
First, it should be noted that the investor protection issue has been
sufficiently contemplated and incorporated into current securities and fund related
statutes, and that they have arguably been functioning relatively well so far
considering the fact that there has been a clear distinction made between the
accredited investors market and the unaccredited investors market under each
jurisdiction.
It remains unchanged until now even after the global financial crisis of
2008 and it is unlikely that this regulatory differentiation between the two investor
groups will be changed in the foreseeable future, albeit some controversies do
surround the criteria for the distinction and the threshold conditions, because the
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In this scenario, both the government and the regulated counterparties are likely to have
imperfect and incomplete hedge fund information, making it harder for the regulators to monitor
hedge fund activities and leverage positions on a consolidated and continuous basis. The global
nature of hedge funds’ domiciles and their investment activities under this approach will make it
much harder for the regulators to oversee them because local regulators are likely to have limited
access to hedge funds who have transactional relationships with local regulated counterparties. See
supra note 161.
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underlying rationale behind the regime has been also well-preserved and
respected. 175 Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that merely fine tuning
approach (i.e., redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions) is sufficient
to deal with the investor protection problem.176
The accredited investor standard should be periodically re-examined, and
perhaps heightened in accordance with the changes in economic situations. At a
minimum, the standard should be set to ensure that both institutional investors and
affluent individuals have no problem understanding the complex nature of hedge
funds and the accompanying risks inherent in hedge fund investments, and to
ensure that they are competent to assume the risk themselves.177
There is no doubt that nobody (including institutional investors) can be
confident in knowing everything for sure about hedge funds and their investment
strategies. This regulatory concern, however, should not be heavily weighted
because securities and fund regimes have been in place focusing on protecting the
investing public (i.e., unaccredited investors), and despite many safe harbor rules
being available in private markets focusing on accredited investors, it has been
functioning well without serious problems thus far.178
175

See infra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.
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See e.g., Choi, supra note 156.

177

See e.g., Dodd-Frank Act § 412.

178

The best way to ensure that only financially sophisticated investors can partake in the hedge
fund market would be to require accredited investors to go through a sophistication test before
investment, but it would be practically impossible and cost-inefficient in that it may entail
unbearable compliance costs and a burden to both market intermediaries and investors as well. As a
result, regulatory efforts to distinguish private markets from public markets, and to treat them
become void. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no fundamental regulatory change needed in
this regard. See supra note 175.
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On the other hand, from a systemic risk-related information gathering
perspective, it is necessary that regulators be in a position to obtain hedge fundrelated information on a consolidated basis and in a timely manner. In that regard,
and because hedge fund managers are responsible for the fund’s day-to-day
investment activities, it looks reasonable to mandate that they (and not the fund
itself) either register with the regulator, or be required to be authorized by the
regulator.179
The problem under this regime, however, is that registration or
authorization requirements for hedge fund managers inevitably entails many
onerous ongoing compliance burdens, and it is doubtful that those regulatory
obligations are really necessary from the macro-prudential or systemic risk
regulatory perspective.180
Thus, it is worth thinking about narrowing the scope of regulation placed
on hedge fund managers. That is, provided that unaccredited and unsophisticated
investors’ direct exposure to hedge funds are strictly barred, regulations must
ensure that hedge fund managers be treated differently from mutual fund advisers
and that mandatory compliance obligations, other than registration/authorization
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See Mcdonald, supra note 134.

180

As pointed out supra, many rules and regulations applicable to the hedge fund managers are
somewhat irrelevant to systemic risk other than registration/authorization, reporting and
recordkeeping, and examination requirements, and rather are more relevant to investor protection.
But, as emphasized earlier, there seems to be no strong regulatory necessity in applying those rules
and regulations to the hedge fund managers, assuming that there is no investing public directly
accessing the private market, because most of the rules and regulations are in place to protect the
investing public. See e.g., C. Edward Fletcher, III, Sophisticated Investors under the Federal
Securities Laws, 6 DUKE L. J. 1081, 1133-34 (1988); Loomis, supra note 91, at 226.
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and periodic reporting/recordkeeping requirements, be imposed on them as little as
possible.181

Table 1: Comparisons between the Hedge Fund Regulatory Alternatives
Strong Points

Weak Points

No Direct Regulation
Approach

-Ensure
self-regulation
and market discipline
-Maximize
market
efficiency and financial
innovation

Fund Only Regulation
Approach

-Directly respond to the
risks
and
problems
inherent in hedge funds

Fund Manager Only
Regulation Approach

-Less
drastic
than
regulating both fund and
the manager
-Likely
mitigate
overregulation concerns
-Strives to take a
balanced approach

-Vulnerable to market
shock
-No contingency plan in
place
-Likely to cause a “race
to the bottom” problem
-Deter market efficiency
and financial innovation
-Likely to cause moral
hazard
-Likely to make the
distinction between the
mutual fund market and
the private fund market
blurry
-Potential overregulation
problem
-Likely to cause moral
hazard
-Likely make it look a
more regulated market
(i.e., government-driven
market)

Manager/Fund

-Directly respond to the -Highly

likelihood

of

This does not necessarily mean that unaccredited investors’ access to the hedge fund market
must be curtailed at all times. Rather, it is premised on the belief that unaccredited investors should
be guided by third party fiduciaries in investing in hedge funds with suitability or sophistication
tests. See e.g., Choi, supra note 156.
181
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Regulation Approach

Investor Only
Regulation Approach

Counterparty
Regulation Approach

risks
and
problems
inherent in hedge funds
-Most powerful approach
to ensure market stability

creating
an
overregulation problem
-Most cost-inefficient
-Highly likelihood of
making it look like a
heavily regulated market
(moral hazard problem)
-No more hedge fund-led
benefits to expect
-Ensure market friendly -Silent to the systemic
approach
risk concern
-Likely to keep the -Likely susceptible to
market more private
market shock
-Likely to encourage
financial innovation
-More market friendly -Likely inefficient for
than direct regulation
dealing with systemic
-Encourage
self- risk concerns
regulation or market -Likely to not properly
discipline
work during a period of
market shock
-Paying little attention to
investor
protection
concerns
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IV.

Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S.

A. Overview
Hedge funds and their advisers used to be unregulated, or minimally regulated,
until the mandatory private fund adviser registration requirement was
introduced by the Dodd-Frank Act in the U.S.182 Both hedge funds and their
advisers have been exempted from various securities and fund related
regulations by relying on safe harbor rules under the securities or fund related
statutes.
However, hedge fund advisers, not hedge funds, become subject to mandatory
registration requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act (reflected into the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940), and that the funds themselves will not fall
under direct regulatory purview - even after the Dodd-Frank Act is in force in
July 2012 - because private fund safe harbor rules under the Investment

182

More precisely speaking, even before the Dodd-Frank Act was implemented, hedge fund
managers were required to register with Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter SEC) in
2004 for the first time under the then existing rule from the Investment Advisers Act. See 17 C.F.R.
§ 275.203(b)(3)-2. At that time, mandatory registration requirements were enforced by amending
the private adviser exemption rule relating to the method of calculation of the number of “fewer
than 15 clients” (hereinafter Look-Through Rule or the Rule), and the Look-Through Rule provides
that the underlying beneficial owners in the hedge fund be aggregated when counting the number of
the clients in determining whether any private adviser could satisfy the threshold conditions for the
exemption. As a consequence, most of the then existing hedge fund managers were forced to
register with the SEC because they were deemed to have more than 15 clients under the LookThrough Rule. But the Rule was vacated by the D.C. Circuit court in 2006. See Goldstein v. S.E.C.,
supra note 105. It should be noted, however, that the then effective mandated private adviser
registration requirement was a lot different from that of the Dodd-Frank Act because the DoddFrank Act repealed the then effective “fewer than 15 clients” private adviser exemption, and instead
introduced brand-new registration requirements that depend on the assets under management the
adviser has. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2010).
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Company Act of 1940 have remained unchanged under the new regime (the
Dodd-Frank Act).183
It has been indicated that the hedge fund market in the U.S. was formed and
developed as an unregulated private market due to the availability of various
safe harbor rules in securities related statutes. However, despite the fact that
safe harbor rules were not put in place with the intent to focus on hedge funds
and their advisers, hedge fund advisers have been relying on the safe harbor
rules to make a special private market to avoid regulatory intervention to the
extent possible for certain of their institutional investors and ultra-wealthy
individuals.184
The hedge fund market has maintained its legal status as an unregulated
private market based on the assumption, among other things, (i) that it is only
accessible to a limited selection of professional investors who are presumably
sophisticated enough to protect their economic interests themselves without
any extensive regulatory intervention, 185 (ii) that the market conduct its
business on a limited basis - in terms of the size of the funds they manage,
and/or the number of clients they have in those funds,186 and (iii) that almost
183

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7).

184

For a general overview of the hedge fund market from the regulatory standpoint, see e.g., SEC
Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 11-33; SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 103-118; PWG
Report, supra note 102, at Appendix B.
185

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18. See also SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at
103-118.
186

See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-(3)(b)(3) (2006). See also Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain
Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 142 (explaining that, although not entirely clear, the legislative
intent of the private adviser exemption is that their impacts on the market are relatively small, and
accordingly, there is no critical need for regulatory protection).
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all-encompassing anti-fraud rules should be able to deter or enforce any
potential market malpractices.187
In other words, based on the two conventional rationales for securities
regulation - such as protecting investors through mandated disclosure and as
deterring market frauds through anti-fraud provisions - hedge funds have been
able to retain its unregulated fund status. Until the SEC raised regulatory
concerns against them in 2003, and made a regulatory effort to subject them to
compulsory registration requirements in 2004, there have been no serious
regulatory concerns raised against hedge funds for a long time.188
When the SEC tried to intervene in the hedge fund market, and directly
regulate hedge fund managers like general investment advisers through
mandatory registration requirements in 2004, 189 there were no particular
systemic risk concerns raised – despite having gone through the LTCM nearcollapse scandal in 1998, and observing potential negative impacts on the
overall market from a big-sized hedge fund failure.
Instead, despite the fact that the SEC paid particular attention to the rapid
growth of the hedge fund industry over several decades, investor protection
concerns (i.e., retailization problem) and market fraud concerns were
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2006).

188

See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28. See also Registration under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 142.
189

Mandating hedge fund advisers to register with the SEC means that they become subject to the
full scope of the Advisers Act because all the substantive rules in the Act are applied to registered
investment advisers. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
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highlighted as the primary regulatory concerns.190 What this indicates is that
neither systemic risk concern nor systemic risk related rationales came into
play to justify the imposition of compulsory registration and reporting
requirements on the hedge fund advisers, but rather it was regarded as a matter
of self-regulation or market discipline between the advisers and regulated
counterparties/creditor banks.191
Because the SEC paid no special attention to the systemic risk issue from the
LTCM failure, they made an effort to regulate hedge funds by amending the
private adviser safe harbor rule, instead of by amending the relevant provision
of the Advisers Act, regarding the method of the calculation of the number of
clients in determining whether the private adviser satisfies the “fewer than 15
clients” threshold condition. 192 As a result, almost all of the then-existing
hedge fund managers have become subject to mandatory registration
requirements without sufficient legislative justifications for doing so.
The SEC’s new regulatory attempt to directly regulate hedge fund advisers
was invalidated by a court decision made in favor of the hedge fund advisers
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See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-88.

191

See id. See also PWG Report, supra note 102, at 29-31; GAO Report, supra note 102, at 29-34
(The report emphasized the potential systemic risk from big-sized hedge fund failure, but its
recommendation focused more on indirect regulatory approaches than on direct hedge fund and/or
its adviser regulation).
In fact, there were no arguments about the reasonableness of the SEC’s new rule-making
initiative, but rather at issue was whether or not the SEC had been empowered by the Advisers Act
to amend the method of calculation of the number of the clients with respect to the private adviser
exemption rule. For a detailed discussion about the SEC’s lack of legislative authority relating to
the newly amended hedge fund rules, see Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105.
192
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in 2006. 193 Following the court decision, it became an open question of
whether or not hedge fund advisers should be regulated, and how to regulate
them, until the Dodd-Frank Act set forth new hedge fund registration rules in
the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis.
In response to the court decision, the SEC endeavored to regulate hedge funds
indirectly by amending the anti-fraud provisions under the Advisers Act. 194
The accredited investor threshold for affluent individuals under the Securities
Act was also heightened based on the conventional rationales like investor
protection and deterrence of market abuse.195
Hedge funds have been pointed out as one of the important players that
provided the momentum for the 2008 financial crisis directly and/or indirectly,
based on the observations that the crisis arose primarily from the sub-prime
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See id. at 884 (holding that the new hedge fund rules are “arbitrary” and therefore invalid).

194

See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2008).

“It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice, or course of business for
any investment adviser to a pooled investment vehicle to:
(1) Make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make
the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading,
to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle; or
(2) Otherwise engage in any act, practice, or course of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or
manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor in the pooled investment vehicle.”
It was made by defining “accredited natural person” to focus on the protection of individual
investors by way of providing much higher threshold conditions for accredited investorsindividuals. Accredited natural person was defined as “any natural person who meets either the net
worth or income test specified in 17 C.F.R § 230.501(a) (2008) or 17 C.F.R § 230.215 (2008), as
applicable, and who owns at least $2.5 million in investments individually or jointly with a spouse.”
However, this new “accredited natural person” idea was not reflected into the law. See Prohibition
of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain
Private Investment Vehicles, 72 Fed. Reg. 400, 405 (proposed Jan.4, 2007).
195
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mortgage related market collapse, and that many investment banking firms
were actively involved in the market as sub-prime mortgage related financial
product providers, and at the same time were involved as services providers
for the hedge funds, such as prime broker or counterparty creditor, whereas
hedge funds used to be there to purchase the products from the investment
firms and to trade those products in the market.196
For this reasons, fundamental changes in hedge fund regulatory structure has
been made since the global financial crisis of 2008.
Based on the macro-prudential regulatory rationale, the hedge fund managers,
not the funds, should be subject to mandatory registration, reporting, and

196

Counter-arguments have been made from various sectors, such as academia, hedge fund market
participants, and even within regulatory bodies, that the hedge fund was irrelevant in causing the
collapse of the subprime mortgage market, and rather that they should be treated as a victim of the
crisis. See e.g., Houman B. Shadab, Hedge Funds and the Financial Crisis (Mercatus on Policy No.
34, January 2009), at 3, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1564847; Wulf A. Kaal, Hedge Fund
Regulation via BASEL III, 44 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 438-39 (March 2011).
It is particularly important to note that even the major regulatory bodies in the U.S. and the U.K.
take similar position that hedge funds should not be blamed s a catalyst of the crisis. See e.g., FSA
Systemic Risk Report, supra note 37, at 4; Alan Greenspan, former FRB Chairman, Risk Transfer
and Financial Stability, Remarks to the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's Forty-First Annual
Conference on Bank Structure, May 5, 2005, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050505; Ben S. Bernanke, FRB
Chairman, Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk, Remarks at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta’s
2006 Financial Markets Conference, May 16, 2006, available at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20060516a.htm.
Albeit it is still a controversial issue, but there has been consensus made from the regulatory bodies
around the globe that hedge funds may have the potential to adversely affect the overall market
stability in an extreme market disruption due to their size, highly risky activities like leveraged
transactions and lack of transparency, and accordingly direct hedge fund regulation should be in
place based on these regulatory concerns ever since the sub-prime mortgage crisis of 2008. See e.g.,
Hedge Fund Oversight, supra note 87. See also Llyod Dixon et al., Hedge Funds and Systemic Risk
(2012), at 39-62, available at
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2012/RAND_MG1236.pdf (illustrating
how the hedge fund may contribute systemic risk in the wake of 2008 financial crisis).
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recordkeeping requirements based on the size of the funds they manage, and
regardless of the number of clients they have. What that means is that the longstanding private adviser exemption based on the number of clients was
repealed, and instead bring a size-based compulsory registration regime come
into play.197
The new registration requirements is that hedge fund advisers meeting the
assets under management threshold condition are required to register with the
SEC, while mid-sized advisers (i.e., advisers with between 25 million dollars
and 100 million dollars in assets under management) are required to register
with a state regulator, and are not allowed to opt in registration with the SEC,
subject to certain exceptions. 198 That is, the traditional private adviser
exemption is no longer available under the Dodd-Frank Act, replaced by a
size-based mandatory registration regime. Under the new regime, basically any
private adviser with 150 million dollars or more in assets under management
are forced to register with the SEC regardless of whether they have less than
15 clients.
Other private advisers with between 25 million dollars and 100 million dollars
in assets under management are required to register with the applicable state
regulator, instead of the SEC.199 Mid-sized advisers and exempted reporting
advisers (including private fund advisers and venture capital fund advisers) are
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See Dodd-Frank Act § 408.

198

See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)-1 (2012).

199

See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1 (2012).
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also subject to certain reporting requirement under the new regime, and are
indirectly subject to SEC supervision although they are exempted from
registration and other compliance obligations.200
All these new requirements have been implemented and justified in the name
of preventing systemic risk, and most private fund advisers in the U.S. come
under the regulatory purview in full or in part. Particularly, large-sized private
advisers are required to comply with the paternalistic rules and regulations in
the Advisers Act exactly the same as other general investment advisers
carrying on business that targets the general public.201
However, even under the new regime the hedge fund itself is not subject to
direct regulation, and the traditional private fund exemptions have been
maintained without significant changes.202
This regulatory approach has been widely supported and justified considering
the facts that (i) hedge funds have played many affirmative roles in the market
- all possible because they have been unregulated or lightly regulated, (ii) the
adviser manages the fund investment activities on a daily basis, and (iii)
systemic risk concerns could be handled more efficiently and effectively by
200

As further illustrated infra, in addition to the mid-sized adviser exemption, among other things,
more exemptions are also available under the new regime, such as a venture capital fund adviser
exemption or a foreign private adviser exemption. What is also noteworthy is that the two year lock
up safe harbor provision has been eliminated under the Investment Company Act, and as a
consequence, private equity fund advisers become subject to mandatory registration requirements
while venture capital fund advisers are still exempt from the registration requirements. See 15
U.S.C. § 3(b)(8) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 202(a)(30)-1, 203(l)-1 (2012).
201

See e.g., Seth Chertok, Detailed Analysis of Title IV of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 1, 23-25 (Spring 2011).
202

See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1), (7) (2012).
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regulating the advisers, not by regulating the funds directly. 203 This may be
regarded as a regulatory effort to strike a balance in between direct regulation
and indirect regulation, in that the new regime has tried to keep the market
competitive and to encourage financial innovation while mitigating the
potential negative impacts on the markets and while focusing on the macroprudential regulatory perspective.204
In short, hedge funds and their managers have been exempted from
registration and other regulatory requirements under the securities or fund
related statutes for a long period of time. It has been widely accepted that they
made many positive contributions to the markets through their unregulated
status. 205 On the other hand, as with the rapid growth in the hedge fund
industry over time, hedge fund advisers have become subject to registration
and reporting requirements, among other things, depending on the size of the
funds they manage and based on the new policy consideration of preventing or
mitigating systemic risk.206

203

See e.g., Harvey J. Goldschmid, Speech by former SEC Commissioner, Should Hedge Funds be
Regulated? (Nov. 17, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch111704hjg.htm.
204

Id. See also Jenny Anderson, Lessons from the British Way of Policing Hedge Funds, N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2006, at C6 (emphasizing the importance of the balanced approach done by the FSA
in the U.K. that enhanced regulatory oversight is needed, while also avoiding any overregulation
issue that may adversely affect the efficiency and competitiveness of the hedge fund market, and
the positive effects hedge funds can have on the overall market).
205

See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 4-5.
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Id. at 76-88. See also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-(3)(m), 80b-(4)(b).
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B. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S.: Before the Dodd-Frank
Act
As briefly illustrated supra, hedge funds and their advisers have been
outside of the regulatory oversight for a long time, relying on the various safe
harbor rules available under the securities related statutes. Below is a brief
summary of the four major safe harbor rules that, among other things, the hedge
fund industry used to rely on to maintain its unregulated status before the DoddFrank Act was enacted.

1. Investment Company Act of 1940
Hedge fund typically falls within the definition of “investment company”
under the Investment Company Act, 207 but two safe harbor rules are available for
hedge funds to avoid the application of the Investment Company Act. The first
safe harbor rule is Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act. It provides
hedge funds with a safe harbor to exempt them from a bunch of paternalistic
regulations, such as registration and continuous reporting requirements, and
specific investment restrictions.208 Basically, it provides that hedge funds are not
required to register with the SEC, and as a result they are free from regulation
Section 3(a)(1)(A) of the Investment Company Act defines investment company as “an issuer
which is or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage primarily, in the
business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securities”, and Section 3(a)(1)(C) of the Act also
defines an investment company as “an issuer that is engaged or proposes to engage in the business
of investing, reinvesting, owning, holding or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire
investment securities having a value exceeding 40 percent of the value of its total assets on an
unconsolidated basis.” See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1)(A), (C).
207
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See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1) (2004).
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under the Investment Company Act, provided that (i) they do not sell or offer the
fund interests to the public, and (ii) the number of beneficial owners (i.e.,
purchasers) in the fund is less than 100.209210
In addition, hedge funds are exempted from ongoing periodic reporting
obligations because those requirements are applied only to registered investment
companies. 211 This private fund safe harbor rule was made with the legislative
background that small pooled investment vehicles such as private funds are more
likely to be composed of the people with “personal, familial, or similar ties”, and
that there is little practical need for governmental intervention.212
As a matter of practice, any individuals or entities who are not accredited
investors under the Regulation D are not allowed to directly invest in the hedge
funds because of the suitability or sophistication test concerns, despite the fact that
they are not completely barred from that investment opportunity in that the
Regulation D does not prohibit hedge funds from accepting any person not
satisfying the accredited investor threshold conditions up to 35 persons, subject to
advance sophistication test.213
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See id.

210

What is important to note is that in calculating the number of investors in 3(c)(1) fund, corporate
legal entities are not counted as one person if they have 10 percent or more shares of the fund, and
the underlying beneficial owners of the corporate entity are included in determining whether the
fund satisfy the threshold requirements. See 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(1)(A) (2004); 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-1(b)
(2004).
211

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-30 (2004).
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See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 106.

213

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2).
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Additional exemption can be found at Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment
Company Act, and it provides another safe harbor for hedge funds if they satisfy a
two-prong test: (i) no public offerings are made, and (ii) they offer or sell the fund
interests only to so-called “qualified purchasers”. 214 215 Unlike the private fund
exemption under Section 3(c)(1), the Section 3(c)(7) exemption does not provide
the maximum number of investors (i.e., purchasers) provided that the offer or sale
is made only to the qualified purchasers.216
However, it has been understood that the qualified purchaser fund is
indirectly required to limit the total number of the investors in the fund to 499
214

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). See also 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(51) for the definition of qualified
purchaser (defining “qualified purchaser” as
“(i) any natural person (including any person who holds a joint, community property, or other
similar shared ownership interest in an issuer that is excepted under section 3(c)(7) with that
person’s qualified purchaser spouse) who owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments, as defined
by the Commission;
(ii) any company that owns not less than $5,000,000 in investments and that is owned directly or
indirectly by or for 2 or more natural persons who are related as siblings or spouse (including
former spouses), or direct lineal descendants by birth or adoption, spouses of such persons, the
estates of such persons, or foundations, charitable organizations, or trusts established by or for the
benefit of such persons;
(iii) any trust that is not covered by clause (ii) and that was not formed for the specific purpose of
acquiring the securities offered, as to which the trustee or other person authorized to make decisions
with respect to the trust, and each settlor or other person who has contributed assets to the trust, is a
person described in clause (i), (ii), or (iv); or
(iv) any person, acting for its own account or the accounts of other qualified purchasers, who in the
aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis, not less than $25,000,000 in investments.”)
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For the legislative background of the qualified purchaser fund, see SEC Staff Report, supra note
20, at 110-14.
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Because of this advantage, Section 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company Act has been more
commonly used in the market than 3(c)(1) funds. Also the fact that performance fee can be charged
only to qualified clients under the Investment Advisers Act also indirectly affect this market
practice. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a), (d)(1) (providing that qualified purchaser under the
qualified purchaser fund falls within one of the qualified clients).
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persons; otherwise they may be obligated to register and comply with periodic
reporting requirements under Section 12(g)(1)(a) of the Securities Exchange Act if
they have assets of 10 million dollars or more and a class of equity securities is
held by 500 or more shareholders.217 Accordingly, it may be concluded that the
qualified purchaser fund exemption is available only if the number of the investors
in the fund is 499 or fewer, and no public offering is made.218
This safe harbor rule was created on the assumption that highly
sophisticated investors, such as qualified purchasers, raise no particular regulatory
concern in terms of investor protection because they are presumably able to protect
themselves.219

2. Securities Act of 1933
As indicated supra, hedge fund falls within the definition of investment
company under the Investment Company Act, and the interests it offers or sells to
prospective investors are also deemed securities under the Securities Act
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See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(a) (2004).
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It should be noted, however, that the threshold conditions for the registration requirement under
the Securities Exchange Act has been changed by the JOBS Act, and it has been relaxed to 2,000
equity shareholders or 500 non-accredited investors. Consequently, hedge fund now is able to rely
on this newly amended safe harbor to avoid the registration and continuous reporting requirements
under the Exchange Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 781(g)(1)(A) (2013).
219

SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 110. It should be noted, however, that the threshold
requirement for qualified purchaser is much higher than that for accredited investor threshold under
the Regulation D, and as a result it is a reasonably inferred that qualified purchaser should be
regarded as highly sophisticated investor who are able to protect themselves vis-à-vis hedge fund
adviser in that even accredited investors are presumed to be sophisticated enough to protect
themselves without the help of mandatory disclosure regime regardless of their actual sophistication.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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regardless of the legal form of the fund (i.e., it does not matter whether or not the
fund has been set up as a corporation, a business trust or a partnership because any
one of them is deemed to be a legal entity under the Investment Company Act).220
As a consequence, hedge funds are subject to registration requirements under the
Securities Act when they offer or sell the fund interests to prospective investors,
subject to certain limited private offering exemptions or safe harbor rules available
under Section 4(2) of the Securities Act or Rule 506 thereunder.221
First, Section 4(2) of the Securities Act exempts any issuer, including
hedge funds, from registration requirements when they sell or offer securities (i.e.,
fund interests) on a private placement basis.222 This private offering exemption is
based on the same premise as the private fund exemptions in that private funds
need to satisfy the private offering safe harbor conditions as a prerequisite to
satisfy the threshold conditions for the private funds, and accordingly the investors
in private offerings are limited to accredited investors who are deemed to have
financial sophistication to protect themselves in terms of their knowledge, wealth,
and experience.223
220

See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(8), 3(a)(1).
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See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. After the JOBS Act went into effect in 2012,
Section 4(2) of the Securities Act has been recodified as Section 4(a)(2). See Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. 112-106, Sec. 201(b)(1), (c)(1), 126 Stat. 306 (2012).
222

See 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2).
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See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18, at 127. More precisely speaking, under the Reg
D accredited investors are automatically deemed sophisticated regardless of whether they are really
sophisticated or not, and up to 35 non-accredited investors are also accessible to the private offering,
subject to sophistication test. Thus, based on the Reg D, it is reasonable to conclude that all the
offerees in the private offering could be treated as sophisticated investors, and that there is no need
to protect them through mandated disclosure. This is a precondition for the hedge fund to comply
with and to satisfy the threshold conditions for the private fund, and that is the reason why private
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However, this exemption is only available where the offerees, not the
actual purchasers, are able to access to the kind of information required to be
included in registration statement under the Securities Act at time of the
investment. 224 Because of that, this exemption is, in practice, very difficult to
satisfy and not that commonly relied upon by hedge funds; instead, another safe
harbor rule, Rule 506 in Regulation D, is more frequently relied.
Second, Rule 506 of the Regulation D provides hedge funds with a useful
safe harbor in the private offering exemption because it does not require
compliance with Section 4(2). In other words, the safe harbor rule (i.e., Rule 506)
enables hedge funds to claim Section 4(2) exemption if they meet the conditions
under the Rule.225 However, that Rule 506 is not necessarily the only way for the
hedge funds to be exempted from registration requirement under the Securities Act.
Rather, hedge funds are still entitled to claim the private offering exemption if they
can prove that they have done the offering in compliance with the Section 4(2) of
the Securities Act.226

funds can be exempted from the registration requirements as an investment company under the
Investment Company Act. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 106.
224

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 223.

Among other things, Rule 506(b)(2)(i) provides a “35-purchaser limit”, so there is no problem in
making an offer or sale to non-accredited investors so long as actual purchasers are within the 35purchaser limit. The SEC takes the position that it is not a violation of the no general solicitation or
advertising requirement under the Rule. It is not, however, applicable to accredited investors, so
hedge funds can sell or offer the fund shares to unlimited number of investors so long as they all are
accredited investors under Rule 506(e)(1)(iv). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506. See also Proposed Revision
of Certain Exemptions from the Registration Provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 for
Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6339, Aug. 7, 1981, at
n.30.
225
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See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500(c).
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In addition, general solicitation and general advertisement are not allowed
when relying on this safe harbor rule. General solicitation and general
advertisement are very broadly defined to include advertisements, articles, notices
or other communications published in a newspaper, magazine, or similar media,
mass mailings, broadcasts over television or radio, materials contained on a
website available to the public, or an email messages sent to a large number of
previously unknown persons.227
Further, hedge funds relying on the Rule 506 safe harbor must exercise
reasonable care to assure that their investors are not investing with the intent to
distribute their shares in the fund to the general public; otherwise they are subject
to registration obligation pursuant to Section 4(1) of the Securities Act. 228 This
resale restriction is to prevent the abuse of the Rule 506 safe harbor through the
resale of the exempted securities, which are originally qualified for.229

3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Under Section 15(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, dealer is defined as
“any person who is engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for its
own account”, and dealer is required to register with the SEC. Trader, who also
227

Id. This no general solicitation or no general advertisement requirement may be avoided under
the JOBS Act if (i) the purchaser is limited to accredited investors, and (ii) the issuer takes
reasonable steps to ensure that the purchasers are accredited investors at time of investment. This is
one way to offer securities under Regulation D, however, existing safe harbors are also available.
Thus, at their discretion, private fund advisers can choose one of these two options to offer the fund
shares on a private placement basis. See Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation
and General Advertising in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 67, at 35-36.
228

See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(d).

229

Id.
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buys and sells securities like dealer, but not as part of a regular business, however,
is not required to register with the SEC.230 Hedge funds used to rely on this trader
exemption to avoid registering as a dealer.
In addition, issuers with 500 or more equity holders and assets in excess of
$10 million as of its most recent fiscal year-end are required to register with the
SEC, under Section 12(g) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 12g-1
thereunder. 231 As a result, most hedge funds seek to avoid the registration and
accompanying reporting requirements by keeping fewer than 500 equity holders or
less than $10 million in assets.
Further, Section 13(d) and 13(g) of the Securities Exchange Act require
any person who, after acquiring beneficial ownership of any equity securities
registered under Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act, beneficially owns 5%
or more of the class of equity securities, file a beneficial ownership statement.232
Because the hedge funds and their advisers may exercise investment
discretion over the equity securities held by the fund, they will generally be
deemed to beneficially own any equity securities owned by the fund. As a result,
once a hedge fund or its adviser is subject to the reporting obligations under
Section 13(d) or 13(g) of the Exchange Act, they must update the previously filed
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See 15 U.S.C. § 78l(b), (g) (2004).
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This threshold test applies on a yearly basis, not on a permanent basis. Thus, an issuer, which is
not subject to the registration requirement, can be subject to the requirement once it reaches the
threshold, and vice versa. Also as indicated supra note 218, the threshold condition for registration
under the Securities Exchange Act has been relaxed under the JOBS Act. See supra text
accompanying note 218.
232

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d), (g) (2004).
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beneficial ownership statements when there is a change made in the statement
under Rule 13d-2.233
Hedge fund advisers may be also subject to the quarterly reporting
obligations under Section 13(f) of the Exchange Act, which apply to any
“institutional investment manager” exercising investment discretion with respect to
accounts having an aggregate fair market value of at least $100 million in equity
securities.234 Finally, Section 16(a) of the Exchange Act requires 10% shareholders
or insiders (e.g., officers or directors) of the reporting companies to report on a
continuous basis the shares they hold and any change in the shares they hold on a
continuous basis, and they all are also subject to a short swing profit provision
under Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act.235
In sum, although hedge funds may be exempted from registration and
accompanying reporting requirements relying on the safe harbor provision in the
Securities Exchange Act, they remain subject to other reporting and insider trading
regulations such as the 5% report, the 10% report, and the short swing rule; These
requirements are applicable to them regardless of their status as a registered
company under the Exchange Act.
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See 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-2.

Section 13(f)(5)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act defines “institutional investment manager”
as “any person other than a natural person investing in or buying and selling securities for its own
account, and any person exercising investment discretion with respect to the accounts of any other
person.” See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(f)(5)(A).
234
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See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a), (b).
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4. Investment Advisers Act of 1940
Section 202(a)(11) of the Investment Advisers Act defines investment
adviser as “any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of advising
others, either directly or through publications or writings, as to the value of
securities or as to the advisability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities,
or who, for compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or promulgates
analyses or reports concerning securities.” 236 Investment advisers are subject to
registration requirements unless they satisfy certain limited exemptions available
under the Advisers Act. Unsurprisingly, hedge fund advisers fall within the
definition of the investment adviser under the Advisers Act.
However, many hedge fund advisers avoid the registration obligations by
relying on the safe harbor provision of Section 203(b), which exempts any
investment adviser that (i) had 14 or fewer clients during the preceding 12 months,
and that (ii) does not hold themselves out to the public as an investment adviser.237
What that means is that so long as it satisfies the “no hold out” requirement,
and it has no registered investment company or business development company as
their client, they are allowed to manage up to 14 hedge funds, regardless of the
number of underlying beneficial owners, without registering as an investment
adviser under the Advisers Act.238 By relying on the safe harbor rule, hedge fund
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (2004).
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Any investment adviser providing investment advice vis-à-vis registered investment company
(i.e., mutual fund) or business development company is not entitled to the Section 203(b)
exemption even if they have 14 or fewer clients. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3) (2004).
This has been possible because the legislative intent and the SEC’s previous interpretation about
the meaning of the “client” have supported the idea that the fund, not the underlying investors,
238
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managers are almost completely free from onerous compliance requirements,
except anti-fraud provision under the Advisers Act.239
As demonstrated above, the private fund market has relied on various safe
harbor provisions in the securities related statutes to maintain its unregulated status,
and there has been no particular regulatory concerns raised against them because
they used to be relatively small in size and they used to have insignificant negative
impacts on the market.240
In addition, their client base has been limited to certain presumably
sophisticated investors only (e.g., accredited investors or qualified purchasers).
Because the hedge fund market has been restricted to sophisticated investors and
they are deemed to “fend for themselves”, there had been no necessity for direct
regulatory intervention into the market (indeed, until the LTCM near-failure
occurred in 1998, there were few regulatory concerns raised against them for a
long time). 241
Thus, it is not that surprising to see that basically the hedge fund market
has been formed and developed based on the market supply and demand successfully settling as an unregulated private market – with the help of the safe
should be counted as a client in terms of the private adviser exemption unless the adviser provides
separate investment advice to the underlying investors. See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105, at
883-84.
239

Even if they are qualified for the exemption, some hedge fund advisers opt in and register as
investment advisers to accommodate clients’ requests or to maintain their competitiveness. See
SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at FN 76.
240

See id. at Appendix A (summarizing the history of previous studies or investigations of hedge
funds done by the SEC).
241

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 18.
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harbor rules available for them, and there were few regulatory concerns raised to
the market because only sophisticated investors are allowed to access the
market.242
Even after the LTCM near-failure in 1988, which was a representative
example of the potential negative impacts hedge funds could have on the overall
market due to their size and highly risky nature of their excessively leveraged
positions, this legislative and regulatory position has remained unchanged. 243
Instead, various indirect regulatory initiatives have been made more focusing on
market self-discipline or on self-regulation, rather than on direct regulatory or
governmental intervention.244
However, in 2003 the SEC raised some regulatory concerns about the
hedge fund industry when they found, among other things, that (i) the market had
grown rapidly within a relatively short period of time and that this trend was
anticipated to continue going forward, while there was little information about
them available to investors and regulators, and (ii) more and more substantively
unsophisticated investors (albeit legally treated them as sophisticated investors)
were exposed to the market, both directly through the accredited investor or
qualified purchaser threshold rules and indirectly through fund of funds or pension

See e.g., Michael J. Schmidt, Notes and Comments, “Investor Protection” in Europe and the
United States: Impacting the Future of Hedge Funds, 25 WIS. INT’L L. J. 161, 166-68 (Spring 2007)
(summarizing the US hedge fund regime as an “indirect regulation approach” primarily relying on
mandated disclosure and investor restrictions).
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See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28. See also Registration under the Advisers Act
of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140.
244

See e.g., PWG Report, supra note 102; GAO Report, supra note 102.
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funds, and (iii) law enforcement tools against their potential malpractices or
misconducts were only limitedly available; leaving regulators to rely on anti-fraud
rules while many market malpractices continuously took place in the market.245
Based on these regulatory backgrounds, the SEC made an attempt to
regulate hedge funds directly by making the hedge fund advisers subject to
mandatory registration requirement.246 In doing so, the SEC amended the private
adviser exemption to change the method of calculating the number of the clients
regarding funds in determining whether the hedge fund advisers satisfy the “fewer
than 15 clients” threshold conditions.247
This new hedge fund rule was referred to as the “look through” rule, under
which almost all the then existing hedge fund advisers became subject to
mandatory registration, and consequently became subject to direct regulatory
oversight because underlying investors in a fund were to be included in calculating
the number of clients with respect to the private adviser exemption.248
The SEC strived to justify the mandatory registration regime by focusing
on micro-prudential regulatory standpoints (i.e., conventional rationales for
245

See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 76-87; William H. Donaldson, Chairman, U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs Concerning Investor Protection Implications of Hedge Funds (April 10,
2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/041003tswhd.htm. See also Registration
Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140, at 76-88 (illustrating,
among other things, that the (i) growth of the hedge fund market, (ii) increase in the hedge fund
fraud cases, and (iii) retailization (i.e., retail investors’ broad exposure to hedge funds market) are
primary concerns from a regulatory perspective, and set the grounds for the mandatory registration
requirement).
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See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140.
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See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(b)(3)-1 (2006).
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Id.
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securities regulation) such as investor protection or deterrence of market fraud, not
on a systemic risk regulatory standpoint, despite the fact that they went through the
LTCM episode in 2003.
The LTCM episode was widely pointed out as a leading landmark case for
demonstrating how even one big-sized hedge fund failure may negatively affect
the overall market directly (through liquidity channel) and indirectly (through the
counterparty credit channel).249
Based on traditional rationales for securities regulation, the SEC made
efforts to have hedge funds under their regulatory purview by implementing the
new “look through” rule in conjunction with the private adviser exemption. That is,
by changing the method of calculating the number of clients targeting hedge funds,
and including the beneficial owners of the funds in determining if private fund
advisers meet the fewer than 15 clients threshold conditions.250
The SEC also paid special attention to the facts that hedge fund information
was very limitedly available to investors and regulators, while the hedge fund
market was rapidly growing and many unaccredited investors were being exposed

249

This implicates that, until the time when the new hedge fund rule was released in 2004, system
risk was not been seriously taken into account as a rationale for securities regulation, rather it was
regarded as a ground for regulating other entities (e.g., banks or prime brokers). There has been a
consensus that it is more important and efficient to regulate the counterparty or creditor banks, and
through them the hedge fund default issue could be handled. In other words, it appears that
systemic risk concern was not considered critical in contemplating a hedge fund regulatory
framework even after the LTCM scandal, and it was broadly accepted even from the regulators’
side that an indirect regulatory approach based on the best practices or market self-disciplines
would be more appropriate and efficient for dealing with the systemic risk issue. See PWG Report,
supra note 102, at 29-44; GAO Report, supra note 102, at 33-39.
250

See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140,
Chapter II, Part D.
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to the highly risky hedge fund market under the accredited investor thresholds or
through fund of funds/pension fund schemes.251
The SEC also tried to justify the regulation based on the assumption that it
is more likely to deter hedge fund frauds, stressing that many fraudulent market
malpractices took place in the hedge fund industry such as mispricing,
misappropriation, and conflicts of interest, and that it is harder for regulators to
proactively take action without having proper regulation in place.252
These SEC’s regulatory efforts ended up with success to some extent
because it was reflected in the SEC Rule and in force early 2006 until it was
eventually vacated by the U.S. court later in 2006 based on the ground that the
SEC had no rule-making authority to amend the rule in violation of the relevant
251

This regulatory argument may be somewhat persuasive in the sense that even general public is
able to access the hedge fund market indirectly through the fund of funds or pension funds. In that
respect, mandated disclosure issue becomes relevant, and mandatory registration requirement may
be justified to some extent. Despite the SEC’s attention to this issue, it may be not that critical, and
at the same time may be a bit misleading because there should be a fiduciary there in the fund of
funds or pension fund scheme, who is obligated to make investment decision on behalf of the
underlying investors and in the best interest of them. These fiduciaries are deemed accredited
investors with expertise, knowledge and experience in negotiating with the hedge fund managers on
an arm’s length basis. More important thing is that basically they are regulated entities and subject
to regulatory obligations when investing in hedge funds. Thus, it seems not that persuasive ground
to justify the mandatory registration requirement in terms of the private adviser exemption. In
particular, the rapid growth of the hedge fund market is more relevant to systemic risk issue, than
mandated disclosure issue, and it should be more appropriate to deal with the hedge fund problem
in that direction. Considering the facts that it is a private market in compliance with the private
offering exemption and it is based on the assumption that all the investors in this market are
composed of sophisticated investors, this regulatory approach may lose the ground to justify the
regulation. Regulator’s limited access problem to the market is understandable to some extent, but
it may be also handled without much difficulty through regulated counterparties or creditorfinancial institutions or simply imposing reporting requirement, instead of imposing full registration
and other compliance obligations, is sufficient to that end. See e.g., Paul S. Atkins, Statement by
SEC Commissioner at Open Meeting Considering Proposed Regulation Under the Advisers Act of
Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, July 14, 2004, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch071404psa.htm.
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See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140.
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law (i.e., Investment Advisers Act).253 After the court’s negative decision about the
new hedge fund rule, the SEC tried to regulate hedge funds indirectly through the
amendments of the anti-fraud rule in the Advisers Act and the accredited investor
threshold conditions in Regulation D, instead of revisiting the mandatory
registration issue again.254
In sum, a new hedge fund rule was in force in early 2006 to regulate hedge
fund managers through mandatory registration and reporting requirements, based
on the traditional rationales for securities regulation, not based on the systemic risk
regulatory rationale. However, the rule was short-lived until late 2006 because of
insufficient legislative background and was invalidated by the court’s ruling. The
regulatory concerns raised at that time were perhaps relevant and agreeable, but
were inappropriately and disproportionately responded to because mandatory
disclosure and registration requirements created an overly extensive regulatory
regime that was not in line with the legislative intents for private offering or
private adviser exemption.255
Investor protection concerns may be resolved or substantially mitigated by
heightening the accredited investor threshold conditions and regulating third party
fiduciaries (e.g., pension funds or fund of funds managers) to behave more
prudently and exercise due diligence in choosing the hedge funds they invest in the
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See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 105, at 883-84.
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See 17 C.F.R. 203.207 (2007). See also Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled
Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 195.
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For the legislative history of the Advisers Act, see SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at
20-21.
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funds they manage. By doing so, the private fund market could be distinguished
more clearly from the public fund market, and this would be more consistent with
the well-established rationales for securities regulation and exemptions.256
Hedge fund fraud issues could be also tackled without difficulty by
regulators’ applying the anti-fraud rules more strictly, or by leaving the fraud
issues to the relevant parties to resolve through civil litigation.257

C. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.S.: After the Dodd-Frank

Act
As briefly indicated supra, in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis,
hedge funds have been pointed out for their roles in causing the crisis in one way
or another.258 The systemic risk issues, like those highlighted after the LTCM near-
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See e.g., Choi, supra note 156; Schmidt, supra note 242.
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In fact, that was advocated for and acted upon by the SEC chairman after the new hedge fund
rule was invalidated by the court. The SEC revised the anti-fraud rule under the Advisers Act to
prevent any loophole in enforcing any fraud cases against the hedge fund advisers. See Statement of
Chairman Cox Concerning the Decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals on Phillip Goldstein, et al. v.
SEC (Aug. 7, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-135.htm. See also
Prohibition of Fraud by Advisers to Certain Pooled Investment Vehicles; Accredited Investors in
Certain Private Investment Vehicles, supra note 195.
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For instance, put aside the LTCM scandal in 1998, the Amaranth Adviser episode in 2006 (the
biggest hedge fund failure in terms of the size of loss,; the U.S. based hedge fund adviser lost about
6 billion dollars due to huge bets on natural gas futures), the Bear Stearns episode where two hedge
funds were bankrupted due to its heavy bet on mortgage backed securities (i.e., CDOs) in 2007, and
Lehman Brothers was also went bankrupt, among other things, due to unbearable loss in its subprime mortgage financing deals in 2008. In common in between the two large investment banking
firms in big trouble was that they both had been heavily involved in the sub-prime mortgage related
financial transactions, and had maintained unbearably concentrated positions on the products. See
e.g., Scott Hamilton & Matt Turner, The Rise and Fall of Amaranth Advisors, FIN. NEWS, 23 July,
2009, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2009-07-23/the-rise-and-fall-of-amaranthadvisors?ea9c8a2de0ee111045601ab04d673622; Vikas Bajaj & Julie Creswell, Bear Stearns Staves
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meltdown in 1998, are the very grounds for the regulators to create a new
regulatory regime, as reflected in the Dodd-Frank Act.259 Under the new regime,
private funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, advisers become
fully subject to registration, reporting, and other compliance requirements in the
Advisers Act like other conventionally regulated advisers.260
This new hedge fund regime is different from the previous regime (i.e., the
new hedge fund rule of 2006) in several ways.
First, back in 2006 when the SEC amended the Advisers Act Rule to make
private fund advisers under the regulatory purview, the SEC primarily relied on the
traditional, long-standing rationales to justify the regulation such as investor
protection and deterrence of fraud. Under the Dodd-Frank regime, systemic risk
was added as an additional regulatory rationale and it is a primary factor to
determine whether or not private fund managers are subject to mandatory
registration and reporting requirements.261

Off Collapse of 2 Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/21/business/21bonds.html?pagewanted=all; Andrew Ross Sorkin,
Lehman Files for Bankruptcy, Merrill is Sold, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 14, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/15/business/15lehman.html?pagewanted=all.
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As a matter of fact, it has been anticipated that securities regimes would become more stringent
as a result of the global financial crisis of 2008 in that IOSCO has proclaimed that systemic risk
would be added as a new rationale for securities regulation in addition to the traditionally accepted
rationales like protecting investors and/or ensuring market integrity, and securities regimes among
the member countries should be amended in accordance with this new rationale. See IOSCO
Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102, at 12-13.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3 (2012); Dodd-Frank Act § 403.

See Dodd-Frank Act, preliminary note (stating that the legislative intent of the Act is “to
promote the financial stability of the United States by improving accountability and transparency in
the financial system, to end ``too big to fail'', to protect the American taxpayer by ending bailouts,
to protect consumers from abusive financial services practices, and for other purposes”).
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Second, the former private adviser exemption based on the number of
clients (i.e., “fewer than 15 clients” exemption) has been eliminated and replaced
by a size-based exemption. It may be viewed as a fundamental change in the
regulatory framework for private fund advisers because the number of clients
based private adviser exemption is no more available, and instead only small-sized
or mid-sized advisers can be exempted from federal regulations in the future. All
these regulatory changes have been justified primarily focusing on the systemic
risk or macro-prudential regulatory perspective.262
In short, there is no more “fewer than 15 clients” private fund adviser
exemption available for the U.S. based private fund advisers, and instead sizebased exemption was newly implemented.263
262

See id. The number of clients based exemption is still available even under the Dodd-Frank Act,
but what is different from the former private adviser exemption is that it is only applicable to
foreign private advisers. In that regard, it may not be viewed as a fundamental shift in regulatory
architecture, but there is little doubt that there has been a dramatic change made in designing new
private adviser exemption, and there has been a distinctive regulatory position shift, from the client
number-based regulation to the fund size-based regulation. In addition, this regulatory position has
been unchanged even in making a safe harbor rule for foreign private advisers in that they are
eligible for the exemption only if they have 25 million dollars or less in assets under management
and they have fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors. All these changes have been justified in terms
of the mitigation of systemic risk. It is somewhat puzzling, however, why the US based private
adviser should be treated differently from the foreign private adviser because their potential impact
on the U.S. market should be assessed same regardless of their location, and it should be under
careful reconsideration whether or not this position should be maintained without any modification.
See supra note 260.
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More precisely speaking, former 25 million dollars in assets under management threshold has
been increased to 150 million dollars in assets under management (this assets under management
threshold are lowered to 100 million dollars in assets under management by the SEC Rule), and
consequently any private fund adviser not meeting the minimum threshold assets under
management condition, in principle, is not eligible for the SEC registration. Instead, under the
Dodd-Frank Act, they are subject to State regulation subject to certain limited exceptions. What it
means is that these so-called mid-sized private fund advisers become generally subject to State
regulation instead of Federal regulation, and no opt-in is allowed for them even though they
voluntarily would like to choose to register with the SEC in order to be subject to Federal
regulation rather than state regulation. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-1.
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Third, under the new hedge fund regime of 2006, private equity fund
managers were placed outside the regulatory purview at the outset because of the
“two-year lock up” safe harbor provision, while they now become subject to
various compliance requirements such as registration and periodic reporting under
the Advisers Act.264 It is unclear why private equity fund managers are treated the
same as hedge fund advisers, and are treated differently from venture capital fund
advisers under the Dodd-Frank Act. It may be inferred that they have been
identified as a source of potential systemic risk like hedge funds. Further, it
becomes blurry to distinguish private equity fund advisers from hedge fund
managers because hedge funds have become more active in raising their voices in
corporate governance issues, like private equity funds typically do.265
Fourth, a private fund adviser exempted from mandatory registration with
the SEC is nonetheless subject to reporting and recordkeeping requirements under

264

As indicated supra, it has been a controversial issue whether private equity fund advisers should
be included into the private fund adviser category, and be subject to full scope of the Advisers Act
under the Dodd-Frank Act. Many opponents strongly argue, among other things, that (i) private
equity funds are irrelevant to the systemic risk issue in nature, (ii) most of the provisions in the
Advisers Act are not fit for the private equity fund advisers, and (iii) the compliance burden is too
onerous to take. See e.g. Joseph A. Tillman, Note, Beyond the Crisis: Dodd-Frank and Private
Equity, 87 N.Y.U.L.REV. 1602, 1615-20 (Nov. 2012). Because of these concerns raised, new
legislative consideration is under way to exempt private equity fund advisers from the Advisers Act.
See Sarah N. Lynch, U.S. House Passes Bill to Exempt Private Equity Funds from Rules, REUTERS,
Dec. 4, 2013, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/04/house-sec-privateequityidUSL2N0JJ26W20131204.
265

See Eilis Ferran, The Regulation of Hedge Funds and Private Equity: A Case Study in the
Development of the EU’s Regulatory Response to the Financial Crisis, ECGI Working Paper Series
in Law, Working Paper No. 176/2011 (Feb. 2011), at 4-5, available at
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762119. See also David M. Freedman, The
Difference between Private Equity and Venture Capital, Jan. 30, 2013, available at
http://www.accreditedinvestormarkets.com/article/the-difference-between-private-equity-venturecapital (broadly explaining how the private equity funds are different from venture capital funds).
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the Dodd-Frank Act, while the former hedge fund rule exempted them from any
reporting or recordkeeping requirements.266
As indicated earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act has been in place focusing on
systemic risk regulatory standpoint, and the Act has empowered the SEC to access
relevant systemic risk information from the “exempt reporting advisers” even if
they are exempted from the registration and other compliance requirements, due to
their relatively small size (for exempted private advisers) or limited nature of the
business (for venture capital fund advisers).267
Fifth, asset threshold for mandatory registration becomes higher from 30
million dollars to 150 million dollars in assets under management under the DoddFrank Act. It generally means that any private fund advisers not meeting the asset
threshold would be exempted from SEC registration, and instead subject to
relevant State regulation such as registration and/or examination.268 So-called midsized private advisers, with assets under management of between 25 million
dollars and 100 million dollars, are not allowed to opt in the SEC registration if
they are eligible for the exempted private advisers and if they are subject to State
registration and examination requirements.
By contrast, large-sized private fund advisers with assets under
management of between 100 million dollars and 110 million dollars are eligible for
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–4(a), 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4 (b).
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Id.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b–3a; 17 C.F.R. 275.203A-1.
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the SEC registration if they choose to do so although they are eligible for the State
registration.269
Sixth, the Dodd-Frank Act also made an attempt to amend the qualified
client standard under the Advisers Act and accredited investor standard under the
Regulation D in the Securities Act respectively. Under the Rule 205-3 of the
Advisers Act, the threshold for the qualified clients, among other things, has been
increased to 1 million dollars from 750,000 dollars in assets under management, or
to 2 million dollars from 1.5 million dollars in net-worth.270
The standard for accredited investors under the Rule 501 of the Regulation
D becomes more stringent by excluding the natural person’s primary residence
from the calculation of the individual’s net worth.271These regulatory efforts have
been made in response to the rising concerns about the substantively unaccredited
investors’ increased accessibility to the private fund market, and these regulatory
reforms can be understood as a regulatory measure to protect retail investors by
placing them outside the hedge fund market.272
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See id.

270

The qualified client threshold has been in place to ensure that only certain qualified individuals
with financial sophistication or sufficient net-worth are allowed to enter into an advisory agreement
with the advisers, based on the performance-based fee. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.205-3(a).
271

See Dodd-Frank Act § 413; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)(i)(A).
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Id.
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D. Summary and Comments
As illustrated supra, hedge funds and their advisers remained unregulated
or very lightly regulated for a long time by relying on the various safe harbor rules
under the securities related statutes in the U.S.
First, the Securities Act provides private offering exemptions for hedge
funds that offer or sell fund interests to accredited investors or other sophisticated
investors. These private offering exemptions were justified based on the
presumption that the sophisticated investors are able to protect themselves without
the governmental protection. 273 There seems to be no reason to change the current
regulatory framework because it has provided a clear distinction between the
private securities market and the public securities market and has helped the hedge
funds market remain private through the accredited investor standard.274
At issue in this private offering safe harbor rule is whether there are some
more objective factors for setting the accredited investor threshold, and whether
the deemed sophisticated investors can really make an informed decision without
the help of mandatory disclosure regime or separate sophistication test.
It is understandable that having high net-worth or earning high income does
not necessarily means that the relevant individual is financially sophisticated
273

See e.g., Fletcher, III, supra note 180, at 1122-24.

274

However, it is still debatable whether accredited investors, who are deemed financially
sophisticated, are really financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves without paternalistic
intervention by the government. See SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 28, at 80-83. See also
Felicia Smith, Madoff Ponzi Scheme Exposes “the Myth of the Sophisticated Investor”, 40 U. BALT.
L. REV. 215 (Winter 2010); Wallis K. Finger, Note, Unsophisticated Wealth: Reconsidering the
SEC’s “Accredited Investor” Definition under the 1933 Act, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 733 (2009);
Howard M. Friedman, On Being Rich, Accredited, and Undiversified: The Lacunae in
Contemporary Securities Regulation, 47 OKLA. L. REV. 291 (Summer 1994); Choi, supra note 156.
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enough to protect themselves. But, these objective standards may be necessary to
create a distinction between the general public and sophisticated investors. Without
a clear and objective standard, it would be almost impossible to raise capital from
wealthy individuals because the sophistication test is very subjective and
accordingly really difficult to make a judgment at time of investment. 275
Thus, it seems reasonable that current private offering safe harbor regime
based on the accredited investor standard should be maintained without substantial
changes, but should be fine-tuned by redefining the accredited investor threshold.
In that regard, the SEC’s regulatory effort to redefine the accredited investor
threshold condition by adding minimum invested amount threshold in addition to
the conventional thresholds based on net-worth or income should be assessed
positively.276
In addition, the JOBS Act has recently repealed the ban on general
solicitation and general advertisement, which used to be one of the essential
prerequisites for hedge funds to comply with to rely on the private offering safe
harbor.277
The new safe harbor rule (i.e., Rule 506(c) of Regulation D) may be
considered a fundamental policy change in terms of securities public offering
275

That is the reason why we have objective safe harbor rules under the securities laws, rather than
merely setting general rules in place. These safe harbor rules provide clear guidance to the market,
which may positively affect market formation and development because participants in the market
can be confident in the scope of the safe harbor rules. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.500.
276

Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, 17 C.F.R. 230, 239, 270 and 275, Release Nos.
33-9287; IA-3341; IC-29891 (Dec. 21, 2011).
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See 17 C.F.R. 230.506(c). See also Eliminating the Prohibition against General Solicitation and
General Adverting in Rule 506 and Rule 144A Offerings, supra note 67.
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regulation because regulatory focus was shifted from offerees to purchasers, and
because hedge funds are free to promote their securities without mandatory
registration under the Securities Act, provided that the purchasers are accredited
investors and the issuer (i.e., hedge funds here in this context) takes reasonable
step to verify that the purchasers are accredited investors at time of purchase.278
Under the new safe harbor rule, hedge funds may be incentivized to market the
funds utilizing various means of mass communication to attract prospective
investors in the future, which may be a way to encourage hedge funds to disclose
more information about them to the public.279
Second, the Investment Company Act provides two safe harbors for hedge
funds. Accordingly, any hedge fund satisfying the private fund conditions under
Section 3(c)(1), or the qualified purchaser fund conditions under Section 3(c)(7)
would be exempted from the onerous regulatory requirements under the Act. These
private fund related safe harbor rules in the U.S. may provide incentives for the
private fund advisers to set up the hedge funds in the U.S. because hedge fund
advisers have full discretion in customizing the fund investment structure to reflect
market conditions and clients’ needs in a timely manner, and hedge funds would
retain their unregulated status even under the Dodd-Frank Act.280
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See supra note 149.
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Under the new safe harbor rule of 506(c), unaccredited investors are strictly prohibited from
investing in the hedge funds. However, there is no doubt that general advertisement or general
solicitation made by the hedge funds would be beneficial for the general public because they are
also exposed to the hedge funds indirectly through fund of hedge funds or pension funds, and also
they may have potential to become accredited investors sometime in the future.
280

What the new safe harbor rule implicates is that hedge funds just need to be mindful about the
new accredited investor thresholds under the Regulation D to meet the private offering exemptions,
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This regulatory position appears reasonable because all the benefits that
hedge funds provide were possible because they are free from the paternalistic
regulations originally placed on mutual funds, and they are in the position to easily
avoid fund regulations by moving offshore if stringent fund regulation is in force
in the U.S.281
As illustrated supra, investor protection concerns are not critical if only
accredited investors have direct access to the hedge fund market, and if appropriate
fiduciary and disclosure regimes, that govern market intermediaries like fund of
funds or pension fund managers, are in place.
Systemic risk concerns are also controllable without difficulty through
manager regulation because hedge fund managers conduct investment and
management activities on a daily basis on behalf of the funds. More than anything
else, direct regulation of hedge funds would end up with losing many benefits they
have provided to the markets and investors.282
Third, the Investment Advisers Act provided a private adviser exemption
based on the number of clients for the hedge fund advisers to rely on (namely,
“fewer than 15 clients” exemption). Under the traditional private adviser
exemption, hedge fund, not underlying investors in the funds, was treated as one

because it is one of the threshold conditions for the private fund exemptions. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a–3
(c)(1), (7).
281

See e.g., Azhar & Ullatil, supra note 13.
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See supra Chapter III, Part B.3. See also Mercer Bullard, Regulating Hedge Fund Managers:
The Investment Company Act as a Regulatory Screen, 13 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 286 (Spring 2008)
(supporting the idea of having hedge fund managers under the regulatory purview of the Investment
Company Act by treating them as an investment company).
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client until the SEC changed the rule governing the method of calculating the
number of clients.283 The SEC’s first attempt to regulate hedge funds was shortlived and ended up with failure because the D.C. Circuit vacated the rule on the
ground that SEC had no legislative authority to change the rule and that doing so
was in contravention of the SEC’s previous interpretation of the meaning of “client”
in connection with fund.284
With the new hedge fund rule, the SEC made an attempt to regulate hedge
funds (excluding private equity funds), and tried to justify the new rule based on
the traditional securities regulatory rationales, and not based on systemic risk
regulation.285 That is, retailization with intransparency and continuous occurrence
of securities frauds from the hedge fund market were named as primary grounds
for the justification of the mandatory registration to the managers.286
However, the rulemaking faced strong oppositions from the inside of the
regulatory body, and from the hedge fund industry, that it was overly burdensome
and cost-inefficient, and that retail investor protection issue could be easily
resolved by redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions.287
Further, the hedge fund fraud issue is in essence a matter of law
enforcement because hedge fund advisers have been already subject to very broad
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See supra note 235.
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See Goldstein v. S.E.C., supra note 253.
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See Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140.
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See supra note 43. See also infra note 289.
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and powerful anti-fraud rules under the securities statutes, and because mandatory
registration and examination cannot guarantee that no hedge fund frauds occur.288
This policy ground is under negative scrutiny from many commentators because
under the new hedge fund rule, many small private advisers were still exempted
from regulatory oversight, despite many previous market malpractices occurring at
those small firms.289
Overall, the purpose of the new hedge fund rule was understandable, but
the way of dealing with the hedge fund problems was inappropriate or went too far
in terms of micro-prudential regulation.
After the global financial crisis of 2008 and accompanying failures of
several big investment banks such as Bear Sterns and Lehman Brothers, the
systemic risk issue became the primary concern for both the legislators and
regulators. As a result, drastic changes have been made in hedge fund regulation
by introducing size-based mandatory hedge fund adviser registration, and large
sized private fund advisers becomes subject to full scope of regulation under the
Dodd-Frank Act.290
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, private equity fund advisers are newly subject
to mandatory registration regimes in the Advisers Act depending on the size of the
assets under management, and former private adviser safe harbor rule has been
See e.g., Joseph Lanzkron, The Hedge Fund Holdup: The SEC’s Repeated Unnecessary Attacks
on the Hedge Fund Industry, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1509, 1530-33 (Summer 2008).
288
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See e.g., Atkins, supra note 251; Cynthia A. Glassman, Speech by SEC Commissioner,
Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Oct. 26, 2004, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102604cag.htm.
290

See supra note 258.

105

substituted for a foreign private adviser exemption (i.e., a non-US based adviser
with fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors in the private funds and 25 million
dollars in assets under management from them).291
All these regulatory changes are understandable in terms of macroprudential regulation because it is difficult to deny that hedge funds could
adversely affect the market directly through their trading activities in the market
and/or indirectly through the counterparty financial institutions, particularly during
times of severe market disruption.292
However, the problem in this regulatory approach is that the new hedge
fund regime under the Dodd-Frank Act put too much emphasis on systemic risk
and tries to regulate them in exactly the same way as other regulated advisers, and
to subject them to full scope of regulations under the Advisers Act - despite the
fact that there has been no clear evidence that they contribute to the global
financial crisis.293
Further, it is also problematic that there are no special direct regulatory
requirements, such as liquidity and leverage requirements, added to the Advisers
Act to mitigate systemic risks from hedge funds. Rather, this mandate seems to be
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See id.
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See e.g., Evan M. Gilbert, Unnecessary Reform: The Fallacies with and Alternatives to SEC
Regulation of Hedge Funds, 2 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 319, 332-35 (Spring 2009).
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See supra Chapter III, Part B.3, Part C.
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handed over to the Financial Stability Oversight Council (hereinafter as
“FSOC”).294
In terms of systemic risk-based regulation, size or assets under
management should not be viewed as the only one relevant factor to decide the
threshold for the exempted private advisers; leverage should be also taken into
account for that purpose.295
The FSOC was newly established to oversee and supervise systematically
important financial institutions including hedge funds and their advisers, and any
hedge funds and their advisers designated as systematically important financial
institutions become subject to very stringent macro-prudential regulation like other
regulated and FDIC insured financial institutions. In that regard, it would be
prudent that the securities regulator’s role be limited to gathering the relevant
information from the hedge fund industry, getting ready to take any corrective
regulatory measures if necessary, and strictly enforce the law against any
malpractices from the hedge fund market relying on the anti-fraud rules.296
294

It is not yet determined whether or not some of the big-sized hedge funds or their advisers are
designated as systematically important nonbank financial companies by the FSOC, but they become
subject to some stringent prudential regulation in accordance with Title 1 of the Dodd-Frank Act
once they are designated as such. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain
Nonbank Financial Companies, supra note 104.
295

See id. at 21640 (indicating that the designation of the systematically important nonbank
financial companies including hedge fund and/or its advisers should be determined considering
various factors like the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration, interconnectedness, or mix of the
activities of the nonbank financial company).
See e.g., Kathleen L. Casey, SEC Commissioner, Statement at SEC Open Meeting – Rules
Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940; Exemptions for Advisers to
Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets Under
Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, June 22, 2011, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm (arguing that “these rules will
needlessly harm innovation and capital formation without a demonstrated, articulable, or
296
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The Dodd-Frank Act permits hedge funds to remain exempted from fund
related regulations under the Investment Company Act. What it implicates is that
the prevention of systemic risk is practically impossible and infeasible because
hedge fund advisers are free to exercise highly risky or highly leveraged
transactions. Unquestionably, the best way to prevent or mitigate systemic risk
from potential hedge fund failures would be directly regulating them, but it is
undesirable because the regulatory cost outweighs the benefits from the
regulation.297
Thus, the more advisable regulatory approach would be to impose
registration and reporting obligations on big-sized and highly leveraged hedge
fund advisers, and to empower the SEC to intervene in the market to regulate them
during times of emerging systemic risk.298
However, current hedge fund regime under the Dodd-Frank Act provides
that large sized private advisers are fully subject to the Advisers Act based on the
systemic risk regulation, while most of the rules in the Advisers Act are in place
based on micro-prudential regulation. There seems to be insufficient grounds to
apply all the paternalistic rules and regulations under the Advisers Act to the
measurable benefit to investors or financial stability”). See also Eugene A. Ludwig, Assessment of
Dodd-Frank Financial Regulatory Reform: Strengths, Challenges, and Opportunities for a
Stronger Regulatory System, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (2012) (generally discussing about the
potential problems inherent in the Dodd-Frank Act).
297

See id.
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It is something similar to the regulatory approach applicable to the so-called exempted reporting
advisers, but the difference is that large private advisers are fully subject to the Advisers Act,
including registration and business conduct regulations, while the small or mid-sized advisers are
merely subject to reporting requirements, despite being exempted from the registration and other
requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4.
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private fund advisers because the Advisers Act was originally enacted to protect
investing public, not accredited investors, and because hedge funds’ target
investors are all accredited investors or qualified purchasers that have been legally
deemed sophisticated enough to protect themselves.299
On the other hand, it is also doubtful that it is necessary to regulate private
equity fund advisers exactly the same as hedge fund advisers by having them fully
subject to the Advisers Act. Private equity funds are less likely to pose systemic
risk than hedge funds, because their business is primarily centered on private
equity investments, not on short-term trading purpose. 300 As pointed out above,
there are no substantial investor protection and market fraud issues in the private
equity fund market in that the investors (i.e., limited partners or LPs) are strictly
limited to accredited investors, and they are subject to anti-fraud rules against any
fraudulent or deceptive market practices. Thus, it is prudent to treat them more like
venture capital funds, and to exempt them from the direct and full regulations, and
instead to make them subject to reporting requirements like “exempted reporting
advisers” (i.e., small sized private advisers or venture capital fund advisers).
In addition, the different treatment of U.S. based private advisers from
foreign private advisers is problematic in that, from a systemic risk standpoint, it
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See Hedge Fund Rule, supra note 56, at 72,067 (indicating that the legislative intent of enacting
the former private adviser exemption was to exempt certain advisers whose activities were “not
sufficiently large or national in scope”).
300

For the legislative background on why the U.S. Congress targeted private equity funds, see
Private Fund Investment Advisers Registration Act of 2009, H.R. Rep. No. 111-686, pt. 1 (2010), at
6, available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-111hrpt686/pdf/CRPT-111hrpt686-pt1.pdf.
See also Tillman, supra note 264, 1615-20 (arguing that no careful considerations or discussions
have been made focusing on private equity funds).
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seems more reasonable and consistent to apply the same threshold requirements to
both domestic and offshore private advisers. It is confusing to understand why the
U.S. Congress maintained the former “fewer than 15 clients” exemption for
foreign private advisers because the number of clients in the funds seems remote
from the systemic risk regulatory concern.301
In terms of investor protection, there is no strong need to directly regulate
foreign private advisers because, like US based private advisers, they must offer or
sell fund shares only to sophisticated investors and they are subject to anti-fraud
provisions under the US securities statutes. Therefore, it seems more prudent to
have the same threshold conditions applied to both domestic private advisers and
foreign private advisers.302

See e.g., Michael I. Overmyer, Note, The “Foreign Private Adviser” Exemption: A Potential
Gap in the New Systemic Risk Regulatory Architecture, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 2185, 2211-19 (Dec.
2010) (arguing that the same registration obligation should be imposed on foreign private advisers
as is applicable to US based private advisers in terms of systemic risk based regulation).
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See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203(m)(b). It should be noted that non US-based private advisers are also
able to rely on the general private adviser exemption based on the assets under management
(namely, less than 150 million dollars in assets under management), but due to the foreign private
adviser exemption and because of the difference in threshold conditions between the two, it is more
likely that regulatory arbitrage problem arises, providing disadvantages to the US based private
advisers (especially to start-up companies) and force them to choose a more regulatory favorable
overseas jurisdictions. See id.
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V.

Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K.

A. Overview
Traditionally, the U.K., and especially London, has been well-known as the
center for hedge fund business in Europe. This is supported by the fact that London
has been ranked as the first place venue for hedge fund managers in Europe, and as
the second place venue worldwide (following the U.S.).303 Various factors explain
why most hedge fund managers in Europe and worldwide have been willing to be
based in London. “Local expertise, the proximity of institutional clients and global
markets, a long established financial services industry, and a generally favorable
regulatory environment” are some of the factors generally discussed.304
Interestingly, however, most hedge funds managed by London-based
managers are not domiciled in the U.K. This can be explained from both a
regulatory and a tax perspective. From a regulatory perspective, there are no
special rules and regulations in place for U.K. based hedge funds, while offshore
domiciled funds have remained unregulated if they are offered or sold only to
certain U.K. professional investors. 305 As a result, by setting up their funds

303

As of the year-end of 2012, almost 80% of hedge fund assets in Europe are under management
by U.K. based managers. See 2013 Preqin Global Hedge Fund Report, at 7, Fig. 2.3, available at
https://www.preqin.com/docs/samples/The_2013_Preqin_Global_Hedge_Fund_Report_Sample_Pa
ges.pdf.
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CORNISH & M ASON, supra note 47, at 483.
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Onshore funds can also be exempted from regulation unless they are marketed to the general
public. In that regard, it may not be a critical factor in explaining why most hedge funds managed
by U.K. based managers are domiciled offshore, rather than onshore. Rather, the tax consideration
may be more important in choosing the jurisdiction for the fund to be set up. See infra Chapter V,
Part B.

111

offshore, it is more convenient and provides more flexibility to U.K. based
managers to be able to structure a fund investment strategy reflecting investors’
needs both locally and globally. From a tax perspective, unfavorable tax treatment
may be applicable if a fund is established as an unregulated fund in the U.K.
compared to if the fund was established in an offshore tax haven, such as the
Cayman Islands or the British Virgin Islands.306
Overall, the U.K. has maintained its leading role in the hedge fund
management business in Europe and worldwide, partly because of a flexible
regulatory environment that allows offshore funds to remain unregulated 307 if they
are only marketed privately to professional investors.

B. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K.: Before the AIFMD

1.

Hedge Fund Manager Regulation
In principle, any person, including a hedge fund manager, who intends to

conduct “regulated activities” in the U.K., must first be authorized by the Financial
Conduct Authority (hereinafter as “FCA”).308 Even a manager domiciled outside
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The tax issue is very important, especially for foreign investors, because they are concerned
about the potential double taxation issue. As a result they may be more comfortable with the fund
regimes located in tax haven countries. See supra note 304.
307

The U.K. financial regulatory body was referred to as the Financial Services Authority until it
was separated into and reorganized as the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential
Regulation Authority (a part of the Bank of England) on April 1, 2013. The roles of the two
separate regulatory bodies may be seen at their websites:
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/PRA/Pages/default.aspx, and http://fca.org.uk/about/what.
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See FSMA, art. 19, Sch. 6.
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the jurisdiction of the U.K. may be subject to U.K. regulations depending on
factual circumstances. 309 For instance, an offshore manager is more likely to
become subject to U.K. regulations if the offshore manager contemplates
conducting “regulated activities” in the U.K. market, such as marketing the
offshore funds they manage to U.K. investors or trading the fund assets.310
Contrary to the U.S. regime, there is no license exemption available for
hedge fund managers in the U.K., and they are subject to authorization and other
business conduct rules like other regulated financial companies. However, the
authorization requirements are relatively flexible because they are in place based
on broad principles.
As a result, the U.K. regulatory authority (i.e., the FCA) has discretion to
apply the requirements to hedge fund managers as leniently as possible provided
that they intend to conduct the business on a limited basis focusing on professional
investors. 311 Schedule 6 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000
(hereinafter as “FSMA”) provides threshold requirements for authorization,
including the applicant’s legal status and location of the offices, close links (i.e.,

See id. art. 21(3). (“In the case of a communication originating outside the United Kingdom,
subsection (1) applies only if the communication is capable of having an effect in the United
Kingdom.”).
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See Cornish & Mason, supra note 47, at 487.

See Hector Sants, FSA Chief Executive, Hedge Funds – Lessons from the Recent Market
Turmoil: A Supervisor’s Perspective, Nov. 20, 2007, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/Speeches/2007/112 0_hs.shtml.
311
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control person(s) of the applicant firm), fitness and propriety of the persons
involved of the firm, and the adequacy of the financial or other resources.312
As authorized and regulated entities, hedge fund managers are required to
have internal policies and procedures in place to monitor that their regulatory
capital is adequate. It is an ongoing obligation while carrying on the authorized
business to remain in compliance with the initial authorization requirements. 313
Wholesale firms like hedge fund managers are not strictly subject to examination
requirements under the Senior Managements Arrangements, Systems and Controls
(hereinafter as “SYSC”) 5 of the FCA Handbook regarding “approved person”.314
That is, a person in the hedge fund managers may be deemed competent without a
thorough examination provided that the applicants can demonstrate why they
believe they are competent.315
Hedge fund sales agents are also subject to authorization by the FCA
because fund marketing and promotion activities are also considered “regulated
activities” under the FSMA.316 In terms of ongoing examination, the U.K. financial
regulator has taken an “outcome-based” approach, along with a broad “principlebased” regime. 317 What this means is that the FSA will take regulatory action
312

See FSMA, art. 41, Sch. 6 (providing broad line-by-line requirements on the threshold
conditions for authorization).
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CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 492.
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Id. at 493-94.
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Id.
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See FSMA, art. 19, 21-22.

317

See Sants, supra note 311.
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against regulated entities, like hedge fund managers, if they find something wrong
in the actions or decisions made by the regulated firms. That evaluation is done
based on the outcomes and consequences of the actions or decisions made, with
reference to the general regulatory principles, and not based on the mere fact of
being in compliance of any given rules.318 For example, Principles for Businesses
3 requires regulated firms to “take reasonable care to establish and maintain such
systems and controls as are appropriate to its business.” 319 This high level
regulatory principle is applied with broad flexibility depending on the size, nature,
scope, and complexity of the business.320
Like other regulated entities, hedge fund managers are subject to the FCA’s
“risk-based” supervision. Hedge fund managers are required to have enough
capital to cover any potential risks they may face while carrying on their business
and to put adequate internal control and risk management systems in place to deal
with the risks inherent in the business.321 Through their “risk-based” supervision
approach and their “principle and outcome-based” regulations, the U.K. seeks to
ensure that any regulated firm carries on their business in compliance with the
rules and regulations in place under the FSMA.322

318

See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 47, at 501.

319

See Senior Managements Arrangements, Systems and Controls, art. 3.1.1R, available at
http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/SYSC/3/1.
320

Id. art. 3.1.2G.

321

See General Prudential Sourcebook, art. 2.1, available at
http://www.fshandbook.info/FS/html/FCA/GENPRU/2/1.
322

For the regulatory objectives of the FSMA, see FSMA, art. 3-6.
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Some may doubt why hedge fund managers, despite conducting business
on a limited basis and only targeting certain professional investors, should be
under prudential regulations. A micro-prudential regulatory perspective is
insufficient to justify such prudential regulation, because unlike other regulated
entities conducting business with the general public, hedge fund business is strictly
limited to certain professional investors. However, there seem to be grounds to
justify the application of prudential regulations to hedge fund managers in terms of
a macro-prudential perspective, because the overall size and risky nature of hedge
funds may pose systemic risk.323
Thus, there is little doubt that the current risk-based regime in the U.K.
should be maintained in general. However, the current regimes should also be
reconsidered in the sense that they do not take into account the size and risk level
of particular hedge fund businesses in subjecting them to full regulatory
supervision. That is, small-sized hedge fund managers have less of a potential to
pose systemic risk to the market, so there is little necessity to subject them to the
full scope of direct regulatory oversight.324

323

See Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, FSA Discussion
Paper, DP 12/1, Jan. 2012, at 14, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/FsaWeb/Shared/Documents/pubs/discussion/dp12-01.pdf. See also
FSMA, art. 3A (adding financial stability as one of the regulatory objectives of the FSMA after the
global financial crisis of 2008).
324

Some may argue that small hedge fund managers may also pose systemic risk on a collective
basis because of their herd behavior, particularly if they have similar investment strategies and
behave in the same direction during extreme market situations. But generally speaking, it is more
reasonable to say that they are less likely to cause systemic risk even in extreme market situations
because they are small in size and have limited market impact (even when they go bankrupt). See
Sants, supra note 311. (“We believe that these firms, with lower volumes of assets under
management, are generally not large enough to have a significant systemic impact, although there
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2. Hedge Fund Marketing Regulation
The FSMA forbids anyone from acting “in the course of business to
communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in investment activity” unless
certain conditions or exemptions are met.325 This default rule is that only an FCA
authorized or approved person is allowed to market their fund interests, but they
are subject to limited exemptions. One exemption allows someone other than the
authorized person to promote the funds provided that the content of the
communication is approved first by the authorized or approved person.326 Under
the FSMA, “financial promotion” is defined very broadly to include any
communication

noted

above,

and

the

promotion

rules

may

include

communications made from outside the U.K.327
Thus, an unauthorized person (including an unauthorized hedge fund) is not
allowed to communicate an invitation or inducement to engage in the marketing or
promotional activity in the U.K. unless they rely on exemptions, because offering
circulars (e.g., private placement memorandum) and other marketing materials for
activities of the fund may constitute financial promotion under the FSMA.328 In
particular, Article 238 of the FSMA applies in cases where the promotion of an
unregulated collective investment scheme (like a hedge fund) has been made in the
may be issues to manage where they hold concentrated positions in specific thinly traded
securities.”).
325

See FSMA, art. 21, 238.

326

Id.

327

See FSMA, art. 21(3), 238(3).

328

See supra note 325.
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U.K., and it specifies the categories of investors that can be marketed or promoted
to by hedge fund managers without being subject to regulatory supervision.329
The Conduct of Business Sourcebook (hereinafter as “COBS”) 4.12R also
provides some exemptions for the general prohibition of fund promotion under
Article 238 of the FSMA. It provides a safe harbor rule that it is not a breach of
Article 238 of the FSMA for hedge fund managers to market the fund shares,
provided that the managers take reasonable steps to ensure that they market fund
interests to only the specified categories of persons, or to any other persons
reasonably regarded as being comparable to those in the specified categories.330
Therefore, if they wish to make use of this exemption it is critically
important for hedge fund managers to only market hedge funds to certain
categories of professional investors. However, because hedge funds are typically
domiciled offshore they are not allowed to market to the general public; only U.K.
based funds or offshore-based funds that are authorized or recognized by the FCA

329

See FSMA, art. 238(5). See also Conduct of Business Sourcebook, art. 4.12.1R [hereinafter
COBS], available at http://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COBS/4/12 (providing some
exemptions for an authorized person to market or promote unregulated funds like hedge funds).
330
See COBS, supra note 329. COBS 4.12.1:
(1) A firm may communicate an invitation or inducement to participate in an unregulated collective
investment scheme without breaching the restriction on promotion in section 238 of the Act if the
promotion falls within an exemption in the table in (4), as explained further in the Notes.
(2) Where the left-hand column in the table in (4) refers to promotion to a category of person, this
means that the invitation or inducement:
(a) is made only to recipients who the firm has taken reasonable steps to establish are persons in
that category; or
(b) is directed at recipients in a way that may reasonably be regarded as designed to reduce, so far
as possible, the risk of participation in the collective investment scheme by persons who are not in
that category.
(3) A firm may rely on more than one exemption in relation to the same invitation or inducement.
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are eligible for the exemption that allows them to market to the general public
under the FSMA.331
The Qualified Investor Schemes established in the U.K. are not accessible
to the public, even if the FCA has authorized them, because it was specially
designed as a non-retail scheme authorized to market only to “qualified investors.”
The qualified investor schemes are also subject to financial promotion regulations
and only authorized persons are permitted to market the funds.332
However, some exemptions are available for hedge funds to rely on in
terms of marketing. One of them is called the “Professional Clients” or “Eligible
Counterparties” exemption. Under this exemption hedge funds are free to market
the fund shares to professional clients and eligible counterparties without engaging
an authorized person in the U.K.333
An additional exemption is available for hedge funds where the promotion
is made to a person who is (or who has been in the past 30 months) a participant in
an unregulated scheme (Category 1); where a firm has made a suitability
determination for an existing (or newly accepted) client (Category 2); or where the
firm has made a suitability assessment of the prospective investor and has warned
the investor in writing that the firm will promote an unregulated scheme to them
(Category 8).334

331

See FSMA, art. 238, 264, 270, 272.

332

See supra note 326.

333

See COBS, art. 4.12, Category 7.

334

See COBS, art. 4.12, Category 1, 2, 8.
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3.

Hedge Fund Regulation
There has been no special regime in place under the U.K. fund regime for

hedge funds to rely on. However, the U.K. government introduced a Qualified
Investor Scheme (hereinafter as “QIS”) in 2004, and U.K. domiciled hedge funds
may utilize this regime. 335 Under this regime, QIS provides more flexibility for
hedge fund managers to exercise their investment strategies because, compared to
other regulated funds available to the general public, relatively less stringent
investment restrictions are imposed on them.
With this, hedge fund-like investment strategies can be utilized through the
QIS regime provided that the hedge fund is marketed to qualified investors.336 In
contrast, the Fund of Alternative Investment Funds (hereinafter as “FAIFs”) 337
scheme may be available if hedge fund managers intend to offer or sell fund
interests to the general public.
In this scheme, the general public can invest in offshore hedge funds
indirectly, while onshore managers are subject to tight due diligence obligations

335

CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 484. See also Collective Investment Schemes Sourcebook,
art. 8.1 (hereinafter “COLL”), available at
https://fshandbook.info/FS/html/handbook/COLL/8/1#D2.
336

For details about who is eligible to be Qualified Investors, see id. art. 8, Annex 1. Some other
types of fund schemes like “Futures and Options Schemes” or “Geared Futures and Options
Schemes” are also available for onshore hedge funds, but it may not work completely as applied to
hedge funds because those rules were not put in place with hedge funds in mind. See CORNISH &
MASON, supra note 55, at 484.
FAIFs mean “a non-UCITS retail scheme, or a sub-fund of a non-UCITS retail scheme which is
an umbrella whose authorised fund manager operates, or proposes to operate, it in accordance with
the investment and borrowing powers in COLL 5.7 (Investment powers and borrowing limits for
NURS operating as FAIFs)”. See FCA Handbook Glossary Definition, available at
https://fshandbook.info/FS/glossary-html/handbook/Glossary/F?definition=G2752.
337
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under the scheme because onshore managers are allowed to invest up to 100% of
the fund assets in unregulated offshore hedge funds.338
However, QIS and FAIFs are different from the “qualified purchaser fund”
under the U.S. regime, because the former are regulated funds (despite relatively
loose investment restrictions being imposed on them), while the latter is an
unregulated fund.339 The QIS and FAIFs are more comparable to Korean qualified
purchaser funds and may be referred to as “quasi-regulated” or “half-regulated”
funds.340
Unlike the authorized hedge fund-like schemes that are subject to FCA
supervisory oversight, such as QIS or FAIFs, unauthorized hedge funds are
generally free from onerous regulatory requirements by relying on private
placement safe harbors. As a result, they can be established in whatever legal form
they prefer, such as limited partnerships or closed-ended corporations. Tax
treatment is also one of the primary factors in determining the legal form of the
fund (as well as the favorable treatment of the offshore hedge funds over the U.K.
domiciled hedge funds), and is the primary reason why there have been so few
hedge funds established in the U.K.341

338

See COLL, art. 5.1.4, 5.7. For further details on FAIFs, see Fin. Serv. Auth., Fund of Alternative
Investment Funds (FAIFs), Consultation Paper (CP 07/6), March 2007, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/cp/cp07_06.pdf.
339

Id. For more detailed investment and borrowing restrictions applicable to Qualified Investor
Schemes, see COLL, art. 8.4.
340

See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1).

341

See CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 486. For a broad overview of the U.K. tax regime
applicable to hedge funds, see also CORNISH & MASON, supra note 55, at 516-23.
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As illustrated above, non-U.K. based hedge funds are not subject to the
FCA’s regulatory requirements unless they are offered or sold to the general
public.342 Therefore, it is not uncommon to observe managers who are domiciled
in the U.K. and are under the U.K. regulatory purview, while their funds are
seldom established in the U.K. but rather are set up in offshore tax havens.343

C. Hedge Fund Regulation in the U.K.: After the AIFMD

1. The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive
In an effort to regulate the hedge fund industry in a harmonious way within
the E.U. and worldwide in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis, the
European Commission (hereinafter as “EC”) adopted the E.U. Alternative
Investment Fund Managers Directive (hereinafter as “AIFMD” or “the Directive”)
in June 2011 (after long discussions and negotiations among the member states).344
The AIFMD was partially implemented in all E.U. member states starting on July
22, 2013.

342

See supra note 331.

343

The reasons why many hedge fund managers are based in the U.K., despite the fact that they are
subject to regulatory supervision, are that there are many potential clients available in the U.K., and
that the U.K. provides a more reliable and more convenient infra-structure for hedge fund managers
to conduct hedge fund business, along with a relatively flexible regulatory regime. See Eva Pakla,
An Analysis of Regulation Governing Hedge Funds in the US and the EU from 2002 to July 2010:
A Preliminary Assessment, 2 W. MIN. L. REV. 1, 34-39 (Sept. 2012); ATHANASSIOU , supra note 79,
at 165-81.
344

For details about the legislative history before the AIFMD was adopted, see ATHANASSIOU,
supra note 79, at 165-81.
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Undoubtedly, the AIFMD will have a substantial impact on the alternative
investment fund markets within the E.U. and worldwide, because it includes many
aspects of the alternative investment fund industry. 345 That is, the E.U. member
states are required to transpose the AIFMD into their national regimes respectively
by the implementation date (July 22, 2013). There are some transitional periods
available, but the AIFMD will be in force and reflected into the local regime of
each E.U. member state in due course.346
The AIFMD provides a uniform and comprehensive regime for the first
time among the E.U. member states; it includes alternative investment funds (E.U.
based or not), their managers (domiciled in the EU region or not), their affiliated
service providers (such as depositories), and the marketing of the funds. 347 E.U.
based Alternative Investment Fund Managers (hereinafter as “AIFMs”) are fully
subject to the Directive, while non-E.U. based AIFMs, who intend to market the
funds (E.U. based or not) to E.U. investors.
The AIFMs are partially subject to disclosure and other reporting
requirements unless they apply for authorization in accordance with the Directive
(which is transposed to the local member state regimes) to manage E.U. based

The EC adopted something called “Level 2” regulation on December 2012 as a Supplementing
Directive to the AIFMD, and it will also become a part of the AIFMD when it is in force. For
further details on the Level 2 regulation, see Commission Delegated Regulation (EU), O.J. L 132,
15.5.2013, Implementing Regulation 2011/61/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council
with regard to exemptions, general operating conditions, depositaries, leverage, transparency and
supervision, available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/alternative_investments/2013/regulation-2013447_en.pdf.
345

346

See AIFMD, art. 66.

347

See id. explanatory note 4.
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alternative investment funds or to market the funds under the so-called “passport
regime.”348
Several noteworthy aspects of the Directive are as follows:
First, the AIFMD defines alternative investment funds (hereinafter as
“AIFs”) very broadly to include any “collective investment undertakings … which
raise capital from a number of investors, with a view to investing it in accordance
with a defined investment policy for the benefit of those investors, and do not
require authorization pursuant to Article 5 of Directive 2009/65/EC.”349 Due to the
broad definition of AIFs any pooled investment vehicles, including commodity
funds, real estate funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds, become subject to
the Directive.
Second, the threshold requirements for AIFMs, who are fully subject to the
Directive, are somewhat different from those of the U.S. These requirements are
two-tiered depending on whether leverage is utilized and on the length of the lockup period for the funds. The default rule is that any AIFMs having 100 million
euros or more in assets under management, are required to be authorized and are
wholly subject to the Directive.
However, this asset under management threshold increases to 500 million
euros if the AIFMs do not make use of the leveraged investment strategies for the
funds and if they put a lock-up period in place of 5 years or longer.350 This two-

348

See id. explanatory note 65, 66.

349

See id. art. 4(1)(a).

350

Those small firms having assets under management in their alternative investment funds lower
than the threshold are required to register with the relevant local regulator and are subject to lighter
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phased approach seems more reasonable for manager authorization than the
approach utilized in the U.S. The AIFMD sets the threshold conditions based on
various systemic risk relevant factors like the size of the funds they manage, the
use of leverage, and the length of the lock-up period, and it tries to strike a balance
to avoid an overregulation problem. 351
Third, the Directive provides that the AIFMs must be exclusive to the fund
they manage. As a result it becomes a fundamental issue of who the AIFM is, and
thus who is fully subject to the Directive, especially in cases where multiple
managers are involved in the management of the AIF. For instance, some
controversies exist about who is the AIFM under the Directive where all or
substantial parts of the core functions are delegated to third party manager(s).
The E.U. Level 2 regulation provides useful guidance about this issue by
expressly stating that an original AIFM becomes the “letter-box entity” if all or
substantial parts of the core functions are delegated to third party managers;
reporting requirements instead of the authorization requirement. This is comparable to the former
U.S. private fund safe harbor regime that exempted private funds from the definition of investment
company on the condition that they have a 2 years or longer lock-up period in place. This
exemption is primarily applicable to the private equity funds, but hedge funds are also able to rely
on the safe harbor if they satisfy the threshold requirements. See id. explanatory note 17.
351

Still this approach may face criticism in that, for example, private equity funds with no or low
leverage strategy and a long lock-up clause in place are inappropriate targets for direct regulation,
even from macro-prudential regulatory perspective, because the likelihood of their posing systemic
risk is substantially lower than hedge funds (considering their private equity investment nature and
their relatively small size). Because of these controversies, the U.S. Congress is considering
exempting private equity fund managers from mandatory registration and ongoing reporting
requirements under the Dodd-Frank Act by eliminating the distinction between private equity funds
and venture capital funds, provided that outstanding debt or leverage ratios are lower than 2 times
the invested capital commitments. See Scott E. Gluck, United States: Legislation Would Exempt
Private Equity Fund Advisers from Registration, June 17, 2013, available at
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?article_id=245222&signup=true. See also Lynch, supra note
264.
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instead, the third party manager is deemed the AIFM and is subject to the full
application of the Directive – despite the third party manager not being authorized
under the Directive.352
Fourth, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to have minimum capital and to put
adequate internal control policies and procedures in place based on the principle of
proportionality. 353 Therefore, there is some flexibility for AIFMs about how to
implement the internal control system, depending on the nature, scale, and
complexity of the business they intend to carry on. The AIFMD also broadly
provides moderate level of investment, valuation, and risk management
requirements for AIFMs, and requires them to have proper internal investment and
risk management systems in place.354
This proportionality-based approach, together with principle-based
regulation, is more appropriate and preferable to a rule-based or one-size-fits-all
regulatory approach; the AIF market is too complex and too diverse to regulate
through a positive regulatory system. For example, many potential issues,
including conflicts of interest between the manager and the investors and fair
treatment among investors, can be resolved by providing broad rules about the
manager’s fiduciary duty and by strictly enforcing the rule against any violators.355

352

See AIFMD, art. 20(3).

353

See id. art. 9.

354

See id. art. 15-17, 19.

355

The fiduciary duty itself may require the managers to disclose any preferential terms, like side
letters or side agreements applicable only to certain investors in the funds.
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Fifth, AIFMs must appoint a regulated credit institution as a depositary for
the custody of fund assets. 356 This ensures the safe custody of fund assets and
protects fund assets through the segregation of fund assets from the manager’s
assets. A depositary should in principle be separately appointed from the prime
broker, but under the AIFMD it is not impossible for a prime broker to be
designated as a depositary for the fund.
However, it is only permissible if the prime brokerage function and the
depositary function of the relevant entity are functionally and hierarchically
separated. 357 This requirement can be understood as a regulatory measure to
minimize potential conflicts of interest between the two functions; they are in
conflict with each other because the prime broker is in the position to make use of
the fund assets for rehypothecation purposes.358
Sixth, the AIFMD defines marketing as “a direct or indirect offering or
placement at the initiative of the AIFM or on behalf of the AIFM of units or shares
356

See AIFMD, art. 21.

357

This regime is more appropriate for hedge funds, and it may not work properly for private equity
funds. Basically, there is no prime brokerage concept for private equity funds, and there is no
practical need to have a separate custodian appointed for asset custody of the private equity funds,
in that the investment in private equity funds should be made on a capital call basis, and there are
no particular assets to be under custody by a separate custodian because most of the fund assets
would exist in the form of equities or some other mezzanine securities for buy-out investment
purposes. However, the Directive provides that a depositary be separately appointed for the custody
of private equity fund assets although it offers some flexibilities for the funds. See id. explanatory
note 43, art. 21(3).
358

Rehypothecation occurs when a broker, who has been hypothecated -- or pledged -- securities as
collateral for a margin loan, pledges those same securities to a bank or other lender to secure a loan
to cover the firm's exposure to potential margin account losses. It is a very common practice
between the hedge fund and the prime broker, and because of this practice fund’s assets may be at
risk when the prime broker goes bankrupt. See e.g., Harriet Agnew, Rehypothecation is being
redefined, Sep. 13, 2010, available at http://www.efinancialnews.com/story/2010-0913/rehypothecation-is-being-redefined (demonstrating that rehypothecation became an important
issue in the hedge fund industry especially after the Lehman Brother’s collapse in 2009).
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of an AIF it managers to or with investors domiciled or with a registered office in
the Union.”359 An AIFM is subject to the Directive whether or not they market the
funds directly or through third party intermediaries.
What can be inferred from the statutory definition is that so-called “passive”
marketing or “reverse solicitation” done at investors’ initiative will not be deemed
to be active marketing under the AIFMD.360 Therefore, for the AIFM to rely on the
passive marketing and reverse solicitation safe harbors they should take reasonable
steps not to conduct active marketing during their follow-up communications
and/or meetings, which are subject to the AIFMD. The passive marketing safe
harbor is narrowly construed and is very hard to comply with accordingly.
Compliance should eventually be determined by the totality of the facts and
circumstances.
The AIFM may have two different options available under the Directive in
terms of fund marketing. First, an AIFM may market funds in the E.U. by relying
on the “passport” regime. Under the passport regime, the AIFM is free to market
the funds throughout the E.U. countries without separate approval from each
individual member State’s regulator (once they get approval or get authorized from
a home regulator).361

359

See AIFMD, art. 4(1)(x).

360

See id. For further guidance about passive marketing, see Financial Conduct Authority, PS 13/5,
Implementation of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, June 2013, available at
http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/policy-statements/ps13-05.
361

This passport regime may not be a viable option for the non-E.U. AIFM to rely on because it
may not be available until late 2015 at the earliest for non-E.U. AIFMs. See AIFMD, art. 37, 39, 40.
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Second, the AIFM may market non-E.U. funds subject to each individual
member state’s private placement regimes. Under this route, each individual
member state has the ultimate authority on whether or not to allow the AIFM to
market the funds on a private placement basis.362
For an offshore AIFM to market funds to E.U. investors, several conditions
must be met: (i) the relevant E.U. member state must have a private placement
regime in place to accommodate offshore fund marketing, (ii) an offshore AIFM
must comply with disclosure and transparency requirements under the AIFMD, in
addition to any other local rules and regulations of the relevant member state, (iii)
a cooperation or information sharing arrangement must be made between the
regulators of the E.U. member state regulator, the home country regulator, and the
regulator where the funds are domiciled (where the jurisdictions of the offshore
AIFM and offshore fund are different), and (iv) the home country of the offshore
AIFM (including the home country of the offshore funds, if applicable) must not
be listed as a “Non-Cooperative Country or Territory” by the Financial Action
Task Force.363
Thus, Non-E.U. AIFMs need not comply with AIFMD, other than the
disclosure and transparency provisions, if they satisfy the member State’s national
private placement regimes for fund marketing (whether or not the funds are based
in the EU).364
362

This national private placement regime route was only available until the end of 2008. After that,
only the passport regime is available. See id. explanatory note 4, 69, art. 42, 67.
363

Id. art. 42.

364

Id. explanatory note 69.
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Seventh, some disclosure and reporting obligations are imposed on both the
E.U. AIFM and the non-E.U. AIFM (when the funds are marketed to E.U.
investors). 365 The AIFMD requires an AIFM to disclose material terms to the
investors before they make investment decisions, including side-letter or sidepocket arrangements, and any material changes to the investment after they
invest. 366 The AIFMs are also subject to continuous reporting requirements to
existing investors after the investment. This includes the illiquid assets’ ratio in the
fund portfolio, special arrangements like side pockets, the risk profile of the fund,
and the amount of leverage employed.367
An AIFM is also subject to ongoing reporting requirements to the relevant
member State regulator.368 The frequency of the reporting may vary depending on
the size of funds the AIFM manages. For example, small firms with assets under
management of between 100 million euros and 1 billion euros are required to
report to the relevant regulator on a half-yearly basis, while big firms with assets

365

Id.

366

Id. art. 23. This mandated disclosure requirement is incompatible with the hedge fund regime in
essence because it is a private market that only certain presumably sophisticated investors (who are
presumably able to protect themselves) are allowed access to. That was the previous U.S. and U.K.
regulatory position and there seems to be no substantial change made in market circumstances,
particularly in the context of the mandatory disclosure (in that the transparency issue may be
tackled easily by ensuring that only sophisticated investors are permitted into the market). Further,
this mandatory disclosure requirement blurs the distinction between the private market and the
public market, despite there being no clear rationale for why both markets should be treated the
same. See supra Chapter IV, Part B; Chapter V, Part B
367

An annual report must also be prepared and provided upon an investors’ request. Id. art. 24.

368

For the detailed items to be included in the report, see Council Directive 2013/238, 2013 O.J. (L
83) 1 (EC), Annex IV (hereinafter Level 2 Regulation), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/investment/docs/20121219-directive/delegated-act_en.pdf.
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under management of 1 billion euros or more are required to report on a quarterly
basis.369
However, the reporting requirements are mitigated for AIFMs of private
equity funds. They are required to report on a yearly basis regardless of the size of
funds they manage, and when they acquire 50 percent or more of the voting rights
of an E.U. non-listed company they are also subject to notice requirements to the
companies, to their shareholders, and to the home member State regulator.370
Eighth, the AIFMD requires AIFMs to set leverage limits internally that
they believe are reasonable for the funds concerned, and the home member state
regulator has the authority to impose leverage limits on an ad-hoc basis “when it is
deemed necessary in order to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial
system.”371 As such, there is no clear and specific rule in place for leverage limits;
rather, the Directive encourages AIFMs to set the limit voluntarily by considering
various factors (such as the nature of the fund and the investment strategy) and the
regulator is ready to intervene to set the leverage limits during market disruptions
or other emergent situations.
This principle-based approach is highly advisable, particularly in terms of
hedge fund regulation, in that (i) it is very difficult to measure the risk they may
369

See id. art. 110(3); AIFMD, supra note 14.

Private equity fund managers under the AIFMD means “AIFMs in respect of each unleveraged
AIF under their management which, in accordance with its core investment policy, invests in nonlisted companies and issuers in order to acquire control.” Thus, AIFMs who manage leveraged
private equity funds may not be able to take advantage of these lighter reporting regimes, but
instead are subject to the same reporting requirements as other AIFs like hedge funds. See Level 2
Regulation, art. 110(3)(d).
370

371

See AIFMD, art. 15(4).
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pose through the leveraged transactions; (ii) it is practically impossible to prevent
risk completely even where a statutory leverage limit is in place; (iii) unitarily
setting the leverage limit may adversely affect the market and make the fund
structure inflexible, making it hard to achieve the fund’s investment goal (i.e.,
market neutral absolute return or alpha); and (iv) there is no or little practical need
to regulate that way considering the fact that it is a private market specially
designed for certain professional investors only.372

2.

The Impacts of AIFMD on U.K. Hedge Fund Regulation
In principle, the U.K. government should take measures to implement the

Directive by the implementation date (i.e., July 22, 2013) by amending the relevant
U.K. rules and regulations. However, U.K. domiciled managers are not required to
comply with the Directive during the transition period until they are authorized by
the U.K. regulator (i.e., FCA), due to the one-year transition clause. 373 This
transition period is applicable to U.K. based AIFMs seeking authorization under
the new regime and to non-E.U. domiciled AIFMs marketing funds in the U.K.374

372

For how to apply the broad principle to hedge funds, see generally Fin. Serv. Auth., Hedge
funds: A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement, Feedback on DP05/4, March 2006,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/discussion/fs06_02.pdf.
373

Under the AIFMD, AIFMs have one year to comply with the new regulatory requirements under
the Directive, even after the implementation date of the AIFMD. Therefore, the actual
implementation date for the AIFMD is practically postponed until June of 2014. See AIFMD, art.61
(1).
374

Id.
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Some of the likely effects on the U.K. hedge fund regime from the implementation
of the Directive include:375
First, U.K. based AIFMs are required to be newly authorized or registered
during the transition period (i.e., by July 21, 2014) in compliance with the
requirements under the Directive and depending on the size of their firms.376
However, the level of regulatory compliance burden varies depending on
the size of the funds and on the nature, structure, and complexity of the business
the managers intend to conduct.377 This new authorization regime seems somewhat
similar to the existing regime in that U.K. based hedge fund managers were
already required to be authorized by the U.K. regulator. However, it is different
from the old regime in that it is much broader and more comprehensive regarding
the scope of the regulated funds, their managers/ related entities, and the regulated
activities.378
Second, AIFs are not subject to direct regulation under the Directive, which
is similar to the existing U.K. fund regime. 379 Under the new regime, however,
375

For the details of the possible impacts of the AIFMD across Europe (including the U.K.), see
Charles River Associates, Impact of the Proposed AIFM Directive across Europe, October 2009,
available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/Impact_of_AIFM_Directive.pdf.
376

For instance, an AIFM whose total size of AIF is less than 100 million euros is required to
register with the regulator instead of getting authorization. Also, the assets under management
threshold requirement is further lifted to 500 million euro for an AIFM who manages unleveraged
AIFs only and who provides no redemption right for 5 years or longer. See id. explanatory note 17.
See also The Alternative Investment Fund Managers Regulations, 2013, S.I. 2013/1773, art. 9, 10
(U.K.) (hereinafter “AIFMR”), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2013/1773/pdfs/uksi_20131773_en.pdf .
377

See AIFMD, explanatory note 17.

378

See id. explanatory note 4, 5.

379

See id. explanatory note 10.
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AIFs may be indirectly subject to regulation because certain rules applicable to
AIFMs (like liquidity management and leverage requirements) may function as defacto regulations of the fund investment and management activities. The Directive
also covers various types of AIFs including hedge funds and private equity funds,
so formerly unregulated funds under the existing U.K. fund regime (e.g., listed
company type funds like investment trusts) also become subject to regulation
indirectly through the manager regulation.380
Third, AIF related entities like depositaries, prime brokers, fund pricing
agencies, and delegates (e.g., sub-adviser or sub-custodian) are also subject to the
new regime, although somewhat lighter regulations may be available depending on
the types of AIFs. For example, the requirement of appointing an eligible credit
institution as a depositary for the custody of fund assets is mitigated for private
equity funds, venture capital funds, and real estate investment trusts considering
their unique investment nature and their type of invested assets.381
Fourth, systemic risk-related regulations focusing on the AIF industry were
introduced for the first time in the Directive. 382 Both liquidity management and
leverage requirements are imposed on AIFMs, and they are subject to continuous

380

For the meaning of AIF, see AIFMR, art. 3. See also Fin. Serv. Auth., DP 12/1, Implementation
of the Alternative Investment Fund Managers Directive, Jan. 2012, at 10 (hereinafter AIFMD
Implementation), available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/FsaWeb/Shared/Documents/pubs/discussion/dp12-01.pdf (illustrating
how diverse types of funds are subject to the Directive as AIFs).
381

See AIFMD, explanatory note 34.

382

See AIFMD, explanatory note 2, 3; AIFMD Implementation, at 17.
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reporting requirements for systemic risk-related information (like assets under
management and leverage employed).383
In addition, the new regime makes it clear that the regulator has an
obligation to monitor the AIF industry to mitigate systemic risk and that it has the
authority to limit the use of leverage if necessary to ensure market stability. 384
Fifth, U.K. domiciled AIFMs may benefit from the passport regime. Once
they are authorized by the FCA, they are free to market the funds in other E.U.
countries.385 By contrast, until new authorization or passport regime is available to
them, offshore managers are only allowed to market the funds by relying on the
U.K. private placement regime.386 That is, non-E.U. domiciled managers will be
allowed to market the funds they manage to U.K. professional investors and
eligible counterparties without authorization until the authorization or passport
system for non-E.U. managers comes into effect under the Directive.387
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See AIFMR, art. 68.

384

Id. art. 65-69.

385

See AIFMD, explanatory note 15; AIFMD Implementation, at 73-78 (illustrating various
dimensions of AIF marketing issues in the E.U.).
386

See AIFMD, explanatory note 19; AIFMD Implementation, at 76-78.
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D. Summary and Comments
As illustrated above, the U.K. hedge fund regimes can be summarized as
follows:
First, the U.K. hedge fund regime was implemented based on broad
principles, including the principle of proportionality. What this means is that U.K.
based hedge fund managers are subject to the same authorization and business
conduct regulations as other regulated entities, but that the rules and regulations
applicable to hedge funds are general and flexible enough to apply proportionately
to the hedge fund managers based on the size, type, and scope of their business.388
This principle-based approach is advisable in regulating the AIF market
because it is very difficult to regulate it in a uniform way. The rule-based or “onesize-fits-all” approach is not appropriate for regulating the hedge fund industry due
to the heterogeneous nature of the business and the complexity of their investment
activities.389
The principle-based regime in the U.K. provides some flexibility in
applying the rules to the hedge fund managers considering the fact that their target
investors are strictly limited to professional investors, but also considering that
they conduct relatively high-risk business compared to other general regulated
entities. The U.K. regime is based on the belief that hedge fund managers should
be regulated in certain ways due to the risky nature of their activities and their
potential negative impacts on the market.
388

See supra Chapter V, Part B.1.

389

Id.

136

However, there are insufficient investor protection grounds to make them
fully subject to the existing regimes in that their investor base is strictly limited to
professional investors. Many of the existing rules and regulations are overly
burdensome for and inappropriately applied to hedge fund managers (because
those rules and regulations are in place to protect the general public).390
This principle-based regime is likely to work more efficiently and properly
if supplemented by the principle of proportionality. Based on these broad
principles, the U.K. regulators would have the discretion to apply the regulatory
principles to the hedge fund managers more lightly than other regulated entities,
and to enforce the rules based on outcomes instead of simply relying on
compliance with a specific individual rule.391
Thus, the principle-based hedge fund regulation in the U.K. can be
positively assessed in that it is hard to deny that hedge funds should be regulated.
However, it is also true that hedge funds should be more lightly regulated than
other more typical regulated entities whose business is widely open to the public,
because hedge fund managers conduct their business on a private placement basis
focusing on professional investors.392
Second, hedge funds are not subject to direct regulatory oversight under
both the old regime and the new regime, although hedge funds become subject to
directly regulations under the new regime because hedge fund managers are
390

See FSMA, art. 5.

391

See supra note 388.

392

See AIFMD Implementation, at 65. It is important to recall that hedge funds used to be
unregulated or lightly regulated in various jurisdictions for a long time; that is how hedge funds
have emerged and evolved as an alternative private market.
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subject to additional regulations on leverage, disclosure, and reporting. 393 There
was formerly no hedge fund regime was in place in the U.K., so hedge funds were
able to avoid regulations unless they offered or sold the fund interests to the
public.394
The U.K. private placement or private fund regime remains unchanged
under the AIFMD because it has no specific hedge fund-focused rules and
regulations and does not mandate that member states make new hedge fundfocused regimes. As a result, even after the AIFMD was transposed to the various
U.K. regimes, there will still be no special hedge fund-focused regime in place.
Domestic and offshore hedge funds can still avoid direct regulation regarding how
they structure the funds, provided that the funds are only marketed and sold to
professional investors.395
This regulatory approach seems to be the result of efforts to strike a balance
between direct regulation and indirect regulation, considering the fact that (i) there
is no practical need to regulate funds directly because the general public is not
permitted to access the hedge fund market directly, (ii) the benefits that hedge
funds provide to the markets were possible because they are outside direct
regulatory purview, (iii) it is very difficult to directly regulate hedge funds because
each E.U. member state has different hedge fund regimes (and local regulation is
not sufficient to reach the funds domiciled offshore), and (iv) it is more appropriate

393

See supra Chapter V, Part B.2.

394

See supra Chpater V, Part B.3.

395

See supra Chapter V, Part B.3, Part C.1.
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to regulate hedge fund managers because they are responsible for the daily
operation of the funds.396
Third, an all-encompassing AIF definition under the new regime is
agreeable in that it could minimize the regulatory gap and regulatory arbitrage
problems between the AIFs in terms of functional based regulation. However, from
a manager regulatory perspective, it is somewhat doubtful if all the AIFMs should
be treated equally regardless of the nature of their business. For instance, private
equity fund managers are different from hedge fund managers in many ways, and
both managers should be treated differently.
It is less likely for private equity funds to pose systemic risk (and there was
no private equity fund generated high-profile financial market collapse so far) in
that they generally have a long lock-up period in place, they utilize minimal
leverage at the fund level, and they invest in target companies (typically private
companies) for controlling purposes, not for short-term trading purposes. Thus, it
is more reasonable to conclude that they carry on business irrelevant to systemic
risk. Further, investor protection concerns are negligible because private equity
fund investors are all professional investors, presumably sophisticated enough to
protect themselves without governmental protection.397
Thus, it is unreasonable to make private equity fund managers subject to
the same level of authorization requirements as other AIFMs, such as hedge fund
managers. It is more prudent to exempt private equity fund managers from
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See supra Chapter III, Part B.2-4.

397

See supra Chapter II, Part C.2.
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authorization requirements and to impose lighter obligations like registration and
reporting requirements for instances when they have the potential to pose systemic
risk.398
Fourth, under the AIFMD, both the local private placement regime and the
passport regime are available for a couple more years for onshore AIFMs who
manage E.U. domiciled funds, while only the local private placement regime is
available for offshore AIFMs who market offshore funds or manage E.U.
domiciled funds until 2015 at the earliest (which will be eventually replaced by the
passport regime).399 The new passport regime is devised to deal with the regulatory
arbitrage and regulatory competition problems among the jurisdictions by setting a
uniform regime applicable not only to all the E.U. member states, but also between
E.U. member states and Non-E.U. member states.
This passport regime is more likely to lower the entry barrier among the
E.U. member states and for offshore managers, to help the managers raise capital
more conveniently from E.U. investors or in the E.U. market, and to apply the AIF
market regime in a consistently to level the playing field among market
participants.

398

As observed in the U.S. regime, small-sized managers should be free from onerous advance
authorization and registration requirements because the regulatory cost outweighs its benefits.
Otherwise, small firms will disappear and new firms will be unable to emerge due to high
regulatory compliance costs. Further, private equity fund managers that create only remote system
risk should be exempted from the onerous authorization and registration requirements, regardless of
the size of the firms, provided that they meet certain threshold requirements (like no leverage and a
certain period of lock up). Instead, minimum reporting and disclosure requirements would be
sufficient for ensuring market stability. See id.
399

See supra Chapter V, Part III.
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However, some doubts still remain about whether it is really necessary to
subject all the AIFMs to advance authorization to rely on the passport regime.
There may not be strong policy grounds to justify the regulation from a microprudential regulatory standpoint, assuming that it is a specially designed market for
certain qualified professional investors, and that many rules and regulations are
already in existence to regulate market frauds like inside trading.
It is somewhat understandable, though, that AIFMs need to be subject to
regulation in terms of a systemic risk based perspective, in that they are big enough
to potentially influence the market in a negative way in times of distressed market
situations. Regulators are in the best position to cope with the overall systemic risk
issues and should be able to access the AIF market information on a continuous
basis to take timely corrective actions.
It seems acceptable that the AIFMD requires AIFMs to provide system risk
related information to relevant local regulators on a regular basis, and that the
AIFMD empowers the regulators to exercise discretion to limit the AIFM’s high
risk activities, like leveraged transactions, on an as needed basis. However, ex-ante
regulation is inappropriate and is overly burdensome on small AIFMs (E.U. based
or not); it is also incompatible with private offering or private fund exemptions.400
There are two separate regimes in place under the AIFMD in terms of fund
marketing regulation; active marketing is regulated and passive marketing is not.
So, in regards to fund marketing, reverse solicitation, and passive marketing

400

In this regard, the U.S. size-based private adviser exemptions, including the foreign private
adviser exemption, seem more reasonable in principle because the U.S. regime takes a cautious
approach to avoiding the overregulation problem - especially in terms of systemic risk based
regulation. See supra Chapter IV, Part III.
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initiated by E.U. investors, if the activity is not deemed to be “active marketing”
initiated by the managers or their placement agents then it falls outside of the fund
marketing regimes.401
However, the problem with this fund-marketing regime is that those two
distinctions are not entirely clear, making it more likely to cause a regulatory
arbitrage problem with AIFMs trying to utilize the passive marketing exemption.
This problem may happen more frequently if regulatory compliance costs are too
high, especially while the prospective business in the E.U. market is limited. Thus,
a small adviser exemption or other private adviser exemption as observed in the
U.S. regime should be taken into consideration.402
Fifth, the AIFMD provides extraterritorial application rules, applicable to
when onshore AIFMs market the offshore funds they manage, when offshore
AIFMs manage and/or market E.U. based funds, or when offshore AIFMs market
offshore based fund to E.U. investors.403 In those situations, the AIFMs are subject
to a local private placement or passport regime.
Under the AIFMD, there should be minimal concerns for regulatory
evasion, regulatory arbitrage, and jurisdictional shopping, in that the AIFMD
provides no fund specific rules and regulations, and because the AIFMD
accommodates all the possible scenarios relating to transnational fund related
transactions. As a result, it makes little difference for AIFMs to choose the E.U. or
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See supra note 361.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C.

403

See supra text accompanying note 360, 361.
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other jurisdictions in terms of fund regulation. They are basically free to choose a
jurisdiction for their funds.404
This is an interesting regulatory approach because offshore managers are
not required to be based in or authorized by the relevant local E.U. regulator to
manage and market the E.U. domiciled funds to E.U. investors. It is likely to help
minimize the jurisdictional shopping problem and to give some incentives for
offshore AIFMs to set up the funds in E.U. member states.405
The AIFMD does still have inherent problems worth revisiting. As stated
earlier, only national private placement regimes are available until the new
passport regime has replaced it. Under the current private placement regimes, both
onshore managers and offshore managers are not required to get authorized by the
E.U. member state regulators, provided that they only market the funds to
professional investors.406
When the new passport regime is fully implemented, AIFMs who obtain
authorization from one E.U. member state regulator will still be subject to
404

Still it is not entirely clear and should be determined based on factual circumstances whether or
not an offshore AIFM is allowed to manage E.U. based funds and to market the funds to EU
investors, supposing that the offshore AIFM chooses offshore solely for the purpose of evading the
U.K. regimes applicable to U.K. based AIFMs. See id.
405

As stressed supra, this is possible because there is no fund focused regime in place under the
AIFMD; the AIFMD basically permits AIFMs to choose any jurisdiction for fund establishment
purposes to help the AIFM accommodate various needs from the clients as much as possible. Also,
the regulatory arbitrage or regulatory evasion issues should be handled without difficulty based on
the general extraterritorial application provision. For instance, suppose that an AIFM chooses to set
up a U.K. domiciled fund to raise capital from U.K. investors, and chooses to have its office
offshore to avoid any U.K. manager regulation, despite most of the investment and management
activities being done in the U.K. It is highly likely to be deemed illegal even under the AIFMD. See
supra Chapter V, Part C.
406

See id.
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authorization requirements even though they are free to market the funds around
the E.U. countries without worrying about local private placement regimes.407
The passport regime is also somewhat problematic in that there are
insufficient grounds to justify it, in terms of investor protection and even in terms
of systemic risk. It is necessary that both onshore and offshore AIFMs be subject
to regulatory supervision, however, the manner of regulating the AIFMs based on
their transnational deals should be done more delicately by only imposing simple
registration and/or reporting requirements, together with certain minimum
threshold requirements as illustrated supra.408
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Id.
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See supra note 363.
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VI.

Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea

A. Overview
Hedge funds had not existed409 in Korea because they were expressly and
legally prohibited before the new hedge fund regime was introduced in September
2011 by amending the Enforcement Decree to the FSCMA.410 Unlike the U.S., the
Korean hedge fund market was not naturally formed by the demand and supply of
the market participants, but rather it came into emergence by a government
initiative to build up the market in Korea.411 Before the new hedge fund regime
was introduced, the then-existing Korean fund regime had not provided any safe
harbor provisions to make hedge fund unique activities or strategies possible.412
409

As further explained infra Chapter VI, there used to be a private fund or qualified purchaser
fund scheme available under the old Korean fund regime (i.e., FSCMA), but it provided detailed
paternalistic rules and regulations limiting the leverage and short sale, and as a consequence
generally accepted hedge funds’ unique investment strategies had not been available before the new
hedge fund regime was implemented in 2011.
410

When Korean hedge funds were initially launched in December 2011, total assets under
management were roughly 150 billion won with 12 funds managed by 9 management companies.
Over time, there were increases in both assets under management and the number of the funds. That
is, as of November 2012, the total assets under management were roughly 1 trillion won with 19
funds managed by 12 management companies. Because of the relatively short track record and
resulting reputational problem, there were little capital inflows from institutional investors at an
initial stage, and so-called high net-worth individuals as well as prime brokers and/or affiliated
companies were the primary funding sources. See Financial Services Commission Press Release,
First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, Dec. 6, 2012, available at
http://www.fsc.go.kr/eng/wn/list_qu.jsp?menu=01&bbsid=BBS0048&selQuarter=&selYear=2012
&nxPage=1.
411

See Financial Services Commission Legislative Release No. 2011-92 (June 20, 2011), at 1,
available at
http://fsc.go.kr/know/law_prev_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0120&page=3&sch1=subject&sch2=&sch3=
&sword=&r_url=&menu=7410100&no=25255. See also Interview with Seokdong KIM, former
FSC Chairman, at Hedge Fund Workshop, May 23, 2011, available at
http://www.asiatoday.co.kr/news/view.asp?seq=483850.
412

As indicated earlier, although there were some special rules for private funds under the old fund
regime, a hedge fund scheme was be practically impossible because leveraged transactions like
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What that means, however, is not that hedge funds are completely
unavailable in Korea: Offshore hedge funds are limitedly accessible to certain
professional investors,413 and retail investors are also accessible to offshore hedge
funds indirectly via fund of funds scheme.414 That is, under the previous Korean
regime (i.e., the FSCMA before the new hedge fund rules were introduced),
offshore hedge funds, established and managed offshore by foreign managers,
were directly available to certain professional Korean investors, and indirectly
available to all types of investors including non-professional investors via Korean
fund of funds scheme.415

money borrowings, speculative derivative transactions, and short sales were legally barred. More
precisely, those private funds used to be treated as one of the regulated funds managed by the
regulated management companies although some of the rules and regulations were not applicable to
the private funds on the condition that they offered or sold their securities on a private placement
basis and that they were subject to certain threshold requirements such as the maximum number of
the investors or eligible investor threshold (i.e., qualified purchasers). See supra note 408.
413

For example, National Pension Service, Korea Investment Corporation and Korea Post are some
of the eligible investors to invest in the offshore hedge funds. For more details about the eligible
professional investors in terms of offshore fund sale, see FSCMA, art. 279; PD, art. 301.
414

For instance, diversification and no double fee rules, as well as mandated disclosure
requirements (i.e., securities registration statements) should be applicable to fund of funds because
they were deemed to be a typical regulated funds (i.e., mutual funds), and even fund of hedge funds,
which were treated as private funds, would be subject to the same requirements to a large extent.
See FSCMA, art. 249; PD, art. 271.
415

Under the Korean regime, offshore hedge funds had also been available to Korean investors
through discretionary investment management accounts or specified money trusts. Thus, four
different alternatives (i.e., fund of funds, fund of hedge Funds, discretionary investment
management accounts, and specified money trusts), in addition to the direct sale of offshore funds
to certain professional investors, have been available to Korean investors to access offshore hedge
funds during the time when Korean domiciled hedge funds had been strictly prohibited. What is in
common among the four alternatives is that there is a market intermediary or third party fiduciary
like an investment adviser or a trustee between offshore hedge funds and Korean investors, and no
direct contact between them is permitted under the FSCMA. See supra note 22.
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Some may wonder why the Korean government (i.e., Korean FSC) has
determined to begin allowing Korean domiciled hedge funds and managers while
many other countries around the world have tried to regulate the hedge fund
industry more tightly than ever. We may find the clues or answers for this question
by highlighting the unique market circumstances surrounding the Korean hedge
fund market as follows:416
First and foremost, the push to expand the Korean hedge fund market was
introduced by the government, not by market participants.417 Meanwhile, Korean
local firms have demonstrated insufficient progress and advancement in their
business practices and have gained little experience or expertise in cutting-edge
areas like hedge fund and prime brokerage services, because they do not have
sufficiently well-experienced human resources and capital to engage in this
innovative, but risky business.
With this problem in mind, the Korean government has made an effort to
introduce a brand-new, high value-added market in Korea, encouraging Korean
domiciled companies to try to do something more innovative businesses, and to
play a more active role in investing in emerging companies with growth
potential.418 What that means is that the Korean government took the initiative to
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See supra note 410.
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As illustrated infra, Korean domiciled hedge funds used to be unavailable because no special
safe harbor rules were provided under Korean laws. That is, private funds and their managers are
subject to the same rules and regulations like licensing, business conduct, and investment activities
as mutual fund managers, although some provisions are exempted to apply for private fund. Thus,
hedge fund-only markets were legally and practically impossible. See infra Chapter VI, Part B.
418

Prime brokerage businesses, which play a very critical role with hedge funds, have not also
developed yet because there have been no local hedge funds available in Korea until the new hedge
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make the hedge fund market as they contemplated, and provided the management
companies and securities companies with incentives to do more risky, but at the
same time highly lucrative, business like hedge funds or prime brokerage
businesses as a way to diversify their business portfolios.
However, especially from the demand side, there has been a great potential
for institutional investors like pension funds and highly wealthy individuals to
pursue innovative investment opportunities for greater, but also stable returns on
an ongoing basis.419 As with the emergence of the Korean domiciled hedge fund
the Korean government has anticipated that Korean institutional investors, such as
public pension funds and the high net-worth individuals, would be willing to
commit their money to Korean hedge funds. In other words, Korean institutional
investors and ultra-rich individuals would be given the opportunity to pursue this
alternative investment opportunity in addition to the already available ones, like
direct investment to offshore hedge fund or indirect investment through Korean
domiciled fund of hedge funds.420
Second, by introducing a local hedge fund market, the Korean government
also expected an incidental effect that highly value-added investment banking
businesses like prime brokerage services may be able to emerge. As previously
indicated, the Korean investment banking industry has fallen by far behind as

fund regime was in place. Thus, from the Korean government perspective, by introducing the hedge
fund market in Korea they anticipate incidentally that more investment bank-like business, such as
prime brokerage services could emerge as the hedge fund market grows. See supra note 410.
419

See supra note 140.
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See FSCMA, art. 81, 249, 279.
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compared with the global practices in terms of business scope, and as a matter of
fact, their business has been primarily oriented towards conventional brokerage
businesses. In that respect, prime brokerage services are essential for the
investment banking firms to diversify their business portfolio and it is critically
important for hedge funds to grow sustainably. Thus, without a doubt, they are
closely interdependent. It would be mutually beneficial for hedge funds and prime
brokers if the hedge fund market were to grow because prime brokers provide very
extensive roles related to hedge funds and they could gain a lot of profit from the
services.421 In short, the Korean government took the lead to create the hedge fund
market in a way that accommodates the various needs of different market
participants.
Third, the Korean government tried to attract foreign hedge fund managers
to Korea to build up the local hedge fund market. To do so, the Korean
government has provided incentives for foreign hedge fund managers by imposing
less stringent licensing requirements as compared to local securities firms or asset
management companies.422
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Prime brokers are the very entity to supply various services for the hedge fund including the
credit extention (e.g., money or securities lending), asset custody, capital raising, and proprietary
investment, and they are indispensable for hedge funds to operate on a daily and stable basis. See
FSCMA, art. 8(8), 77-2, 77-3.
422

For instance, the assets under management requirement was reduced to 1 trillion won while local
Korean licensed management companies need to have 10 trillion won in assets under management
to obtain the hedge fund license. Also personnel requirements are less onerous than Korean
licensed advisers to accommodate foreign managers having fund management experience in foreign
jurisdictions. Despite this preferential treatment of foreign advisers, so far there has been no foreign
hedge fund adviser licensed in Korea. It may be partly because the Korean hedge fund market entry
regulation is still quite onerous or cost inefficient compared to those of other countries (especially
nearby countries like Hong Kong or Singapore) and some alternatives are available for them to do
hedge fund business on a cross border basis, as indicated earlier. See Financial Services
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It may be understood as a policy decision by the Korean government in that
offshore funds have been marketed already via Korean institutional investors and
have been managed by managers outside of Korea, and as a result they have little
incentive to obtain the Korean adviser license and to have a commercial presence
in Korea. Further, local Korean entities have little experiences, expertise, and track
records to attract Korean investors at an initial stage.

B. Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea: Before the New Hedge
Fund Regime

1.

Hedge Fund Manager regulation
Under the FSCMA, any person is required to obtain a license in advance if

he/she intends to conduct fund (including private fund) management and
marketing business in Korea. 423 Unlike in the U.S., there has been no private
adviser exemption for licensing purposes available in Korea even in cases where
someone intends to only target professional investors for their private fund
business. As a result, exactly the same licensing requirements as applicable to
mutual fund advisers are applied to private fund advisers, such as major

Commission Press Release, First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, December 6,
2012, available at
http://fsc.go.kr/eng/wn/list_qu.jsp?menu=01&bbsid=BBS0048&selQuarter=&selYear=2012&nxPa
ge=1.
423

See FSCMA, art. 12.
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shareholder, equity capital, and personnel requirements, although some
requirements may be alleviated to some extent.424
In addition, private fund management companies also need to obtain a fund
distribution license to market the fund units (also known as “collective investment
securities”) themselves, because fund units are classified as securities under the
FSCMA, and are subject to securities dealing license requirements in connection
with fund sales activities.425Interestingly, there is a clear definition of private fund
(i.e., private collective investment scheme) under the FSCMA, but there is no
special licensing unit available for those who intend to engage in private fund
business only. Thus, as a matter of practice, there is no private fund adviser license
available under the old regime.426

424

More precisely and legally speaking, only equity capital and investment management expert
requirements will be reduced to half of the requirements applicable to the manager for the mutual
fund if target investors are limited to professional investors, and other licensing requirements like
major shareholder or business plan requirements are equally applicable to private fund advisers as
well. See FSCMA, art. 12.
Under the FSCMA, fund sales activities are deemed as “regulated business” (i.e., securities
dealing or brokerage business), and as a consequence the private fund manager is also required to
obtain a fund distribution license (namely, securities dealing license) if they intend to engage in the
fund distribution activities themselves. See FSCMA, art. 12; PD, Annex 1.
425

426

This problem happens because the licensing unit for fund business is different from the fund
classification. That is, fund manager licenses are broken down simply based on the investor
classification of professional investors, not by whether the fund is classified as a mutual funds or
private funds. As a result, it is de facto impossible to do private fund business if targeting high networth individuals who are not deemed professional investors under the FSCMA, but who are
eligible for the investment of private funds. More than anything else, it makes little difference and
provides little incentive for the applicant to pursue private fund business only because largely the
same regulatory burden is imposed on them despite the fact that they intend to do fund business
focusing on professional investors or quasi-professional investors only.
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However, there is an exception for private equity fund (hereinafter as
“PEF”) managers. Unlike hedge fund 427 managers, the PEF managers are not
required to have a license provided that they engage in PEF business only. 428
Basically, PEF advisers are exempted from fund management license requirements
and fund distribution license requirements.429 In short, under the old regime private
fund (including qualified purchaser fund, but excluding private equity fund)
advisers need to obtain both a fund management license and a fund distribution
license, while no license is required to PEF managers.
It is uncertain why the old Korean regime provided license exemptions for
PEF advisers as opposed to other private fund advisers. However, it may be
inferred from the fact that private funds in Korea have traditionally been regarded
as a part of general fund business similar to mutual fund business, because only
fully licensed companies covering mutual fund businesses have been allowed to
manage private funds; also, because the PEF rule was introduced at a later stage in

427

For clarity, in this chapter, private funds mean both private funds and qualified purchaser funds
only, to the exclusion of private equity funds, although in principle private funds may include PEF.
Unlike in the U.S., the Korean regime has a separate provision for defining PEF, in addition to the
private fund definition. For the definition of PEF, see FSCMA, art. 9(18)(vii).
428

Private equity fund is a kind of private fund in a broad sense of meaning under the FSCMA, but
are distinct from typical private fund because private equity funds are strictly limited to private
equity investment only, while other private funds are flexible in investment architecture. Because of
the limited nature of PEFs most of the fund rules and regulations applicable to private funds are
exempted to PEFs and their managers, and instead separate set of rules are in place for them. See
FSCMA, art. 268 et seq.
429

It should be noted, however, that the PEF itself is subject to regulation to some extent despite the
manager or GP being exempted from licensing requirements, and the GP is also regulated to some
extent indirectly, although they are not subject to licensing requirements. For instance, the PEF is
subject to registration requirements and some restrictions are also imposed on them in regard to
their investment activities. See FSCMA, art. 270.
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2004 as a special and separate form of fund business focusing only on buy-out
investment business.430
On the other hand, venture capital fund

431

managers are expressly

exempted from licensing requirements under the FSCMA provided that they offer
or sell the fund units on a private offering basis. 432 It may be explained as a policy
decision to avoid a regulatory overlap problem, considering the fact that they have
been subject to other comparable regulatory regimes and separate regulatory
bodies are in place to supervise them; thus, there is no practical need for financial
regulators to regulate them directly.433 As a consequence, PEFs are subject to the
FSCMA while venture capital funds are subject to a completely separate statute –
despite being functionally similar in many ways.434

430

When the PEF regime was newly introduced in 2004, the then-existing U.S. regime provided
license and registration exemptions for PEF advisers. That may also have affected the Korean
government’s decision not to regulate the PEF advisers directly at that time.
431

Venture capital fund is defined under a separate law, and is subject to separate rules and
regulations that are quite different from the fund regime under the FSCMA. Assuming that they are
subject to comparable regulation under separate regimes, venture capital funds were deemed to
qualify for an exemption from fund regulation under the FSCMA, despite falling under the fund
definition under the FSCMA that would make them subject to fund regulation under the FSCMA.
See FSCMA, art. 6(5) (S. Kor.); PD, art. 6(1).
432

Id.

433

Unlike the U.S., there has been no debate whether or not to regulate venture capital funds under
the FSCMA from a systemic risk perspective, both before and after the sub-prime mortgage crisis,
although there was a debate about that in terms of functional regulation. Namely, in Korea venture
capital funds used to be explicitly excluded from fund regulation under the FSCMA or its preceding
statutes despite falling within the definition of fund. Instead, they used to be regulated by a separate
governmental body and financial regulator, and separate rules and regulations were applied to them
by separate statutes.
434

For the details of the similarities and dissimilarities between the two, see supra Chapter II, Part
C.2.
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In sum, private fund (excluding PEF) managers have been subject to the
same license requirements as mutual fund managers,435 and only licensed entities
are entitled to engage in private fund business in compliance with detailed rules
and regulations applicable to mutual fund advisers. PEF managers, distinct from
other private fund managers, are subject to no direct licensing requirements;
however, they may be under regulatory supervision to some extent indirectly
through the general partner regulation in the fund. 436 Also venture capital fund
managers are expressly excluded from fund regulation under the FSCMA unless
they raised capital from the public.437

435

Private fund manager licenses may be theoretically possible under the FSCMA, but it is
practically infeasible because the only difference or benefit to private fund advisers is that less
stringent capital and investment management experts requirements are applied, and other than that,
every other rule and regulation for mutual fund managers is equally applied to private fund
managers. More precisely speaking, there is no private fund only license is available under the
former FSCMA because there is no clear license unit available to accommodate private fund only
managers. Furthermore, newly licensed entities targeting professional investors may have a hard
time accessing high net worth individuals who may be the primary target investors, because they
are not covered by the professional investors and because they are deemed to be non-professional
investors. For the new adviser, raising capital from institutional investors is practically impossible
because new advisers have no track record available to attract institutional investors.
436

See supra note 427.

437

See supra note 430.
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2. Hedge Fund Regulation
As described above, Korean private funds have been defined broadly to
accommodate both general private funds and qualified purchaser funds.438 Both are
similar in nature because both funds are limited to offer or sell the units on a
private placement basis only.
On the other hand, they are different in that private funds are limited to
offer or sell the units to up to 99 purchasers, and up to 49 unsophisticated retail
investors (i.e., non-professional investors) may have access to the fund, while the
latter is limited only to qualified purchasers, 439 and an unlimited number of
investors can be accessible if they meet the qualified purchaser eligibility threshold
requirements.440
Both private funds are somewhat similar to those under the U.S. regime in
terms of the threshold requirements because the Korean regime benchmarked the
U.S. regime in making their private fund rules. Korean private funds are a lot
different from those under the U.S. regime because the Korean regime borrowed
the private fund concepts to treat them a bit more favorably than mutual funds by
imposing less onerous investment requirements on the assumption that they are
marketed on a limited basis relying on a private placement exemption, and that

438

See FSCMA, art. 9(19).

439

Qualified purchasers may be regarded as super accredited investors because the threshold
requirements for them are much higher than that for general professional or accredited investors. It
may be presumed on the belief that qualified purchaser funds are a more risky product than general
securities, and should be limited to highly accredited investors. For the details about who may be
eligible to become qualified purchasers, See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1), 271-2(1).
440

See FSCMA, art. 249, 249-2.
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purchasers should be limited to certain professional investors. 441 That is, the
private fund concept is in place to mitigate the regulatory burden on investment
activities, not to exempt them entirely from regulatory supervision in Korea. Thus,
Korean private funds under the old regime are more likely classified as a sort of
regulated fund like mutual funds, although they are exempted from some of the
fund rules and regulations.
They are subject to various fund rules and regulations including registration
requirements 442 and reporting requirements, but they are exempted from some
investment and management related provisions. Because of this unique regulatory
framework, under the old private fund regime, it was practically impossible for a
hedge fund market to emerge in Korea.

441

As previously indicated, theoretical non-professional investors are also accessible to private
funds up to 49 persons, but they must go through a suitability test, while professional investors
need not to do so. Thus in reality, non-professional investors are hard to access by private funds
because the fund distributor carries the suitability obligation. It is extremely difficult to prove that
fund distributors checked the suitability test and confirmed that the non-professional investors are
eligible for the investment, especially from the fund distributor’s standpoint. See FSCMA, art. 46.
442

Unlike general private fund, qualified purchaser fund is subject to ex-post notice requirement,
instead of ex-ante registration requirement. It may be because there is less investor protection
concern for the latter in that the offerees and purchasers are limited to qualified purchasers only,
while general private fund are accessible by non-professional investors on a limited basis. See
FSCMA, art. 249-2(6).
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3.

Hedge Fund Marketing regulation
Contrary to fund regulation, private funds are exempted from securities

registration requirements if they satisfy private offering safe harbor conditions.
That is, general securities private placement exemptions are also applicable to
private funds, and private funds can avoid the onerous securities registration
process to promote fund securities to certain eligible prospective investors.
The policy rationale for this private offering exemption is exactly the same
as that under the U.S. securities regime.443 The Korean private fund and private
offering regimes permit unsophisticated investors to invest in the funds on a
limited basis (i.e., up to 49 persons) subject to suitability requirements, which is
similar to the U.S. regime in that unaccredited investors can access the private fund
if they go through the sophistication test.444
Some may doubt why private funds can enjoy private placement safe
harbor rules while they are subject to paternalistic fund regulations and registration
requirements in Korea. The securities registration requirement is a mandated
disclosure regime to help prospective unaccredited investors make informed
decisions, while fund registration requirements are not a disclosure regime, but
rather is in place for regulator’s supervisory or information gathering purpose.445
The fact that non-professional investors have access to private funds to some
443

See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 40.

444

Only difference between the two regimes is that there is no clear rule for the sophistication test
requirement in Korean private funds and private offering safe harbor rules, while the U.S. regime
expressly requires it.
445

See e.g., Arthur B. Laby, S.E.C. v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940, 91 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1051, 1069-70 (2011).
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extent is also likely to encourage legislators and regulators to support imposing
private fund registration requirements.
As illustrated above, it appears that the Korean regime takes a bit more of a
paternalistic and cautious approach in regulating private funds by putting them
within regulatory oversight, and that they did so primarily because of investor
protection concerns. There are also counter-arguments to this approach that are
worth exploring.
First of all, the investor protection issue can be handled to a large extent by
strictly applying the suitability rule to non-professional investors. That is, access to
the private funds by retail investors can be effectively filtered out through the
suitability check process if strictly applying the rule.446
Second, the market may be hindered from developing into a more
innovative and competent alternative investment market by regulating them
directly through structuring investment portfolios and by making both the
managers and investors heavily rely on the regulators, which often times will be
more likely to result in a moral hazard problem or less vigilant due diligence
practice in the marketplace.447
Finally, even from the systemic risk regulatory standpoint, the Korean
regime seems to have an overregulation problem because the managers, not the
funds, are the parties responsible for the day-to-day management of the funds; they
should be the right targets for regulatory oversight in terms of systemic risk

446

See supra note 440.

447

See supra Chapter III, Part B.2.
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regulation. 448 Overall, there seem to be few grounds for supporting direct fund
regulation in Korea.449

4.

Offshore Fund Marketing Regulation

While local private funds and their advisers are subject to stringent
regulation under the Korean fund regime, offshore private funds and their
managers are relatively free to market the fund units if they offer or sell them fund
to certain Korean institutional investors. 450 Offshore private fund managers are not
subject to licensing requirements under the Korean regime if they offer or sell the
fund units through locally licensed fund distributors (e.g., locally licensed
securities broker or dealer), and instead they are required to have the fund
registered with the Korean regulator beforehand.451
Instead, their target offerees and purchasers should be strictly limited to
certain professional investors (excluding high net-worth individuals). 452 This
448

Id.

449

It should be noted, however, that the goal of preventing systemic risk by direct size and/or
leverage regulation is almost harder to achieve and is cost-inefficient because hedge fund failure
could happen even under the stringent regulatory regime. It may be an unavoidable problem we
face in extremely stressful financial situations. Accordingly, direct fund regulation may be assessed
as overly conservative and unreasonably burdensome. See id.
450

See FSCMA, art. 279.

451

Id. Although it is not entirely clear, there appears to be an implied safe harbor in the FSCMA for
offshore fund registration, if Korean investors voluntarily invest in offshore funds without any
solicitation or advertisement from the offshore funds or their sales agents. See FSCMA, art. 279(1);
PD, art. 7(3)(vi).
452

The permissible scope of target investors for offshore fund managers is a lot narrower than those
for locally licensed entities. This difference may be explained by the fact that Korean domiciled
private funds are relatively less risky and complicated than offshore hedge funds because the
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Korean offshore fund sales regime indicates that offshore hedge funds have easy
access to potential Korean investors, provided that the target investors are limited
to certain professional investors via an offshore fund registration route. 453 Offshore
fund registration requirements are imposed for the regulator only, however, not for
the investors. Thus information regarding registered offshore hedge funds is not
publicly available, but may be available on a limited basis only.454

C. Hedge Fund Regulation in Korea: After New Hedge Fund
Regime
As demonstrated supra, hedge funds were not available under the FSCMA,
except for offshore hedge funds, until the Enforcement Decree to the FSCMA was
amended in 2011.455

former are heavily regulated by the Korean regulator while the latter are not regulated or lightly
regulated under foreign jurisdictions. Regarding the scope of professional investors for offshore
hedge fund sale, see FSCMA, art. 279(2); PD, art. 301(2).
453

Locally licensed fund managers may set up hedge funds offshore and offer the units to Korean
investors, theoretically speaking. But it may be practically and legally problematic because of
regulatory arbitrage or extraterritorial application issues. Namely, it may be rejected by the FSC if
locally licensed managers apply for fund registration with FSC with a view to marketing the fund
units to Korean investors because under the FSCMA there is an extraterritorial application
provision that FSCMA should be applicable even to offshore funds if it may affect the Korean
market or Korean investors. However, it is permissible and no extraterritorial application issues
arise if Korean domiciled managers set up offshore funds for offshore investors. See FSCMA, art. 2.
454

The general information about the offshore hedge fund registered with the FSC may be available
to the public because the Korean FSC and a Korean SRO called KOFIA provide some information
about the registered offshore funds to the public. See FSCMA, art. 279(3), 280(4); PD, art. 303.
455

See supra note 410.
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However, the hedge fund concept in Korea is not a totally brand-new one;
rather it should be understood as a modified form of qualified purchaser fund
regime already in place under the old regime. That is, the Korean hedge fund
regime went into place by re-defining the then-existing qualified purchaser fund
regime.456
Under the new hedge fund regime, qualified purchasers are redefined to
cover the high net-worth individuals, and much more relaxed investment and
management requirements are applied to accommodate the needs of the hedge
funds to utilize various leveraged transactions, albeit hedge funds are still
somewhat subject to investment limitations or restrictions.457

1.

Hedge Fund Manager Regulation

(A) Licensing requirements
Under the new regime, hedge fund manager licenses have become available
that focus on hedge fund business only, and the prior-existing licensed entities
such as investment advisers, asset management companies, and securities firms
have limited accessibility to the hedge fund business to the extent that they satisfy
certain threshold requirements for hedge fund business. 458 That is, hedge fund

456

See FSCMA, art. 249-2.

457

Id.

458

Only some of the regulated entities like investment advisers, asset management companies or
securities firms are eligible to apply for the hedge fund manager license because there are some
threshold requirements in place. For example, one trillion won or more in equity capital is required
for the securities firms, 500 billion won or more in assets under management is required for the
investment advisers, and 10 trillion or more in assets under management is required for asset
management companies as a prerequisite for the license application. Later on, these threshold
requirements have been repealed or relaxed, but similar entry barriers are still maintained. For
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managers are subject to new licensing requirements with threshold limits in place
for the license.459
Thus, anyone who intends to carry on the hedge fund business, including
previously licensed entities like investment advisers or asset management
companies, should obtain the relevant license beforehand. 460 Not all persons are
allowed to apply for the license; only certain licensed entities like securities firms,
investment advisers, asset management companies, and foreign hedge fund
managers who satisfy certain threshold requirements are eligible to apply for the
license.461
It appears that the Korean government has taken a step-by-step approach in
granting hedge fund licenses considering the fact that there was no track record
and no sufficient experience in managing hedge funds among locally licensed
entities; accordingly, among the licensed entities, some investment advisers, asset

instance, the assets under management requirement for the fully licensed asset management
companies has been repealed, but instead new assets under management threshold requirement (i.e.,
1 trillion won) is in place for the securities fund only license holders, and for securities companies
or investment advisers, the threshold requirement of equity capital or assets under management has
been relaxed to half of the previous ones each (i.e., 0.5 trillion won for securities companies, and
250 billion won for investment advisers). See FSC Press Release, Private Fund Regulatory Reform,
Dec. 10, 2013, available at
http://fsc.go.kr/info/ntc_news_view.jsp?bbsid=BBS0030&page=1&sch1=subject&sword=사모펀
드&r_url=&menu=7210100&no=29506.
459
Hedge fund manager licensing requirements are exempted to the asset management companies
already fully licensed because the license they already obtained covers hedge fund licenses and as a
consequence they are deemed licensed entities for hedge fund business. It is because the new
regime defines the hedge fund as a type of “mixed asset fund” already in existence under the
FSCMA, and the fully licensed asset management companies have no need to obtain the hedge fund
license in addition to the previously obtained license. But they are required, instead, to file the
relevant documents with the FSC before engaging in the business to make sure that they satisfy
certain additional requirements like assets under management and investment management expert
requirements. See Regulation on the Financial Investment Business, FSC Release No. 2011-22,
Nov. 22, 2011, addenda art. 2(1), as amended (S. Kor.) (hereinafter FSC Regulation).
460
The Korean FSC announced the plan to integrate current hedge fund manager licensing
requirements into registration system in the foreseeable future. See supra note 458.
461
Id.
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management companies, and securities firms were allowed to engage in hedge
fund business.
Securities firms are required to have sufficient equity capital of 1 trillion
won or more and to set up a separate company for their hedge fund business
because of the conflict of interest concerns.462 As a result, only certain securities
firms, investment advisers and asset management companies have access to hedge
fund business through the locally licensed entities.463
For foreign hedge fund advisers, the Korean government takes a much
more flexible approach in that much less stringent assets under management, track
record, and investment management expert requirements are applied. For instance,
1 billion dollars in assets under management is required for the foreign managers
to apply for the Korean hedge fund manager license, while 10 trillion won in assets
under management is required for Korean licensed managers. 464 Despite the

462

Compared to other licensed entities like investment advisers, securities firms have a higher
potential to have problems with of conflicts of interest because they are the the ones doing prime
brokerage business via hedge funds, and they have a proprietary trading desk actively exercising
hedge fund like strategies.
463
Because of the aforementioned threshold requirements, only big-sized regulated firms are able to
participate in hedge fund business, while small-sized regulated firms or newly established firms are
not. It looks a bit unreasonable because the hedge fund market should be treated as niche market
focusing on private fund business only, and for that reason it should be open for everyone who is
willing to do creative or innovative business. However, it may be also understood as an inevitable
choice from the Korean regulator’s standpoint in that while introducing the market in Korea in the
wake of the financial crisis (and various concerns have been raised about their potential negative
impacts on the market) the government would like to make sure that the newly established regime
is safe and sound enough to deal with those concerns. The same criteria is applied to foreign hedge
fund managers, and only some well-recognized and reputable managers who satisfy the threshold
assets under management requirements are allowed to apply for a hedge fund manager license in
Korea. The Korean FSC has announced the plan to change the hedge fund licensing regime into a
simple and straightforward registration system in the near future. See supra note 458.
464
It should be noted that the assets under management requirement for the Korean domiciled fully
licensed asset management companies was repealed on November 22, 2012, and instead a reduced
assets under management requirement (i.e., one trillion won) was imposed on the securities fund
only license holders. But, there are still considerable differences between domestic companies and
offshore private fund managers in terms of the threshold assets under management requirement. See
FSC Press Release, First Annual Status Report on the Hedge Fund Industry, supra note 421.
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counter-discriminatory concern against locally licensed managers, this approach
may be understood as a policy decision to attract reputable foreign hedge fund
managers to Korea.465
In addition, the Korean FSC takes a different regulatory approach between
investment advisers and asset management companies. 466 Different assets under
management requirements are imposed on investment advisers and asset
management companies, largely because of the fact that some investment advisers
have experience and expertise in hedge fund-like investment strategies, while asset
management companies have insufficient experience in hedge fund-like
strategies.467
Unlike hedge fund managers, private equity fund managers are still subject
to different rules and regulations than hedge funds even under the new hedge fund
regime. That is, private equity fund managers are still not subject to stringent
licensing requirements, but instead they are subject to registration requirement.468

465

Despite these preferential treatments of foreign hedge fund managers, there have been no foreign
applicants for hedge fund business in Korea thus far. It may be explained that, from the foreign
private fund manager perspective, current Korean licensing requirements is still very onerous and
quite costly while the Korean hedge fund market size is relatively small (i.e., cost inefficient). On
the other hand, it may also affect their decision not to apply for the license that they can market
their funds on a cross-border basis even under the current regime, and there is no urgent need to
obtain local licenses that require them to invest lots of capital and human resources in Korea.
Further, it may also be taken into account that neighboring countries like Hong Kong and Singapore
provide more flexible licensing requirements for hedge fund advisers. These concerns may be
mitigated or resolved if the Korean FSC implemented the registration regime in the future, instead
of the current onerous authorization regime. See supra note 458.
466
Briefly speaking, investment advisers provide investment advisory or discretionary investment
management services on an individual and segregated account basis, while asset management
companies provide discretionary investment management services via a fund or collective
investment scheme. For the statutory definitions, see FSCMA, art. 6(4)-(7).
467
Unlike the U.S. regime, under the Korean regime (i.e., FSCMA) there is a clear distinction in
licensing between investment advisers and asset management companies in that the former provides
investment advisory services on a segregated account basis, while the latter provides investment
management services on a collective basis targeting collective investment schemes or funds. See id.
468
This registration requirement was newly introduced by the amendment of the FSCMA, and it
has been in force since May 28, 2013. Before the amendment of the FSCMA, the private equity
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The requirements for private equity fund manager registration are much less
onerous compared to hedge fund managers.469
This newly introduced registration requirement for private equity fund
managers may be influenced by the apparently global regulatory consensus
towards regulating PEFs and hedge funds as private funds in the U.S. or as
alternative investment funds in Europe. The Korean FSC, however, took a bit
different approach in terms of how to regulate them. Under the FSCMA, there is a
clear distinction between hedge funds and private equity funds; private equity
funds are defined to carry on primarily buy-out investment activities and special
rules and regulations are separately in place for them.470

(B) Reporting Requirements
In addition to the licensing requirements, hedge fund managers are subject
to reporting requirements if there are material changes after the registration of the
funds they manage. Also, they are subject to reporting requirements relating to
leveraged transactions such as money borrowing and to over-the-counter
derivatives transactions.471
These requirements are in line with the U.S. regime and are in place to
monitor risky activities and to mitigate potential systemic risk, although under the
fund only managers were exempted from licensing and registration requirements, unlike hedge fund
or private fund managers. For the detailed registration requirements, see FSCMA, art. 272-2.
469
As indicated earlier, under the old regime PEF managers used to not be subject to any licensing
or registration requirements, but under the new regime they become subject to registration
requirements. It is not clear why the Korean government takes the position to treat them differently
but it appears that both are different in many ways. The PEF market was already in place in Korea
while the hedge fund market is more newly established. With that in mind, it seems that the Korean
government has taken a step-by-step approach to structuring the regulatory architecture for hedge
funds and private equity funds for some period of time.
470
See FSCMA, art. 9(18)(vii), 268 et seq.
471
See FSCMA, art. 249-2(7), 270(9).
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Korean regime there is no clear provision stating that the prevention of systemic
risk is one of the goals of securities regulation.472
It appears that the Korean FSC takes the position that, compared to hedge
funds, there are not as many systemic risk related concerns for PEFs; however,
they are still subject to reporting requirements for their leveraged transactions.473

2.

Hedge Fund Regulation

(A) Reporting Requirement
Compared to general private funds, Korean hedge funds are relatively free
to establish and market to investors because they are only subject to ex-post
reporting requirements, while general private funds are required to register with
the FSC and cannot market the fund before registration.474
However, Korean hedge funds are also subject to some of the rules and
regulations applicable to mutual funds to the extent necessary to protect investors
and to mitigate systemic concerns. 475 For instance, leveraged transactions 476 are

472

Unlike the U.S. regime, the Korean regime tackles the systemic risk issue directly by providing
an upper limit for leveraged transactions like borrowing and speculative derivatives transactions, in
addition to the reporting requirements. In that regard, the Korean regime may be more concerned
with potential systemic risks, although there is no express provision under the FSCMA asserting
that preventing systemic risk is a goal. The licensing requirements applicable to hedge fund
managers could be evaluated as being systemic risk focused because certain levels of capital and
appropriate internal control systems should be in place to obtain the license. See FSCMA, art. 1.
473
This two-tiered approach in Korea can be evaluated positively because at least in Korea there is
a clear distinction between hedge funds and PEFs from a legal and practical perspective. Under the
current PEF regime it is difficult to say that PEFs have great potential to pose systemic risk in that
they primarily engage in private equity investments, they are not active traders in the secondary
market, and there is a quantitative limit to their leveraged transactions in place. See supra Chapter
II, Part B.3.
474
See FSCMA, art. 249, 249-2.
475
For instance, unlike the qualified purchaser fund under the U.S. regime, Korean qualified
purchaser funds are accessible to only high net-worth individuals who are deemed to not be
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limited to up to four times a fund’s equity capital,477 suitability rules are applicable
to non-professional investors (but qualified purchasers) like high net-worth
individuals, fund custody service must be provided by the licensed entity like
trustee banks, and fund assets must be evaluated on a mark-to-market basis.478
Thus, unlike the U.S. and U.K. regimes, Korean hedge funds are subject to
direct regulation, which may not work properly on unique hedge fund investment
strategies that largely depend on leverage and/or short sales.479
Overall, the Korean hedge fund regime is unique in that Korean hedge
funds are directly subject to rules and regulations like mutual funds; accordingly, it
may be described as quasi-regulated funds.480

professional investors, and as a result the suitability rule is applicable to them. Also, quantitative
leverage restrictions are imposed and periodic reporting of leveraged transactions is required. See
FSCMA, art. 47, 249-2.
476
Legally leveraged transactions entail borrowing money from third party creditors, but practically
it means that every transaction in essence is borrowing in substance. They may include over the
counter derivative transactions, repurchase agreements, and third party debt guarantees, in addition
to the money being borrowed. See FSCMA, art. 249-2(4), (5).
477
This quantitative leverage limitation may adversely affect funds who find it necessary to utilize
leveraged transactions a lot (e.g., fixed income arbitrage fund), and may also make the local hedge
fund market a bit unnatural. The Korean government takes a more conservative approach to make
sure that no substantial systemic risk issues will arise and that there is no urgent need to allow
unlimited leveraged transactions because most of the locally licensed managers are willing to
manage traditional equity long-short fund, not fixed income arbitrage funds requiring considerable
amounts of leverage at an initial stage.
478
It should be noted that all these rules and regulations are mandatorily applied to hedge funds and
hedge fund managers, and because of these rules and regulations the Korean regime may be
described as taking a rule-based approach like the U.S., and not a principle-based approach like the
U.K.
478
Regulating hedge funds may have a negative impact on the market because it may give the
wrong signal to potential investors that they should rely more on government (i.e., moral hazard
problem), and from the regulator’s side they may have more pressure from the public and the
political groups to be proactive or take preventive action to deal with potential hedge fund problems.
To the contrary, it may also encounter criticism that the private market becomes somewhat similar
to public mutual fund market, and because of that the regulator is too susceptible to political
pressure when certain bad things happen. More than anything else, it may be problematic that there
is no clear distinction between the private market and public mutual fund market and the regulator
takes a somewhat unclear position in regulating the hedge fund market. It may also be harmful to
every participant in the market because no one can have a clear understanding about what the
rationale behind the regulation is.
480
Registration or reporting may be mutually beneficial for both the manager and the investors in
some respects. From the manager’s standpoint, it may be helpful to market the funds because it may
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(B) Hedge Fund Marketing Regulation
Under the FSCMA, any offer or sale of fund units may be deemed
securities dealing or brokerage business depending on a factual assessment; no one
is allowed to market the fund targeting potential investors without obtaining the
relevant license first.481
Mandated disclosure (i.e., filing securities registration statement) can be
exempted if the offer or sale were done on a private placement basis in compliance
with private offering rules, and if no public solicitation or advertisement is
permitted then they are allowed to market to certain pre-defined qualified
purchasers.482
Among the qualified purchasers, high net-worth individuals are not deemed
professional investors under the FSCMA, but rather they are treated as nonprofessional-unsophisticated investors; however, they are classified as qualified
purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund definition. 483 As a result, various
rules and regulations applicable to securities brokers/dealers, including a suitability

enhance their reputation or creditworthiness with counterparties and investors. At the same time,
from the investors’ perspective, it also may help them to access the hedge fund more comfortably
because they may think it should be regulated enough to protect them by the regulatory authority.
However, it is doubtful if mandatory registration or reporting requirements are really necessary in
that the manager and the investors are able to choose registration on a voluntary basis if they think
it is beneficial for them, and mandatory registration or direct regulatory intervention in designing
their investment strategies may hinder them from pursuing financially innovative investment
strategies, and may deter them from maximizing their positive roles in the marketplace. Further,
considering the fact that the manager is already subject to regulatory supervision to some extent
there is little practical need to regulate the fund because it may distort the market.
481
See FSCMA, art. 7, 12,
482
See FSCMA, art. 9(7), (8), (19), 249-2.
483
See FSCMA, art. 249-2; PD, art. 271-2(1).
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rule, would be applied if fund units were marketed to high net-worth
individuals.484
That is, high net-worth individuals are treated differently from other
institutional investors in the qualified purchaser funds. They have more legal
protection under the suitability rule because they are deemed to be nonprofessional investors, requiring securities brokers or dealers to check their
suitability before soliciting the fund.485
Hedge fund managers are able to market the fund directly, but are subject
to fund distribution license requirements. It is because the Korean government
would like to ensure that high net-worth individuals are sufficiently protected by
the suitability rule when they are marketed by the fund manager and not by third
party intermediaries like securities firms.486
Unlike hedge fund managers, PEF managers are eligible to market the fund
units without any fund distribution license. Thus, the suitability rule, which is
484

This problem arises because high net-worth individuals are defined to cover non-professional
investors as qualified purchasers under the hedge fund regime, but they are legally treated as nonprofessional investors and no opt-in clause is available under the FSCMA. What that means is that
under the FSCMA high net-worth individuals are not included in the category of professional
investors (i.e., deemed sophisticated investors, and no suitability rule is applied to them), but they
are intentionally and statutorily included as a type of qualified purchaser in defining the qualified
purchaser fund. It is a bit contradictory to the private offering or qualified purchaser fund concept
in the U.S. in that typical qualified purchaser thresholds are much higher or stringent than the
accredited investor threshold under the private offering safe harbor rules. However, it may be
understood that the Korean government is trying to take a compromised position to accommodate
the market needs to cover high net-worth individuals as a potential hedge fund investors, while
making sure to protect high net-worth individuals who do not meet the professional investor
threshold requirement. See id. See also FSCMA, art. 9(5); PD, art. 10 (defining the scope of
professional investors).
485
See id. See also FSCMA, art. 46.
486
For instance, think about the situation where hedge fund managers are not required to obtain a
fund distribution license. That means they do not need to be in compliance with suitability rule
because they are not deemed to be a securities broker or dealer, and only securities brokers or
dealers are subject to the suitability rule. It is true that under the FSCMA there is a fiduciary duty
and anti-fraud rule in place for the fund manager, but these are not sufficient to protect HNWIs (i.e.,
deemed non-professional and unsophisticated investors) proactively when they make investment
decisions.
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applicable to hedge fund managers when they sell the units directly, is not
applicable to PEF managers if they sell the units directly to high net-worth
individuals.487
Korea domiciled hedge funds are exempt from securities registration
requirements based on the private offering safe harbor rule, but are subject to a
suitability rule for high net-worth individuals when they sell or offer the units
directly or indirectly through third party fund distributors. By contrast, PEF
managers are free from the suitability rule if they market the units directly to high
net-worth individuals.488

(C) Investors (Qualified Purchasers)
Interestingly, the scope of who is deemed a qualified purchaser under the
new hedge fund regime is a lot wider than the former regime in that certain high
net-worth individuals are allowed to directly access the hedge funds. The former
qualified purchaser funds used to be inaccessible to high net-worth individuals

487

It should be noted that, contrary to the PEF managers, any third party intermediary is subject to
fund distribution license if they sell the PEF units on behalf of the PEF managers, and accordingly
they are subject to suitability rule when marketing the units to certain HNWIs who do not satisfy
the professional investor threshold requirement but who are eligible for the PEF investment.
Because of the regulatory difference between direct marketing and indirect marketing of the PEF,
regulatory gaps and loopholes will arise, needing to be fixed legislatively.
488
The thresholds for high net-worth individuals for hedge fund and PEF are different in Korea: 0.5
billion won of invested amount is applied for hedge fund while 1 billion won of investment amount
is applied to PEF. Both HNWIs under the hedge fund and PEF regime are deemed to be nonprofessional investors under the FSCMA because the general professional investor threshold for the
high net-worth individuals is much higher than that for hedge funds and PEFs (i.e., at least 5 billion
won of invested amount is required for individuals to be treated as professional investors). This
regulatory differentiation should be reconsidered and amended by either treating HNWIs as
professional investors or by lowering the general threshold requirement for wealthy individuals to
include high net-worth individuals under the hedge fund and PEF regulatory regime. See FSCMA,
art. 9(5), 249-2(1), 269(6); PD, art. 10, 271-2(1), 291(3).

170

despite the fact that hedge funds are much riskier due to access to highly leveraged
transactions than the former qualified purchaser funds.489
This may be interpreted as a policy decision that the Korean regulator (i.e.,
the FSC) has taken a more affirmative position to accommodate a larger investor
pool so that hedge funds can build up the market during this initial stage, despite
the increased risk inherent in hedge fund investment strategies.
It seems reasonable that some professional investors, including institutional
investors, are included in the qualified purchaser category. However, it is
unreasonable for the threshold for high net-worth individuals for hedge funds to be
much lower than the former threshold for the general qualified purchaser funds.
Generally speaking, hedge funds deal in much riskier financial products
than general securities or derivatives products. In addition, the threshold for high
net-worth individuals under the Korean regime is in contradiction to that of the
U.S. regime in that the accredited investor threshold under Regulation D is much
lower than the qualified purchaser threshold for qualified purchaser funds under
the Investment Company Act of 1940.490

489

See FSCMA, art. 249-2.
Under the FSCMA, general threshold for high net-worth individuals (i.e., professional investors)
is 5 billion won of invested amount while the threshold for qualified purchasers is 0.5 billion won
(i.e., just one-tenth of the general high net-worth individuals threshold). The former is applicable
when individual investors are willing to invest in general securities or derivatives, and it is also
applicable to private offerings. On the other hand, the latter is applicable only when the high networth individuals are willing to invest in the hedge funds. Under the private offering regime, nonprofessional or unaccredited individuals are also accessible to the offering on a limited basis, and
they are also accessible to the hedge funds if they meet the qualified purchaser threshold. In that
respect, some may argue that the qualified purchaser threshold is a lot higher than that under the
private offering regime, but it is untrue and misleading because qualified purchasers include some
of the professional investors, not some of the general public. It is also consistent with the rationale
that as a prerequisite the qualified purchaser fund must meet the private offering rule, and qualified
purchasers should be selected from the general professional investors pool. See FSCMA, art. 9(5),
249-2(1); PD, art. 10, 271-2(1).
490
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Some high net-worth individuals (i.e., those in between 0.5 billion won in
invested amount and 5 billion Won in invested amount) under the hedge fund
regime should be treated as non-professional investors despite meeting the
requirements of the qualified purchaser category, and should be treated differently
under the private offering exemption as well.491
They are treated differently from other qualified purchasers (e.g.,
institutional investors) who are deemed professional investors under the Korean
securities regime even though they are classified the same as qualified purchasers
under the new hedge fund regime. Theoretically, 49 high net-worth individuals or
fewer can be marketed to and can directly invest in the hedge funds provided that
they go through the suitability test in every private offering – despite not
qualifying as professional investors under the Korean securities regime.492

491

Theoretically, putting those two regimes together, up to 49 high net-worth individuals are
accessible to the hedge funds for a one time private offering, and the number of the them could be
expanded more provided that they meet the private offering rule in every offering and also meet the
qualified purchaser threshold. See FSCMA, art. 9(7), 249-2(1); PD, art. 11(1), 271-2(1).
492
It is unclear whether, under the Korean private offering exemption, some high net-worth
individuals, who are deemed non-professional investors, may be required to go through the
sophistication test, because there is no express provision that an ex-ante sophistication test is
required for the high-net worth individuals. But it should be reasonable to interpret that something
like that test should be applied to high net-worth individuals even under the Korean private offering
exemption because of the suitability rule applicable to them when fund distributors offer or sell the
unit to them. However, the Korean private offering regime is different from the U.S. regime
because no sophistication test is required for the non-professional high net-worth individuals under
the Korean private offering regime, and the suitability rule is a bit different and less stringent
compared to the sophistication test applicable to unaccredited investors under the U.S. private
offering regime. This regulatory difference arises between the two countries because the qualified
purchaser threshold under the Korean regime is a lot less stringent than the threshold for the private
offering exemption under the U.S. regime. For the details of the U.S. private offering regime, see
supra Chapter IV, Part B.2.
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(D) Investment and Management Regulation
Unlike the U.S. and U.K. regimes, the Korean hedge fund rule directly
regulates the investment and management of hedge fund portfolios. As indicated
supra, the Korean regulator takes a very conservative position in directly
regulating both the funds and their managers to ensure mitigating potential
regulatory concerns. Leveraged transactions like cash borrowing, third party debt
guaranteeing and/or speculative derivative transactions are strictly limited to 400%
or less of the fund assets.493 Also the fund managers are required to report the
details of the leveraged transactions on a quarterly basis.494
Regulation of leverage transactions under the Korean hedge fund regime is
appropriate given that there is no precedent for how to manage leveraged hedge
funds in Korea, and it is difficult to imagine how the leveraged transactions may
adversely affect to the market during a stressed situation, if any. Thus, it may be
concluded that the Korean regulator took a wait see approach at the beginning,
despite the potential harm for hedge funds in fully exercising investment strategies
that utilize leveraged transactions.495 In this regard, Korean hedge funds may still
be regarded as quasi-regulated, as no full discretion is granted to the fund
managers in terms of the investment activities.
However, this regulatory strategy may deter market autonomy and financial
innovation, and it is more likely that the Korean hedge fund market may fall

493

See FSCMA, art. 249-2(4), (5).
See id. art. 249-2(7).
495
It may also be taken into consideration that at the initial stage there is no urgent market need for
more flexible leverage thresholds because there is no meaningful track record or experience with
managing the leveraged hedge funds like fixed-income arbitrage funds that need more leverage, and
most of the Korean hedge fund managers are willing to do traditional equity long-short strategies
first because it is more comfortable and familiar to them. See supra note 464.
494
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behind their global competitors. It is also problematic that the government is
somewhat directly involved in the hedge fund’s investment activities; as a result, it
is inevitable for the government to be the direct target of public blame if something
bad happens from the hedge fund industry. At the same time, too much
government intervention may cause a moral hazard problem from both the
managers and their counterparties/investors.
Therefore, it would be advisable that direct fund regulation and direct
governmental intervention in fund investment activities should be minimized or
refrained from in the long run in Korea, assuming that an adequate investor
protection regime and systemic risk monitoring and risk management system is in
place.

(E)

Fund Assets Custody

Segregation of fund assets is critically important for protecting investors,
particularly against the situations of the fund or the manager’s bankruptcies. Under
the hedge fund regime, there is no other practical way to protect the investors’
assets in the fund other than strict segregation of fund assets from others, and they
are expressly required to do so under the Korean hedge fund regime. 496 The
Korean regime requires the fund manager/custodian to separate fund assets from
their own assets, and to have the fund assets under custody by an independent third

496

Unlike hedge fund managers, PEF managers are not required to segregate the fund assets from
others under the FSCMA, and it is probably because there exists many differences in terms of
raising capital from investors, there is no daily active trading taking place in PEF, and it is more
common or typical for limited partners to be involved in making important investment decisions. It
may indicate that there is no practical need to require them to split fund assets from others. See
FSCMA, art. 272(4).
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parties, like regulated custodian banks or prime brokers.

497

Traditionally,

commercial banks, holding trust business licenses, provide the fund custody
services for funds (including hedge funds); prime brokers are recognized as
primary fund custody service providers under the new hedge fund rule. The prime
broker is also allowed to delegate the fund custody services to a third party service
provider with relevant license.498

(F) Suitability
Under the FSCMA, suitability rules are applicable to non-professional
investors only.

499

Thus, generally speaking, qualified purchasers such as

institutional investors are not protected by the suitability rule. As explained supra,
however, certain high net-worth individuals are deemed to be non-professional
investors under the new hedge fund rule even though they are also equally
classified as qualified purchasers (like institutional investors). As a result, among
the hedge fund investors, certain high net-worth individuals are treated differently
from institutional investors in regards to the suitability rule.
This unique phenomenon under the Korean hedge fund rule occurs because
the Korean government takes the policy position that high net-worth individuals
should be under the regulatory protection of the suitability rule, while classifying
them as qualified purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund scheme. This
497

See FSCMA, art. 246, 249-2(1).
Under the Korean hedge fund regime, the hedge fund manager is allowed to choose any prime
broker as a fund custodian or to choose an independent third party custodian like a bank. In cases
where the fund manager chooses a prime broker as a fund custodian, the prime broker has
discretion to delegate some of the custody functions to licensed third party custodians. But it should
be noted that it is not mandatorily required for the fund manager to choose prime broker as the only
fund custodian, but instead they have discretion to appoint other fund custody service providers in
addition to the prime broker. See PD, art. 50(1)(iii); FSC Regulation, art. 4-101(1).
499
See FSCMA, art. 46.
498
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approach may be possible because of the assumption that they are not sophisticated
or professional investors in principle, but may be treated like quasi-professional
investors by going through the suitability rule.
This regulatory approach may be understood as a somewhat inevitable one
in Korea considering the fact that the hedge fund market has newly emerged. It is
highly likely to expect that it is difficult to raise capital from institutional investors
from the start because Korean hedge fund managers lack a track record or
reputation for hedge fund management; accordingly, high net-worth individuals
are the primary sources or targets for funding at the initial stage.
However, this approach may have inherent problem, from a theoretical
perspective, because it is likely to confuse the nature of the accredited investors
(i.e., professional investors) under the private offering exemption, and the
relationship between accredited investors and qualified purchasers under the hedge
fund regime.
Under the private offering exemption in Korea, non-professional investors
(certain high net-worth individuals) can be directly marketed and exposed to hedge
funds, subject to the suitability rule. As pointed out supra, the problem here is that
the threshold for high net-worth individuals who are deemed professional investors
under the private offering rule is much higher than that for qualified purchaser high
net-worth individuals.
It is questionable, though, whether this two-tiered approach regarding high
net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers is reasonable. The fact of qualifying
high net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers should indicate that they are
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presumably sophisticated enough to protect themselves without paternalistic
governmental intervention.
Given that the rationales of the accredited investor standard under the
private offering exemption and qualified purchaser standard under the hedge fund
regime are similar between the U.S. and Korea, it would be a more reasonable
conclusion that qualified purchasers (including high net-worth individuals) should
be treated as professional investors because that is the reason why they are defined
as qualified purchasers.500

(G) Periodic report
Under the new hedge fund rule and private offering exemption, there is no
mandated disclosure required to hedge fund managers regarding investors at the
time of purchase of the fund securities. However, hedge fund managers are subject
to periodic (i.e., quarterly) reporting requirement to both the investors and the
regulators.
Unlike the U.S. and the U.K., under the Korean regime the information in
the fund related document, including the periodic report, is not legally accessible
by fund investors, and it is only accessible to the regulators; instead, under the new

500

Some may counter-argue that non-professional investors should be allowed to access hedge
funds directly as a matter of policy considering the fact that they are already accessible to hedge
funds through fund of funds or pension schemes. This view may have some grounds to support it,
but it is also true that defining high net-worth individuals as qualified purchasers, but treating them
as non-professional investors, is a very uncommon regulatory approach that may cause unnecessary
concern or confusion about the underlying rationale of why they are included to the qualified
purchaser category for hedge funds. Thus I believe it is a more prudent and consistent regulatory
approach to treat them as professional investors, or alternatively to lower the threshold requirement
for accredited investors under the private offering exemption, so that high net-worth individuals are
included under the qualified purchaser fund scheme. See SEC Staff Report, supra text
accompanying note 223.
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hedge fund regime, there is a special provision to force the fund manager to
provide quarterly performance reports to investors. 501 This periodic disclosure
requirement is equally applicable to both institutional investors and high net-worth
individuals to ensure the equal treatment of information access among the qualified
purchasers in the fund.502

D. Summary and Comments
As explained above, Korean hedge fund regime has been introduced in the
wake of the financial crisis in 2008, and because of that it was considered to be an
audacious and a counter-intuitive decision, because as with the financial crisis
there was an international consensus made to regulate the hedge fund industry
more stringently than ever.503
Because of these unfavorable or even hostile circumstances worldwide
relating to the hedge fund industry, Korean regulators have taken a very cautious
approach. They have sought to make the local hedge fund market available by
introducing a new hedge fund regime while, on the other hand, it placed a more
stringent regime in place under which hedge funds and their managers are both
501

In principle, under the Korean private offering rule it is legally impermissible to disclose fund
related information to the public because it would be in violation of the private offering safe harbor
rule. Thus, a mandated disclosure idea may not be feasible under the Korean private offering
regime even though some of the general information of the funds may be distributed by the
regulator and accessible by the general public. It should be noted, however, that this general
information disclosure can only be made by the regulator, not by the manager or distributors, so
there is no law violation issue here relating to the private offering safe harbor rule. See FSCMA, art.
249-2(1).
502
This periodic disclosure requirement is also confusing and seems inconsistent in terms of private
offering and private fund exemptions, because a mandated disclosure rule is in force in regard to
periodic disclosure while it is not applicable from the private offering exemption or suitability
perspective. Thus it should be advisable to make it clear that mandated disclosure rule is not
applicable to professional investors or to qualified purchasers.
503
See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102.
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subject to regulatory purview. This is generally in line with the global consensus
and at the same time may help mitigate investor protection concerns and/or
systemic risk concerns.504
However, this regulatory approach may have some potential problems
calling for careful reconsideration.
First, direct fund regulation is inadvisable because it is more likely to
impair the competitiveness and efficiency of the local Korean hedge fund market,
and at the same time it may also deter financial innovation. It would be less likely
for the local hedge fund market to be fully functioning and it may influence the
market in an abnormal way.505
There is no doubt that proper control of the highly risky leveraged
transactions by hedge funds is essential to ensuring market stability. However,
direct fund size or leverage regulation are less viable options because there are
more cost-efficient ways to deal with the problems – by regulating the fund
managers, counterparties-financial institutions, and by enhancing market discipline
through establishing best-practices.
Moreover, it is less likely to promote all the possible benefits and
simultaneously it may deter the market autonomy and creativeness, which should
be the hallmark of this market if they are directly regulated. 506 Given these
problems, the new hedge fund regime in Korea is less likely to be free from the

504

See id.
See supra Chapter III, Part B.2.
506
See id.
505
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overregulation issue, and should be revised to enhance market flexibility to the
extent possible in the long run.507
Second, as for the manager regulation, the Korean hedge fund regime has
also had problems because it requires close to the same (or even more stringent)
licensing requirements for those who intend to carry on hedge fund business only
as mutual fund managers.508
Assume that hedge fund business should be done on a very limited basis
with sophisticated investors including ultra-rich individuals, it is doubtful if such
onerous licensing requirements are really necessary. Investor protection concerns
become irrelevant or insignificant if all the investors are strictly limited to
professional/qualified investors (i.e., deemed sophisticated investors), and systemic
risk concerns can be effectively handled without creating an onerous licensing
regime. Lighter registration and reporting requirements should be sufficient.
In that regard, barriers to entry such as licensing requirements should be
lowered to reflect the business nature and potential investors pool, while ensuring
that an appropriate ex-post risk monitoring system in place.509
Third, the definition of accredited investor under the private offering
exemption regime and qualified purchasers under the new hedge fund regime

507

As discussed supra and observed in the U.S. and the U.K. regimes, it would be more advisable
not to directly regulate the fund, instead but to eventually regulate the manager only. See id.
508
Any entity could apply to be a mutual fund manager if they satisfy the relevant licensing
requirements, but there is a prerequisite for the hedge fund manager applicants in addition to the
general licensing requirements (such as assets under management or equity capital). It may be
considered an unreasonable or a disproportionately excessive regulation because the hedge fund
market is a niche market like the investment advisory market in Korea, and the participants in the
market are restricted to certain qualified purchasers. See supra Chapter VI, Part B.1.
509
The Korean FSC recently announced its plan to lower the entry regulation in regard to hedge
fund management business in the near future, and it should be assessed as a positive regulatory
policy change. See supra text accompanying note 458.
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should be revised. The current qualified purchaser threshold should be higher than
it is now and the general accredited investor (i.e., professional investor) threshold
should be lowered to include high net-worth individuals, who are eligible to be
qualified purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund scheme as professional
investors. Because hedge funds are a much more complex and riskier product than
other financial investment products the target investors (i.e., qualified purchasers)
should be more limited than accredited investors under the private offering regime.
Assuming that qualified purchasers are composed of institutional investors
or ultra-rich individuals meeting the professional investor threshold conditions,
there should be no serious investor protection concern raised and there is no
practical need to have a stringent paternalistic regime in place.
Fourth, as noted supra, under the Korean regime, it is unclear why there is
a clear regulatory distinction between hedge funds and private equity funds, and
why they are regulated separately and differently. Hedge funds have been treated
more like mutual funds, not like hedge funds in offshore jurisdictions, and hedge
funds and their managers both are heavily regulated in Korea. Private equity funds
and their managers have been treated a lot differently from hedge funds and their
managers. The private equity fund managers have been exempted from direct
regulations, like licensing requirements, although the funds are subject to direct
regulation in the form of registration and restrictions on investment activities.
This PEF regime is very uncommon in other jurisdictions, and it may be
understood as the result of the Korea unique regulatory consideration of the
“Chaebeol” or conglomerate issue. That is, Korean regulators are concerned about
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the possible misuse of the private equity fund scheme as a buy-out vehicle to
expand the affiliates of the Chaebeol firms in Korea.510 However, this regulatory
approach may be viewed negatively in terms of regulatory architecture because
there are no crystal clear rationales to justify the different regulatory approach
between hedge funds and private equity funds, and many regulatory
inconsistencies exist between the two regimes. Thus it should be revised to
minimize the regulatory disparities between the two regimes in the long run.
Fifth, it is worth noting that there are considerable regulatory differences in
regulating local private funds and offshore hedge funds. As pointed out supra,
Korea based hedge funds and their managers are subject to onerous regulatory
requirements in Korea, while offshore hedge funds are readily accessible to
Korean investors by relying on offshore fund sales regime or fund of funds
schemes. There is no doubt that this creates significant regulatory arbitrage
problems for Korea based hedge funds and their managers, and it is likely to drive
them offshore to carry on hedge fund business targeting Korean investors.
In sum, the Korean hedge fund regime has insufficient legal justifications
for its structure and it should be re-designed with reference to the major
jurisdictions like the U.S. and the U.K. Korea needs to have clearer rationales for
regulating hedge funds and to act consistently with those rationales moving
forward.

510

See ganjeob tuja jasan woonyongeob beob [Indirect Investment Asset Management Business
Act], Legislative Release, Act No. 7221, Oct. 5, 2004, as amended (S. Kor.), available at
http://www.law.go.kr/lsInfoP.do?lsiSeq=62375&lsId=&efYd=20041206&chrClsCd=010202&urlM
ode=lsEfInfoR&viewCls=lsRvsDocInfoR#0000.
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VII. Similarities and Differences between the U.S., the U.K., and
Korea
A. Overview
The unprecedented worldwide financial crisis in 2008 occurred primarily
due to sub-prime mortgage related financial market failures, and it had substantial
negative impacts on the global market as it lead to some big-sized financial firms’
failures. Some examples of the crisis driven failures include Bear Sterns affiliated
hedge fund adviser’s failure and Lehman Brother’s demise in the U.S., and
Northern Rock’s bailout in the U.K.511512 Unsurprisingly, powerful and stringent
regulatory reforms followed around the world after the crisis, and they have been
justified primarily based on the macro-prudential regulatory rationale (namely,
preventing or mitigating the systemic risk or ensuring the market stability).513
Hedge funds have been pointed out as one of the major players that caused
the subprime mortgage market failure and subsequent worldwide financial crisis,
among other things, while remaining unregulated or lightly regulated. 514 As a
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For the details of the Northern Rock failure, see THE ECONOMIST, Northern Rock: Lessons of the
fall, Oct. 18, 2007, available at http://www.economist.com/node/9988865/print.
512

Korea was relatively safe from the crisis in the wake of the 2008 global financial crisis and it
demonstrated no big failures in the financial market primarily because they had limited exposure to
sub-prime mortgage related financial products. See THE HANKYOREH, US subprime crisis likely to
have limited impact on S. Korea, Aug. 14, 2007, available at
http://english.hani.co.kr/popups/print.hani?ksn=228595.
513

See e.g., IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102 (discussing generally the securities
regulator’s role regarding systemic risk).
514

See e.g., Sants, supra note 311. See also Rebecca Christie & Ian Katz, Hedge Funds May Pose
Systemic Risk in Crisis, U.S. Report Says, BLOOMBERG, Feb 17, 2011, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-17/hedge-funds-may-pose-systemic-risk-in-crisis-u-s-
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result, regulatory efforts have been made to have them be subject to mandatory
registration and authorization, as well as periodic reporting requirements based on
the size and amount of leverage the hedge funds utilize.515 In other words, large
sized hedge funds are presumed to be systemically important enough to negatively
affect the markets when they fail or are in a seriously distressed market condition.
Registration and reporting requirements are implemented to prevent or mitigate the
market disruption created by hedge fund failures by monitoring their activities in
the markets on a continuous basis, helping the relevant regulators be ready to take
appropriate corrective measures in a timely manner when necessary.516
In addition, rules and regulations are in place to address the traditionally
well-recognized micro-prudential regulatory rationale of investor protection.
Mandated disclosure to the investors in the U.K. and various business conduct
regulations are some of the examples to that end. 517 These regulatory measures
have been justified based on the fact that the hedge fund market has been growing
quickly and continuously over recent decades, that there has been a significant
increase in unsophisticated investors’ access to the hedge fund market, and that

report-says.html (reporting on the FSOC report indicating that hedge funds may pose a threat to
market stability, especially in a time of crisis).
515

See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.

516

See e.g., Tim Geithner, U.S. Treasury Secretary, Written Testimony for the House Financial
Services Committee Hearing, March 26, 2009, available at http://www.treasury.gov/presscenter/press-releases/Pages/tg71.aspx.
517

See supra note 515.
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many market malpractices have been executed by hedge fund advisers while they
were outside of the regulatory umbrella.518
Because of these changes in the regulatory landscape around the world and
the global consensus among local regulators, 519 the newly adopted hedge fund
regulatory regime is similar to a large extent, but some differences in regulating
the hedge fund industry can be observed between the countries. Below is the brief
summary of the regulatory similarities and differences observed in the hedge fund
regimes of the three different countries (namely, the U.S., the U.K., and Korea).

518

See e.g., SEC Hedge Fund Report, supra note 245.

519

See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102. For a general illustration of the relationship
of between hedge funds and systemic risk, see Ferran, supra note 265. See also Andrew W. Lo,
Hedge Funds, Systemic Risk, and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008: Written Testimony for the
House Oversight Committee Hearing on Hedge Funds, November 13, 2008, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1301217; and Shadab, Hedge Funds and the
Financial Crisis, supra note 196.
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B. Similarities Between the U.S., the U.K., and Korea
First and foremost, what can be observed in common among the three
countries is that hedge funds and/or their managers have come under direct
regulatory oversight with the new regulatory framework in one way or another.520
As illustrated supra, hedge funds and/or their advisers were unregulated or lightly
regulated in the U.S. and the U.K. until the recent regulatory reform driven by the
global financial crisis, while they were completely prohibited from carrying on
hedge fund business in Korea. But the global financial crisis arising from subprime mortgage related financial market bubble urged the regulators around the
world to regulate hedge funds and/or their managers more directly. As a result, the
U.S. and the U.K. regulators have finally taken the position to regulate the fund
managers directly, leaving the hedge funds outside the direct regulatory
supervision, and focusing on the rationale of prevention or mitigating of systemic
risk.521
520

As indicated supra, Korea is a bit of a unique example, and may be seen to take a relaxed
position in terms of hedge fund regulation in that Korea has newly introduced a hedge fund regime
in Korea to institutionally develop the market amid the global financial crisis and the global
consensus to reinforce direct regulation against hedge funds and/or their managers. But what is
important to note about the Korean example is that they are also trying to go in parallel with global
regulatory consensus and exercise their legislative or regulatory authority within the scope of global
consensus. That is, on one side, the Korean regime may be regarded as an example of a
deregulatory effort because the local hedge fund market has been completely barred in Korea until
the new hedge fund regime became available in late 2011. But, on the other side, it may be
regarded as an example of relatively stringent hedge fund regime compared to the U.S. and the U.K.
regimes because the Korean regime basically provides more stringent rules and regulations against
both hedge funds and their managers. See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
521

See supra Chapter IV, Part C and Chapter V, Part C. It should be noted, however, that systemic
risk is not the only base for mandatory registration/authorization; rather it has also been grounded
on the conventional rationale for securities regulation (i.e., investor protection and deterrence of
market abuse). See e.g., Andrew J. Donohue, U.S. SEC director, Regulating Hedge Funds and
Other Private Investment Pools, Feb. 19, 2010, available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch021910ajd.htm.
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The Korean example is basically same as that of the U.S. or the U.K. in that
the Korean regulator would like to ensure that both hedge funds and their
managers are within their direct regulatory purview, giving them a close watch
over hedge fund investment activities and the potential impacts on the Korean
financial market. The flip side here is that the Korean regulator has strived to build
up the Korean hedge fund market, and has relaxed the then-existing rules and
regulations that made the local hedge fund business practically impossible.522
It is reasonable to conclude that hedge funds and/or their managers have
become somewhat regulated entities, and that they are subject to onerous reporting
and compliance obligations under the new regimes of the three countries.
The private adviser exemption (namely, “fewer than 15 clients” exemption)
is no longer available in the U.S., and they are required to comply with registration,
reporting, and business conduct rules, as well as the SEC’s examinations under the
Advisers Act. 523 The U.K. regime also requires hedge fund managers to be
authorized, and hedge fund managers are subject to broad business conduct rules
(although those rules may be applied a bit lightly to the hedge fund managers
considering the nature of their limited business based on the proportionality

522

In that regard, it may be more accurate to say that Korea takes a relatively more conservative
position than the U.S. or the U.K. in regulating the Korean hedge fund market considering the fact
that it has been newly introduced in late 2011, while the global financial market turmoil had not
been cleared yet, and they may need some time to wait and see how the hedge fund market goes
locally and globally.
523

See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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principle).524 Both countries take position not to directly regulate the hedge funds
provided that they are marketed only to certain eligible investors.525
The Korean regime provides a comparable regulatory framework to that of
the U.S. and the U.K. in principle in that any hedge fund adviser carrying on hedge
fund business in Korea is required to be authorized in advance like other regulated
entities. It is different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes because hedge funds are
also subject to direct regulatory requirements such as leverage limits or other
investment restrictions, and in that regard the Korean regime may be viewed as a
more stringent regulatory regime than that of the U.S. or U.K.526
Second, regulatory focus has been shifted more to macro-prudential
regulation (namely, systemic risk control or ensuring market stability) from microprudential regulation (namely, investor protection), and many rules and regulations
have been implemented from that perspective in the three countries in response to
the mortgage bubble and accompanying financial crisis.527

524

See supra Chapter V, Part C. See also Dan Waters, U.K. FSA Asset Management Sector Leader,
Hedge Fund Regulation 2009 Forum Speech, The European Regulatory Agenda for Hedge Funds,
Sept. 30, 2009, available at
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/speeches/2009/0930_dw.shtml.
525

See supra note 521. The U.K. private placement exemption is no longer available to hedge funds
after 2018, and the uniform European passport regime will replace it. All hedge funds will be
subject to approval or reporting requirements under the AIFMD starting in 2019. See AIFMD,
explanatory note 4, 69; art. 42, 67.
526

It should be noted, however, that the U.K. regime may be viewed as being more similar to the
Korean regime, and thus different from the U.S. regime, in that both the funds and the managers are
required to register to or be authorized by the relevant local regulatory authorities under the
AIFMD, while the U.S. hedge fund regime still provides safe harbors for hedge funds to avoid
many of the paternalistic regulations. See supra note 521.
527

See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.
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It does not necessarily mean that the conventional micro-prudential
regulatory rationale has been disregarded or treated lightly, but it is more accurate
to say that the then-existing regulatory regime based on the micro-prudential
rationale has been supplemented by the new rationale of macro-prudential
regulation. For instance, redefining the threshold conditions for accredited
investors in the U.S., and having hedge fund advisers subject to mandatory
registration/authorization, reporting/disclosure, and examination obligations in the
three countries, among other things, are some of the regulatory measures taken in
terms of investor protection or deter fraud from private fund advisers.528
There was a consensus among the regulators to redesign the regulatory
framework to prevent or mitigate the systemic risk from the hedge fund market and
to have a close watch over them.529 A few of the new hedge fund regimes changes
made to address systemic risk regulation include imposing authorization and
registration requirements on the private fund manager and/or the fund, mandatory
reporting, and compulsory implementation of appropriate compliance and risk
management systems.530
In the U.S., the then-existing private adviser exemption based on the
number of clients has been repealed and replaced by a new size-based exemption

528

See e.g., Donohue, supra note 521; Waters, supra note 524.

529

See e.g., Eilis Ferran, supra note 265, at 9-14 (summarizing the regulatory initiatives among the
regulators from the global level in response to the global financial crisis).
530

These rules may be also viewed as a regulatory regime with a micro-prudential regulatory
perspective because it is in some ways connected with a mandated disclosure regulatory philosophy
in that the information contained in the registration statement or periodic report are publicly
available in whole or in part. See supra note 525.
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(except for foreign private advisers) and new continuous reporting requirements
based on this rationale. 531 A new uniform alternative investment fund manager
authorization regime has been transposed into the U.K. regime reflecting the
AIFMD, and periodic reporting requirements are in place to monitor the systemic
risk from the hedge fund market. The Korean regime also requires hedge fund
managers to be authorized like other regulated entities and to report relevant
information regarding system risk periodically such as cash borrowing or other
leveraged transactions (e.g., OTC derivatives transaction).532
Needless to say, regulating the fund’s leveraged activities is the most safe,
easy and efficient way to deal with systemic risk concern from the regulator’s
standpoint.533 The problem with this regulatory option, however, is that regulatory
costs may outweigh the regulatory benefits in that it is more likely to deter
financial innovation and prevent hedge funds from providing many benefits to the
market, like supplying liquidity, portfolio diversification, price discovery, and
market shock smoothing.534

531

What is noteworthy particularly in the U.S. is that big-sized hedge funds and/or their managers
designated by the FSOC may be subject to macro-prudential based regulatory requirements like
liquidity, capital, and leverage requirements, in addition to the general private adviser regulation
under the Advisers Act. See Authority to Require Supervision and Regulation of Certain Nonbank
Financial Companies, supra note 104.
532

See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.

533

See e.g., Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investors Exemption, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 49, 110
(2012) (suggesting, as one of the possible alternative regulatory options, that direct regulation of
hedge fund’s leveraged transactions should be taken into consideration).
534

See e.g., Goldschmid, supra note 203.
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Therefore, the U.S. and U.K. approaches would be a more reasonable and
less drastic regulatory approach than the Korean regulatory option because (i)
systemic risk issue is something ex-post in nature that is difficult to deal with on a
proactive basis, (ii) it is very rare and exceptional to observe the really high profile
hedge fund failures, sufficient to pose systemic risk, and (iii) other viable
alternative regulatory options are available by regulating the counterparties or
institutional investors as well as the managers, most of whom are regulated
entities.535
Third, disclosure requirements for investors and the public are heightened
in these three countries to enhance the transparency about the hedge funds and
minimize informational asymmetry between the managers and investors. In the
U.S., regulatory efforts to make the private fund industry more transparent have
been made in the form of making the registration statement and periodic report
publicly available, not in the form of mandating that the manager to provide the
documents directly to the investors.536
The Korean regime provides that all the Korean domiciled hedge fund
managers be subject to periodic reporting obligations with the regulator, but there
is no express provision that requires the hedge fund or its manager to provide its

See e.g., Tamar Frankel, Private Investment Funds: Hedge Funds’ Regulation by Size, 39
RUTGERS L. J. 657 (Spring 2008) (arguing that not regulating hedge fund directly, but regulating
the sources of hedge funds’ leverage is more appropriate). See also supra Chapter III, Part B.
535

536

The information in the registration statement of the registered investment adviser is publicly
available in part, and other information in the periodic report filed with SEC is also available to the
public in case of the exempted reporting advisers. That is, they are exempted from the registration
requirement, but still subject to recordkeeping and ongoing reporting obligations. See supra
Chapter IV, Part C.
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investors with private placement memorandum or periodic reports.537 In contrast,
the U.K. regime (namely, AIFMD) explicitly requires hedge fund managers to
provide periodic reports for the investors on a continuous basis in addition to the
filing requirements with relevant local regulator.

538

Basically, the Korean

disclosure regime is more like the U.S. regime than the U.K. regime.539
Fourth, private equity fund managers, not to mention hedge fund managers,
become subject to authorization/registration in the three countries. This new
regulatory approach has been justified in the name of systemic risk control because
like hedge funds, private equity fund managers also have the potential to disrupt
market stability.540
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As illustrated supra, any information filed by the manager in the authorization process or in the
periodic report is not publicly available including the investors in Korea, and no private placement
memorandum delivery is required at time of offering or selling the funds. But some high net-worth
individuals in the hedge funds are indirectly protected through suitability and product guidance
rules because they are treated as non-professional investors (non-sophisticated investors). It is still
doubtful, though, if these rules are really in line with the legislative background for defining
qualified purchaser to include high net-worth individuals. See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
538

It may be a confusing regulatory approach because the investors in the fund are deemed
sophisticated, and they are in the position to request relevant information from the adviser if
necessary. Also it seems inconsistent with the idea that no mandated disclosure is required if the
offer or sale is limited to certain professional investors. It is likely that express disclosure
requirements may dilute the disclosure issue because it may give them the impression that they are
free from liability if they merely comply with the disclosure obligation set forth in the statute. See
supra Chapter V, Part C.
539

It should be noted, however, that the Korean disclosure regime is somewhat different from the
U.S. regime in that even the information in the fund registration statement or periodic report filed
with the regulator is not publicly available under the Korean regime, while some of the hedge fund
information filed with the regulator are publicly available in the U.S. See supra Chapter IV, Part C;
Chapter VI, Part C.
540

For the relationship of PEF and systemic risk, see generally Ferran, supra note 265; Tillman,
supra note 264.
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The U.S. regime treats PEF managers exactly the same as hedge fund
advisers, while the U.K. and Korean regimes have tried to regulate them
differently based on a proportionality principle. For instance, some rules regarding
fund custody are relaxed for private equity fund managers considering the
difference in their investment process and the assets they invest and hold in the
U.K. Korea also provides lighter regulatory treatment for PEF managers by
subjecting them to a more simplified registration.541 But the three countries take
the same regulatory position in imposing periodic reporting requirements on both
hedge fund managers and private equity fund managers for the purpose of
monitoring their systemic risk.542
Fifth, these countries take similar approaches in regulating offshore-based
hedge fund managers. Under the U.S. regime, offshore hedge fund managers are
subject to registration requirements under the Advisers Act if they conduct the
business in the U.S. or with U.S. investors, unless they satisfy the private adviser
or foreign private adviser exemption. 543 Foreign hedge fund advisers, like U.S.
based hedge fund advisers, used to rely on the then-existing “fewer than 15 clients”

541

See supra note 525.

542

It is not entirely clear if private equity funds are more likely to pose systemic risk and many
academics support the idea that there is a lot less likelihood that they pose systemic risk because
their investment strategies are by far different from those of hedge funds. The leverage concern is
also not as critical in the private equity fund industry because the leveraged transaction typically
takes place in the level of the acquired target companies, not the fund level. See e.g., Tillman, supra
note 264. See contra Ferran, supra note 265 (supporting the idea of regulating the PEF market like
the hedge fund market from the standpoint that they are also big enough to pose systemic risk in the
event they go bankrupt, and the leverage they take in the acquired portfolio company level could
also negatively affect the market in the event of their collapse).
543

See supra Chapter IV, Part C.1.
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private adviser exemption to avoid the registration obligation under the Advisers
Act.544
Even under the Dodd-Frank Act, the same private adviser exemption is still
available to foreign private advisers despite no longer being available to U.S.
based private fund advisers. The “fewer than 15 clients” exemption remains
unchanged in connection with foreign private advisers; U.S. domiciled private
advisers no longer have access to the “number of clients” based exemption, but are
now subject to new size-based safe harbor rules. 545 Consequently, two separate
safe harbor rules are in place under the Dodd-Frank Act for U.S. based private
advisers and foreign private advisers respectively.546
Under the U.K. regime, foreign based advisers have not been legally
required to be authorized unless substantial parts of their conduct takes place in the
U.K. or with U.K. investors, but the U.K. regime does not provide clear safe

544

For the general overview of the extraterritorial reach of the Advisers Act before the Dodd-Frank
Act, See SEC Staff Report, supra note 20, at 221-236.
545

See supra note 541.

More precisely and legally speaking, the old “fewer than 15 clients” exemption has been
officially repealed and a new registration regime has been implemented based on the size of the
fund and the manager, and new safe harbor rules have been put in place including the foreign
private adviser exemption under the Dodd-Frank Act. But in substance, the new foreign private
adviser exemption is exactly the same as the old private adviser exemption, because the former
exemption was narrowed down to only provide a foreign private adviser exemption. This U.S.
regulatory approach may be understood as a way for regulators to measure and clarify the scope of
the extraterritorial application for foreign based private advisers, and at the same time this safe
harbor condition is in place to minimize the negative regulatory impact on U.S. based private
advisers (with a goal of discouraging them from moving to an offshore regulatory friendly location
to avoid onerous U.S. regulations). See Overmyer, supra note 301, at 2208-10. See also
Registration under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, supra note 140, at 72,071.
546
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harbor rules for foreign private advisers, and it has been typically been dealt with
in the context of offshore fund marketing.547
Likewise, the Korean regime does not provide express safe harbor rules for
foreign-based private advisers, and instead provides a general extraterritorial
application provision and offshore fund sales rules.548 Based on those rules, it has
been understood that offshore private advisers are not subject to authorization
requirements under the Korean regime if they market the offshore funds in
compliance with the offshore fund sales rules, and unless there are any special
factual circumstances to apply the general extraterritorial provision.549 Overall, the
three countries provide some safe harbors expressly or impliedly for the offshore
hedge fund managers in different ways.
Sixth, the three countries take similar regulatory approaches in general
relating to offshore hedge funds marketing to their local investors. That is, offshore
hedge funds are not subject to registration requirements if the fund interests are
offered or sold to certain eligible professional investors. The U.S. regime provides
express safe harbor rules for the private offering of hedge fund interests,550 the U.K.
regime provides that offshore hedge funds are not subject to the U.K. fund regime
if not offered and sold to the general public,551 and the Korean regime provides
547

See supra Chapter V, Part B, C.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
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Id.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2.
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It should be noted, however, that offshore funds become subject to approval requirements under
the new U.K. regime (i.e., AIFMD) starting in 2019, although until that time the current private
placement safe harbor regime is still available. See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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similar safe harbor rules to that of the US in terms of private offerings.552 Until the
new U.K. offshore fund marketing regime is implemented under the AIFMD in
2019, the U.K. regime provides for a private placement safe harbor regime and
offshore hedge funds have been outside of regulatory oversight as long as they are
not marketed to the general public. The U.S. regime provides similar private
offering safe harbors.553
The Korean regime is positioned in between the two regimes. It is
somewhat similar to the U.S. and U.K. regimes in that offshore hedge funds are
exempted from securities registration requirements (in terms of the private offering
exemption), but it is different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes (before the AIFMD
is fully in force in 2019) in that they are subject to fund registration requirements
even when they intend to sell the funds only to certain eligible professional
investors.554
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2; Chapter V, Part B.2.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2.
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C. Differences between the U.S., the U.K., and Korea
Overall, in principle, there is no substantial difference in the hedge fund
regulatory framework because hedge fund regimes have been modified or newly
introduced in the same direction – to reinforce regulations after the global financial
crisis of 2008 by focusing on preventing or mitigating systemic risk from hedge
funds. Nonetheless, some meaningful regulatory differences can be observed.
First, the U.S. basically follows a rule-based approach, regulating hedge
fund advisers with the Advisers Act (exactly the same as the mutual fund advisers);
while the U.K. maintains its previous broad principle-based regime and provides
the flexibility to loosely apply the rules considering the limited nature and scope of
their business.555 In contrast, the Korean regulatory model goes between the two
regimes in that Korean hedge fund managers are required to be authorized in
addition to having many rules and regulations applicable to mutual fund managers
being equally applied to them.556
In terms of a micro-prudential regulatory perspective, it is disputable that
hedge fund managers should be subject to the full scope of the Advisers Act in the
U.S. like other mutual fund advisers, as they focus only on accredited investors.
The current mandatory registration regime for private advisers is somewhat
555

See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.
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The Korean model looks somewhat similar to the U.K. regime because Korea based hedge fund
managers are subject to authorization requirements. However, some of them may be applied to
hedge fund managers more lightly than other regulated entities including mutual fund managers,
and some of the rules applicable to mutual fund advisers are exempted from applying to hedge fund
managers. But, on the other hand, it also looks like the U.S. regime because the Korean regime is in
place on a rule basis, not on a principle basis, and there is no flexibility to apply the rules
differently or more lightly to hedge fund managers other than through the licensing requirements.
See supra Chapter VI, Part C.1.
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inconsistent with the legislative intent or history that distinguishes the private
market from the public market and from all the rules and regulations in place that
focus on the public market.

557

Even from a macro-prudential regulatory

perspective, it is still doubtful that the current regulations are appropriate and that
all the rules in the Advisers Act are relevant to addressing systemic risk.558
The Korean hedge fund regime is also problematic. It treats the hedge fund
market as a regulated market in principle, at least for Korea based funds and their
managers, because many of the rules applicable to mutual fund advisers are
equally applied to hedge fund managers. Korean regulators meticulously define
hedge fund and bar the investing public from accessing the market directly, and
also keep them distinct from other heavily regulated markets such as the mutual
fund market (and even from the general private fund where the general public can
access on a limited basis).559 Furthermore, it tried to directly regulate hedge funds
and to impose investment limitations on the fund’s leveraged transactions.560
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See supra Chapter IV, Part D.
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This doubt is based on the observation that hedge fund counterparties or creditors should be
regulated to control potential systemic risks in terms of credit channel regulation, while direct
regulation of hedge fund’s risky investments (e.g., highly leveraged transactions like borrowing or
speculative OTC derivative transaction) are more effective in terms of market channel regulation,
and should be a matter of Investment Company Act, not the Advisers Act. As a matter of fact, most
of the rules in the Advisers Act are in place to protect the general public and are more relevant to
micro-prudential regulation. Therefore there is a mismatch between the rationale for private adviser
regulation and the implemented rules to a large extent, assuming that there are no unaccredited
investors involved directly in the hedge fund market and that there are no critical concerns for
investor protection. See id.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part D.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2.
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Second, the three countries demonstrate differences in regulating the hedge
fund itself. The U.S. regime remains unchanged in terms of the private fund
exemption and allows hedge funds to avoid fund regulation while their advisers
come under regulatory purview; the U.K. takes a similar position, even under the
new regime (i.e., AIFMD).561 Both countries, take a bit different of an approach in
designing the regulatory framework for hedge funds in that the U.S. provides
express safe harbor rules while the U.K. does not. The U.K. achieves the same
regulatory goal by providing not creating rules applicable to hedge funds unless
they offer or sell the fund interests to the public.562
Korea demonstrates vivid contrast from the other two countries in terms of
hedge fund regulation in that they try to regulate the fund investment activities
directly. For instance, leveraged transactions like money borrowing and
speculative OTC derivative transaction are allowed on a limited basis. 563 This
difference may arise because the Korean regime treats hedge funds like quasiregulated funds, and only some of the rules applicable to mutual funds are
exempted to from applying to hedge funds.564 This approach may be working to
some extent to mitigate the occurrence of market disruption from the Korea based
hedge funds because the amount of leverage they may utilize is capped at the
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.
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See id.
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See FSCMA, art. 249-2(3), (4).
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See FSCMA, art. 249-2(1).
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outset. However, it is likely working incompletely and is easily avoidable by
choosing an offshore jurisdiction not covered by the Korean regime.565
Therefore, the U.S. or the U.K. approach seems more appropriate in that
direct fund regulation cannot completely ensure the market stability, in part
because most of the funds are based offshore giving them more power to influence
the local market. Also, they are generally free from local regulation inevitably
resulting in a regulatory arbitrage problem.566
Third, the three countries take a somewhat different approach in regards to
the disclosure requirement to the investors. The U.S. regime provides no specific
direct mandatory disclosure regime for the purpose of investor protection. That is,
the U.S. Securities Act provides hedge funds with a safe harbor rule that exempts
them from registration requirements, and the U.S. Advisers Act also provides no
rule to force the hedge fund advisers to provide disclosure documents for the
investors.567
Further, under the U.S. regime certain information in the registration
statement or other reports filed by registered investment advisers is not publicly
565

This regulatory loophole may be curtailed or minimized if all the offshore funds were subject to
registration and reporting requirements, but it is practically impossible and undesirable because a
regulatory overlap or regulatory conflict problem may arise. See SEC Staff Report, supra note 544.
566

See AIFMD, explanatory note 4. It would be best and ideal if we can make the hedge fund
regime uniform and consistent to level the playing field between the countries around the world,
and the E.U. AIFMD would be an example to that end. However, this is almost impossible for
various reasons. Thus it is more prudent and more feasible for local regulators to coordinate in
regulating the local hedge fund market and to share information relevant to systemic risk. See e.g.,
Anne Riviere, The Future of Hedge Fund Regulation: A Comparative Approach, 10 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 263, 328-31 (Summer 2011).
567

Some of the information in the Form ADV filed with the SEC may be publicly available, but
still it is different from direct disclosure to the investors. See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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available, while the information contained in the report filed by the “exempt
reporting company” (namely, mid-sized private adviser or venture capital fund
adviser) may be publicly available.568
Korea takes a similar position to the U.S. in that there is no mandatory
disclosure and prospectus delivery requirement for hedge funds.569 Instead, Korean
hedge fund managers and their sales agents are required to comply with suitability
rules and product guidance obligations for non-professional individual investors
among the qualified purchasers when they market the fund interests to them.570
In contrast, the UK regime (namely, AIFMD) expressly provides that
hedge fund managers disclose material terms to the investors before investment

The reporting requirement imposed on the “exempt reporting adviser” may be justified on the
ground that the mid-sized private advisers or venture capital fund advisers may also have potential
to pose systemic risk on a collective basis because of their possible herd behavior. The regulator
should be able to monitor their activities and be ready to take action if necessary. See Seth Chertok,
supra note 201, at 24 (2011). However, it may be counter-argued that the distinction between
registered private advisers and exempt reporting advisers becomes blurry, and treating them
basically the same as registered hedge fund advisers would be appropriate. Even exempted private
advisers are subject to same recordkeeping and reporting requirements as registered private fund
advisers, and it undoubtedly entails a lot of disproportionate compliance burdens for the mid-sized
private advisers or venture capital fund advisers, and impairs their business operation considering
the relatively small size of their business. See e.g. Kathleen L. Casey, SEC Commissioner,
Statement at SEC Open Meeting, Rules Implementing Amendments to the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940: Exemptions for Advisers to Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with less than
$ 150 Million in Assets under Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, June 22, 2011, available
at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch062211klc-items1-2.htm. See also Eisner Amper,
Dodd-Frank Bill: A Year and a Half Later, at 25-28 (March 2012), available at
http://www.hofstra.edu/pdf/academics/colleges/zarb/zarb_paper_doddfrank.pdf (observing that due
to the heightened reporting and compliance burden small private advisers are particularly required
to reorganize their management system in one way or another).
568
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2
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These suitability and product guidance rules are different from prospectus delivery or mandated
disclosure rules, but it may be functioning indirectly as a regulatory tool to urge the managers to
provide disclosure documents (like private placement memorandums) for the non-professional
qualified purchasers in the hedge funds. See id.
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and that they update any material changes made after the investment. 571 It also
provides that the manager is subject to continuous reporting obligation to the
investors.572 That seems a bit confusing and in contradiction with the rationale for
private offering exemption, though, because mandatory disclosure obligations are
imposed on the hedge fund managers despite the fact that the investors in the fund
are strictly limited only to professional investors.573
There is no doubt that certain types of information should be provided
before investment to the investors, and as a matter of market practice it is very
common to provide certain disclosure documents called private placement
memorandums to meet the investors’ due diligence requests, and at the same time
to avoid the possible breach of fiduciary duty or anti-fraud rule. Thus, it may be
more advisable not to expressly set forth rules for mandatory disclosure
requirements.
Fourth, the three countries also have taken slightly different approaches in
regards to the coverage of the regime and the way to deal with private fund
advisers (including hedge fund advisers). The U.S. private fund regime is
applicable only to private funds, and it includes general private funds and qualified
purchaser funds only under Section 3(c)(1) and 3(c)(7) of the Investment Company
Act. Other private funds (e.g., real estate funds or commodity funds) not falling
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See AIFMD, art. 23.
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See id. art. 24
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See e.g., Sants, supra note 311.
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within the definition of investment company under the Investment Company Act
will remain outside the regime even under the Dodd-Frank Act.574
In contrast, the U.K. and Korea take a quite different position based on the
principle of functional regulation that any private pooled investment vehicles are
subject to the private fund regime unless they can rely on the exemption clauses.575
As a result, REITs or commodity funds are also subject to the new private fund
regime.576 In addition, some differences can be observed in the way that different
types of private funds (including hedge funds and private equity funds) are
regulated between the three countries.
The U.S. takes a very simple and straightforward position in regulating
private funds, including hedge funds and private equity funds, and the default rule
is that all private funds should be subject to same rules and regulations under the
Advisers Act; despite the diverse nature of the private fund market and despite the
fact that the original legislative intent of the Act was to protect the general public
from the managers.577 As a consequence, there is no different regulatory treatment
574

It may be assessed as an inevitable regulatory measure because the Investment Company Act has
been in place to cover the pooled investment vehicles set up mainly for the securities investment
purposes, and the private fund safe harbor rules were implemented to exclude those private funds
from the reach of the Investment Company Act. Thus any other pooled investment vehicles
primarily investing in something other than securities would be outside the regulatory purview
under the Investment Company Act at the outset. See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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See AIFMD, explanatory note (2), (4) and (6); FSCMA, art. 9(18), (19) and 249-2.
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Private funds, such as REITs or commodity funds, have been subject to the U.K. and the Korean
private fund regime even before the new regimes were implemented. Nonetheless, the new hedge
fund regimes in the U.K. and Korea are meaningful to some extent in that a new uniform regulatory
regime is in place focusing on hedge funds (or more broadly the alternative investment fund
market). See supra Chapter V, Part B; Chapter VI, Part B.
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See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., et al., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
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made between hedge funds and private equity funds based on the assumption that
private equity funds may also have potential to pose systemic risk.578
In contrast, the U.K. and Korean regimes take a proportionate approach in
regulating hedge funds and private equity funds. Some of the rules applicable to
hedge fund managers may be exempted or loosely applied to private equity fund
managers. For instance, among other things, capital requirements are reduced for
private equity fund managers who do not utilize leverage and for those who have 5
years or longer lock-up period in place in the fund. Disclosure and reporting
requirements are also more lightly applied to private equity fund managers than
hedge fund managers under the U.K. regime (i.e., AIFMD).579
Korea also takes a two-tiered approach in regulating hedge funds and
private equity funds, with much lighter regulatory oversight on the private equity
fund market. Simplified registration, instead of authorization, is required for the
private equity fund managers and most of the rules and regulations applicable to
hedge funds and their managers are exempted from applying to private equity fund
managers under the Korean regime.580 The size, the level of leverage they utilize,
the investment strategy and investment portfolio, the frequency of trading in the
market, and the frequency of redemption are, among other things, different to a
large extent between hedge funds and private equity funds; although there has been
no clear legal distinction made between them in the past, there has also
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See Tillman, supra accompanying text note 264.
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See AIFMD, explanatory note 17; Level 2 Regulation, art. 110(3)(d).
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See FSCMA, art. 268 et seq.
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occasionally been convergence between them depending on the market
circumstances.581
Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that the private equity fund market
should be treated differently from the hedge fund market, as observed in the U.K.
and Korean regimes. Lighter regulatory oversight is needed in the private equity
market than in the hedge fund market. For instance, simple registration and/or
reporting and recordkeeping requirements would be sufficient for the regulator’s
oversight of the systemic risk posed by private equity funds.582
Fifth, there are some differences found in regulating offshore private
advisers between the three countries. The U.S. provides an express safe harbor rule
that offshore fund advisers can rely on to avoid registration and other regulatory
obligations under the Advisers Act. To do so, the U.S. has utilized the former
“fewer than 15 clients” safe harbor rule as a new foreign private adviser
exemption.583 Relying on this new safe harbor rule, offshore private advisers are
able to avoid the registration requirement under the Advisers Act to the extent that
they satisfy such threshold conditions for “foreign private adviser” who: (i) have
no place of business in the U.S., (ii) have, in total, fewer than 15 clients or
investors in the U.S. in private funds advised by the adviser, (iii) have aggregate

581

For the distinctions between hedge funds and private equity funds, see supra Chapter II, Part C.2.
For the convergence tendency between hedge funds and private equity funds, See e.g. Shadab,
supra note 64.
This may be comparable to the U.S. “exempt reporting company” under the Dodd-Frank Act,
and it may be acceptable for the systemic risk monitoring purpose from the regulator’s standpoint.
See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
582

583

Id.
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assets under management attributable to clients in the U.S. of less than 25 million
dollars, and (iv) neither holds itself out generally to the public in the U.S. as an
investment adviser, nor acts as an investment adviser to any registered investment
company under the Investment Company Act or as a business development
company.584
That may be assessed as a regulatory effort to demarcate the line for
whether or not offshore private advisers are required to register with the SEC in
accordance with the Adviser Act, and it may have positive effects to some extent
in that it makes a clear distinction between regulated non-U.S. based private
advisers and unregulated non-U.S. based private advisers in terms of the outer
reach of the Advisers Act.
However, in some respects it is more likely to cause some problems. First,
it fails to clearly explain why different safe harbor rules are necessary between U.S.
based private advisers and non-US based private advisers, and why different
threshold conditions are provided for them.

585

From the macro-prudential

regulatory perspective, both onshore and offshore private advisers (conducting
hedge fund management business in the U.S. or with U.S. investors) should be
under the U.S. regulator’s oversight because they both have the potential to pose
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See Dodd-Frank Act, § 402, 124 Stat. 1376, 1570 (2010); 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3).
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As illustrated supra, US based private advisers are exempted from registration requirements
depending on the size of the funds they manage, while foreign private advisers are exempted from
the registration requirement based on the size and the number of the U.S. clients or investors in the
funds they manage. Furthermore, the threshold conditions are also different in terms of the size
between them. See supra Chapter IV, Part C.

206

systemic risk in the U.S. 586 Furthermore, it may provide private advisers
(especially startup companies) with the incentive to choose to be offshore to avoid
onerous regulatory requirements under the Advisers Act if they intend to carry on
the business on a limited basis in the U.S. or with U.S. investors. Thus at least
from the systemic risk regulatory standpoint, it would be more prudent to set forth
comparable safe harbor threshold conditions between them.587
In contrast, the U.K. takes a much different position in regulating offshore
private advisers. They are not subject to the authorization requirements of the U.K.
regime unless there is special circumstances to treat them like a U.K. based adviser,
depending on the factual circumstances (e.g., if they choose offshore merely to
avoid the UK regulation).588 They are also free to choose the U.K. as a base for
fund establishment.589
Korea takes a more unique position in regulating offshore private fund
managers. Offshore private fund managers are not allowed to set up the fund in
Korea to raise capital from Korean investors, unless they are based in Korea and
authorized by the Korean regulator. 590 It is partly because private advisers and
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See Overmyer, supra note 301.
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There are not any serious investor protection issues here because foreign private advisers are
also subject to private offering safe harbor conditions, and only accredited investors would be
allowed to invest in the funds they manage. Also, a regulatory overlap issue would be easily
avoidable by limitedly applying the rules under the Advisers Act to the extent necessary to gather
relevant systemic risk information from them. See supra accompanying text note 580.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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This implies that the private adviser is allowed to carry on the private fund business on a cross
border basis without having a commercial presence in the U.K. and without obtaining authorization
under the U.K. regime. See id.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
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private funds are both subject to regulation in Korea, and because only Korea
based and Korea licensed advisers can set up Korea based funds.591
It is not easy to clearly judge which regime is more appropriate and
desirable. But what is clear here is that offshore private advisers should be subject
to certain types of regulatory supervisions if they intend to carry on the business in
foreign jurisdictions. Regulatory obligations for them should be mitigated provided
that their business in a certain jurisdiction is done on a limited and private
placement basis.592
The U.K. approach seems more reasonable in that they provide implied
safe harbor rules for foreign private advisers, and provide flexibility for offshore
advisers to choose onshore or offshore as their fund base (subject to approval or
reporting requirements when they intend to sell the funds to the investors in their
territory). 593 This is a private market available only to certain sophisticated
investors and there is no serious concern for investor protection accordingly, and
systemic risk concerns from the offshore private advisers may be easily handled by
imposing registration and reporting requirements on them if necessary.594
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See id.

It is because it is too disproportionate and cost-inefficient from the foreign private advisers’
perspective if they are subject to the full scope of regulation in certain jurisdictions, especially if
their business is very limited in that jurisdiction. Unbearable regulatory burdens may discourage
them from carrying on the contemplated business and may encourage them to try and find other
loopholes to avoid the regulation. See supra Chapter VI, Part D.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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As emphasized supra, investor protection concerns should not be a sufficient ground to directly
regulate hedge fund advisers because we have many other alternatives available to filter
unsophisticated investors out from the so-called sophisticated investor market, and most rules and
regulations already in place under the fund regimes are irrelevant to systemic risk. See supra
Chapter III, Part C.

208

Sixth, these countries also take a bit different approach in regulating
offshore fund marketing. The U.S. traditionally has handled this issue with their
private placement or private fund regime. No mandatory registration is required
where offshore funds are offered and sold to U.S. accredited investors, and no fund
registration is required if the offshore funds satisfy the private fund threshold
conditions.595
The U.K. and Korea take a different approach from the U.S. The U.K. has a
similar private placement regime in place and offshore private advisers are not
required to be authorized by the U.K. regulator provided that they offer or sell the
fund to certain professional investors only in the U.K. 596 This U.K. private
placement regime, however, will no longer be available starting in 2019, and only
the passport regime will be available under the AIFMD. Under the passport regime,
offshore private advisers would be required to get approval from the U.K.
regulator before selling the fund interests to U.K. investors, together with reporting
and disclosure obligations.597
Korea takes a similar position to the UK in terms of offshore fund
marketing regulation. That is, offshore funds are required be registered in advance
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.
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See supra Chapter V, Part B.2.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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before selling the fund interests to certain Korean professional investors, along
with periodic reporting requirements.598

D. Summary and Comments
There has been a tendency to reinforce hedge fund regulation around the
globe after the global financial crisis of 2008, and based on the global
consensus,

599

these three countries show similar patterns in designing the

regulatory architecture for the hedge fund market in the big picture, while some
differences are observed in the details.
First, the 2008 financial crisis has urged regulators to take appropriate
regulatory measures to oversee the hedge fund market, paying special attention to
the systemic risk they may pose. Both the U.S. and the U.K. have taken regulatory
actions, among other things, focusing on the potential systemic risk from hedge
fund industry and emphasizing the need to ensure market stability as a new and
supplemental rationale for securities regulation.600 All three countries have taken
similar actions to that end.
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This Korean regime is somewhat confusing because there is no disclosure requirement at all at
the time of purchase, while ongoing disclosure is required for existing investors. See supra Chapter
VI, Part C.2.
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See IOSCO Systemic Risk Report, supra note 102.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C. Korea also takes similar regulatory posture to
the U.S. and the U.K. by imposing authorization requirements on the managers, registration
requirements, and express leverage restrictions on the funds, as well as continuous reporting
requirements. However, they do not expressly declare that prevention of systemic risk is an
additional rationale for securities regulation. See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
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For instance, the U.S. has introduced a new registration and periodic
reporting regime for hedge fund managers 601 and the U.K. has maintained its
authorization regime for hedge fund managers and simultaneously has reinforced
the periodic reporting/disclosure regimes. 602 Korea also has taken regulatory
initiative to build up the new local hedge fund market, while ensuring market
stability by imposing authorization and reporting requirements for the managers
and imposing registration and quantitative limitations on leveraged transactions for
the funds as well.603
These regulatory approaches by the three countries should be positively
assessed in principle because there is little doubt that hedge funds have become
more important as active players in the financial market locally and globally, and
from the regulators’ standpoint, there should be ways for the regulators to oversee
their activities on an ongoing basis for systemic risk so that they may take
appropriate regulatory action if necessary.604
However, the current crisis-driven regimes in the three countries seem to
have problems with overregulation, based on the belief that private markets (like
the hedge fund market) should be carefully handled and that direct ex-ante
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.
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Regardless of the possibility of their posing systemic risk, the regulator should be in a position
to get the information about the private fund market because their activities in the market may
directly or indirectly affect market stability in various ways. See supra Chapter III, Part A.
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regulatory intervention should be refrained from to the extent possible to avoid
adverse impacts on the market.605
That is the very reason why the private market is distinct from the public
market – by relying on the various safe harbor rules. Considering the
heterogeneous nature among them and their positive roles in the market, it is very
important to implement a flexible regime that provides them with sufficient
discretion in designing investment structure and the accompanying investment
activities, while keeping them under regulatory oversight (from a macro-prudential
regulatory standpoint).606
The hedge fund market was formed and developed on a voluntary basis by
relying on the various safe harbor rules. Hedge funds have played a constructive
role in part because they have remained lightly regulated on the ground that it is a
special market for accredited investors and because there is no need to heavily
regulate the market like public market for the investing public.607 The systemic risk
issue is critical for regulators and other market participants (including investors or
counterparties), but it is still doubtful that direct government intervention into the
market is a panacea to resolve the issue.608
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For instance, paternalistic government intervention in the private market may give the wrong
signal to the market as well as to investors that it is a quasi-regulated market, which may give rise
to a moral hazard problem. See supra note 202.
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See supra Chapter III, Part C.
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See id.

As pointed out supra, the regulator’s role is to mitigate the risk before and after crisis, but we
have seen many cases of regulator failure in preventing occurrences of crisis, from even heavily
regulated entities. The mere fact that the regulator is closely watching the market may itself have a
smoothing effect by urging market participants to reinforce self-regulation and market discipline.
See supra note 109.
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Without a doubt, the most powerful and effective way to deal with the
systemic risk concern is to regulate hedge funds and their managers directly like
mutual funds and their managers, but it makes little sense because it means that
there would no longer be a private fund market that parallels the public mutual
fund market. It also becomes much harder to expect them to have a positive impact
on the market. 609 Furthermore, it is in contradiction with the fundamental
regulatory framework that has intentionally segregated the private market from
public market, and leaving much of the things to be determined by the relevant
parties on a negotiated basis.610
Regulatory differentiation and lighter regulatory intervention have been
justified based on the belief that there is no practical need to directly regulate the
market if the counterparties and investors are institutional investors or highly
wealthy individuals who are deemed sophisticated enough to protect themselves
without government protection. 611 This position for securities regulation is still
valid and most of the rules and regulations based on this rationale remain
unchanged.612
The fundamental problem in the hedge fund regimes in those three
countries is that there are too many specific rules in place for the managers to
609

See supra Chapter III, Part B.4.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part D.
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See id.
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For example, the private offering, private fund exemption, and accredited investor or qualified
purchaser concepts are a few of the regulatory efforts to distinguish the private market from the
public market at the outset. These different regulatory treatments have been justified based on the
assumption that there is no need to protect them like there is with the general public. See id.
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comply with, and consequently, the distinction between the public fund market and
private fund market becomes blurry.613
As indicated earlier, most of the existing rules and regulations have been in
place to regulate the advisers providing investment advisory services to the
investing public, and this investor protection concern could be easily handled by
limiting the general public’s access to the market. So, even under the conventional
securities and/or fund regime investor protection concerns could be effectively
managed without the regulator’s visible hand. For example, the accredited investor
and qualified purchaser threshold in the U.S., the professional investor and
qualified purchaser threshold in Korea, and the eligible counterparty threshold in
the U.K. may be regarded as regulatory initiatives to make the hedge fund market
really private.614
The systemic risk issue could be dealt with in a different and a less drastic
way by imposing relatively simple authorization, registration, and continuous
reporting obligations for information relevant to monitoring systemic risk, rather
than having them subject to the full scope of regulations applicable to mutual fund
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See Atkins, supra accompanying text note 251.
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At issue here is whether the investors are really sophisticated enough to make an informed
decision without the help of a mandatory disclosure regime, or wealthy enough to assume the risks
from the investment, and whether the current net worth threshold is really relevant for the
sophisticated investor threshold. But it has been working relatively well for a long time and,
without the objective or quantitative threshold condition, there could be no hedge fund market due
to uncertainty and hardship in screening the investor’s eligibility for the investment. For example,
unaccredited investors are not typically marketed to by the hedge fund managers and their sales
representatives because of the difficulty in going through the sophistication test, although they are
legally allowed to invest in the fund on a limited basis. See supra Chapter IV, Part B.
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advisers.615 The hedge fund market is supposed to be a financially innovative and
self-evolving market, mutually beneficial for investors and counterparties as well
as the managers who pursue alternative investments and absolute return
opportunities.616
The government’s role in the market should be as a whistle blower in cases
where market fraud and market failure happen, and to be ready to take proactive
action to reduce the possibility of the occurrence of the failure in normal situations.
In that regard, it seems that current hedge fund regimes in the three countries go
too far by striving to heavily regulate the hedge fund market based on the rationale
of systemic risk prevention, while many of the rules in place are more relevant to
the rationale of investor protection, despite little need for the protection of
investors in this market.617
Second, the three countries have taken additional regulatory measures in
response to the retailization concern (i.e., the increase in direct and indirect access
to the hedge fund market from the investing public). The U.S. has leveraged the
retailization phenomenon as a legislative background to subject private fund
advisers to mandatory registration under the Advisers Act as a way to enhance
their transparency.618
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See supra Chapter III, Part C.
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See supra Chapter II, Part D.
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See supra Chapter III, Part C.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.4.
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But in the U.S. regime, the new mandatory registration requirements are in
place primarily for the purpose of gathering relevant information on systemic risk
and not for the protection of investors. This is clear because it is not legally and
explicitly provided that the information in the registration statement should be
provided to investors.619
This approach seems reasonable in that the transparency issue in this
market is more relevant to the regulator than to the investors because the investors
in this market are sophisticated and do not need the mandated disclosure to protect
themselves.620 Instead, the investor protection concern has been dealt with by way
of redefining the accredited investor threshold condition, particularly focusing on
wealthy individuals.621 In addition, retail investors’ indirect exposure to the hedge
fund market through fund of funds or pension funds would not be a serious
concern for investor protection because they have a third party fiduciary, and they
are subject to regulation directly or indirectly by relevant authorities. 622 Thus, this
retailization concern is an insufficiently justifiable ground to have hedge funds
subject to full scope of the Advisers Act.
The U.K. takes a similar approach to the U.S. in that it mandates that hedge
fund managers be authorized and subject to continuous reporting requirements. But
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2.
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See Net Worth Standard for Accredited Investors, supra note 274.
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For example, fund of hedge funds should be subject to the Investment Company Act as a type of
mutual fund if the adviser offers or sells the fund interests to the investing public. See 15 U.S.C. §
80a- 12(d)(1).
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at the same time, they differ slightly from the U.S. in that they impose additional
disclosure obligations on the manager requiring that certain information be
provided to investors before investment. 623 However, this mandatory disclosure
regime is inconsistent with the private placement regime under which only certain
professional investors are permitted to invest in the fund.624
By contrast, Korea’s approach is somewhat unique in that even nonprofessional individuals are allowed to directly participate in the hedge fund
market as qualified purchasers. The Korean hedge fund regime tries to deal with
investor protection concerns indirectly with suitability rules. 625 This regulatory
approach should be reconsidered and revised to make the threshold for the wealthy
individuals as qualified purchasers a lot higher than it currently is, and to treat
them as professional investors without requiring suitability test. Also, nonprofessional investors should be indirectly exposed to the hedge fund market
through fund of funds.626
Third, the three countries also demonstrate slight differences in regulating
offshore fund marketing. Based on the U.S. private placement regime, offshore
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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See supra Chapter III, Part A.
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It is somewhat similar to the U.S. in that, theoretically, even unaccredited investors are allowed
to invest in the hedge funds (up to 35 persons and up to 100 persons in total) after a sophistication
test under the U.S. private placement and private fund regime. Under the Korean private placement
and qualified purchaser fund regime, non-professional individual investors are allowed to
participate in the fund (up to 49 persons) while there is no limitation in the number of the qualified
purchasers under the qualified purchaser fund regime. See supra Chapter IV, Part B.1, 2; Chapter
VI, Part C.2.
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See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2(C).
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funds are exempted from registration requirements under the Securities Act,627 and
at the same time they can also avoid registration requirements under the
Investment Company Act under the private fund exemptions.628 Thus there are no
particular rules or regulations applied from an offshore fund level other than antifraud provisions under the securities related statutes.
The U.K. has taken a similar regulatory position in that offshore funds are
free from approval requirements, and as a result are exempted from the onerous
fund related rules and regulations, if the fund interests are offered or sold to certain
professional investors on a private placement basis.629 It should be noted, however,
that this U.K. private placement regime will be no longer available after 2019 in
terms of offshore fund marketing, and it will be replaced by a uniform fund
passport regime. Offshore funds will be required to get advance approval from the
local regulator in order to promote the fund interests to U.K. investors. 630 This
regulatory change in the U.K. private placement regime has been made in an effort
to regulate the alternative investment fund market in a consistent way between
European countries and between European countries and other countries.631
This approach seems reasonable in terms of functional regulation, and it
may help local regulators oversee offshore hedge funds’ activities in the local
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.2.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part B.1.
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See supra Chapter V, Part B.2.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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See id.
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market because this would be the only way for local regulators to monitor the
offshore fund activities in the local market. It may also help deter any regulatory
arbitrage effort from the offshore private fund managers.632
The Korean approach is more like the U.K. regime in that offshore funds
are required to register with the Korean regulator before they market the fund
interests to certain eligible professional investors in Korea.633 This Korean offshore
fund promotion regime may be regarded as an implied safe harbor rule for offshore
private advisers to conduct hedge fund business on a cross-border basis, because
they do not need to obtain a local license in Korea if they satisfy the offshore fund
promotion rules.634 At the same time, this offshore fund registration regime may be
functioning as an invisible hand to fill in the regulatory gaps between local hedge
fund regimes and offshore fund promotion regimes.635
Fourth, the three countries take similar positions in general in regulating
offshore fund advisers, but there are some differences observed in the details. The
U.S. provides express safe harbor rules for foreign private advisers that exempt
them from registration requirements if they meet certain threshold conditions, such
as fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors and less than 25 million dollars in assets
under management from U.S. investors or clients.636
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See supra Chapter V, Part D.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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Unlike the private adviser exemption based on the size of the adviser and
primarily available to U.S. based advisers, the foreign private adviser exemption is
based on both the size of the adviser and the number of U.S. clients or investors in
the fund.637 It seems to take into account the systemic risk concern as well as the
U.S. investor protection concern in determining the threshold conditions for the
outer reach of the Advisers Act on foreign private advisers.638
This exemption may provide clear guidance as to whether foreign private
advisers are required to register with the SEC. On the one hand, it is more likely to
include too many foreign advisers under the U.S. regime, leading to an
overregulation or regulatory overlap problem between the home jurisdiction and
the U.S., because foreign private advisers become fully subject to the US Advisers
Act unless they satisfy threshold conditions (even if they carry on business in the
U.S. on a very limited basis with U.S. accredited investors). 639 On the other hand,
it is likely to cause a regulatory loophole in terms of systemic risk regulation
because some foreign private advisers are missing from the regulatory oversight
despite conducting private fund business in the U.S.640
It would be worth amending the threshold condition to make the same
threshold conditions applicable to the extent possible between U.S. based private
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See supra Chapter IV, Part C.
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See supra Chapter IV, Part D.
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See id.
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advisers and foreign private advisers, and at the same time to mitigate the
regulatory compliance burdens for registered foreign private advisers.641
Unlike the U.S., the U.K. provides no clear safe harbor rule for foreignbased private managers, and instead provides an offshore fund promotion regime
with a general extraterritorial application clause. 642 What this means is that
offshore private managers are not required to obtain licenses from the U.K.
regulator unless there is a special factual circumstances evidencing that they chose
offshore to avoid the U.K. licensing regime. 643 Instead, offshore-based private
managers are required to get approval before marketing the funds (offshore or not)
to U.K. investors under the new regime (i.e. AIFMD).644
Therefore, it appears that the U.K. provides a less stringent regime than the
U.S. in terms of licensing or other compliance requirements in general, and that the
U.K. effectively deals with the regulatory loophole issue in that any private funds
managed by foreign private advisers are subject to requiring advanced approval
from local regulators when an offer or sale is made to local investors.645
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For instance, it would be one of the possible ideas that foreign private advisers relying on the
exemption be subject to reporting and recordkeeping requirements on a continuous basis like the
U.S. based exempted private advisers. Instead most of the rules in the Advisers Act are exempted
from applying to them. This idea is more like the offshore fund promotion regimes observed in the
U.K. and Korea. It would be sufficient for gathering systemic risk related information, and the
investor protection issue would be minimal here because only a limited number of US accredited
investors have access to the offshore funds. See id.
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The Korean regime is similar to the U.K. regime. In Korea foreign private
fund managers do not need to obtain licenses from the Korean regulator in
principle, subject to a general extraterritorial application clause, and instead are
subject to registration requirements in regards to the offshore fund marketing to
certain eligible Korean professional investors.646
Each of the three countries’ regimes has good points and weak points in
regulating foreign-based private advisers. The U.K. and Korean offshore fund
promotion regime seems more reasonable than the U.S. foreign private adviser
regime, in that it is more likely that an indirect approach minimizes the
overregulation issue; this ensures that local regulators have the necessary
regulatory tools to oversee the foreign private adviser’s activities in the local
market.
Table 2: Comparisons of Hedge Fund Regimes between the U.S., the U.K.,
and Korea
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. VIII.

Recommendations

A. Regulating Hedge Funds in the Future
With their rapid growth in size and the negative potential impact created by
market disruptions, hedge funds have been highlighted as a target for stricter
regulation for several reasons.647
First, in terms of investor protection, no direct regulatory intervention can
be justified provided that the investors are wealthy and sophisticated enough to
make informed decisions themselves. 648 This position should be maintained
despite the tendency for retailization (both direct and indirect), unless there is a
consensus that the regulatory distinction between the private fund market and the
public fund market is no longer necessary.649
The individual’s wealth itself does not necessarily mean that they are
financially sophisticated enough to protect themselves, considering the increasing
complexity of new financial products (e.g., hedge funds) and the risks inherent in
the investment. 650 But sophistication should be one of the criteria in judging
whether a particular individual is in the position to protect themselves at the time
of investment because they have the financial resources to ask for assistance from
financial intermediaries and to absorb the possible loss from the investment.651 The
existing regime for sophisticated investor eligibility is not fundamentally flawed
and should be maintained by redefining the threshold conditions in terms of assets,
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See supra Chapter III, Part A.
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See supra Chapter III, Part A.
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See S.E.C. v. Ralston Purina Co., supra note 223.
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income and/or invested amount to reflect the changes in market circumstances over
time.652
In addition, the concern about retail investors’ participation in the hedge
fund market through fund of funds or pension funds should not be treated as a
critical one because (i) third party intermediaries (i.e., fund of funds managers or
pension fund managers) should be between the hedge funds and retail investors, (ii)
they are obligated to play a fiduciary role (e.g., conduct due diligence) for the fund
investors and they are financially sophisticated enough to evaluate investments in
hedge funds, and (iii) they are in the position to negotiate on an equal basis with
hedge fund managers.653
Furthermore, managers are subject to regulatory requirements such as
diversification and asset quality, and accordingly hedge funds can be indirectly and
sufficiently controlled by regulating the investor-third party intermediaries – not
by regulating hedge funds directly.654
The investor protection concern could be handled well by making the
hedge fund market truly private, denying direct access to unaccredited investors,
and regulating intermediaries if necessary.
Second, the ensuring market integrity issue should also be handled under
the existing anti-fraud, inside trading, and price manipulation rules.655 Hedge fund
fraud cases are likely to occur occasionally under the existing regimes, but it is not
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a problem unique to hedge funds; rather, it is a universal problem observable even
in other heavily regulated entities like mutual fund advisers or broker/dealers.656
What matters more is how to enforce the law against violators. Placing
them under direct regulatory oversight cannot guarantee that no hedge fund frauds
will occur in the future, rather more rigorous and strict law enforcement efforts
may be a strong and effective enough regulatory tool to deter potential hedge fund
frauds.657
Third, unlike the micro-prudential regulatory concerns, current market
consensus is that large leveraged hedge funds may have the potential to negatively
affect the market in extreme situations and accordingly that they should fall under
regulatory oversight. However, it is still debatable whether hedge funds really do
pose systemic risk to the market.658
Therefore, it is a more relevant and compelling issue of how to regulate
them than whether to regulate them. Possible regulatory frameworks worth
considering for the future include direct regulation, indirect regulation, or a market
discipline based approach.
First, a purely market discipline based approach is less plausible and is
unsustainable because self-regulation cannot guarantee market stability in cases
where high-profile hedge fund failures occur. Investors, creditors, and
counterparties cannot efficiently and effectively handle the systemic risk issue
when emergent market crisis happens because they are commercially self-
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interested and because it is unlikely that they have sufficient information about the
funds on a consolidated basis.659
Second, the direct fund regulation approach is apparently reasonable in that
the restriction of hedge funds’ leveraged activities may be the best way to prevent
the potential negative impacts on the market from hedge fund failures. 660 But the
problem with this regulatory option is that it may overshadow the many positive
roles that hedge funds play in the market, such as promoting financial innovation,
providing market liquidity, and encouraging market stability during ordinary
market situations.661 Thus the idea of direct fund regulation is not easily advocated
for.
Third, an indirect regulatory approach via investors, creditors, and
counterparties may come into play because they of their self-interest in closely
monitoring hedge fund activities on a continuous basis. Also, they are such a
heavily regulated entity that they are legally required to have sufficient capital and
proper risk management policies and procedures in place.662 The problem with this
regulatory option, however, is that the systemic risk issue is not something that can
be easily dealt with among market participants because each one of them is
economically self-interested and because hedge fund counterparties have no
effective tool to handle the overall market stability issue. Rather, it is something
for the regulators to undertake.663
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Fourth, regulating hedge fund managers and not hedge funds may be a
more realistic and more feasible regulatory option, especially from the systemic
risk regulatory standpoint, because they are the people in charge of the funds’ dayto-day investment and management activities.664 Imposing mandatory registration
or licensing obligations, together with periodic reporting, recordkeeping, and
examination requirements, is understandable to that end.665
Hedge fund manager regulation should be minimized to the extent
necessary to deal with systemic risk matters because many of the current rules and
regulations are irrelevant to systemic risk. Further, investor protection concerns
may be tackled without much difficulty by redefining “accredited investors,” by
reinforcing the creditor and counterparty regulations, and by encouraging
heightened market discipline and self-regulation among the market participants.666
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B. Which Country’s Approach is More Desirable?
With the global nature of hedge funds in mind, and considering the discussions
supra, 667 it is worth exploring which country’s regulatory approach is the most
reasonable, as evidenced with hypothetical situations below.

1. What If a non-US person raises capital in the U.S.?
The first possible scenario is a situation where a non-U.S. person intends to
carry on the hedge fund business as a start-up company with prospective investors
in the U.S., U.K., and Korea, with fewer than 15 U.S. investors and less than 25
million dollars in assets under management from the U.S. investors.
First of all, as for the fund jurisdiction, unlike Korea, both the U.S. and the
U.K. provide safe harbor rules for hedge funds to avoid regulations unless they
offer or sell the fund interests to the investing public.668 In that regard, it is more
likely that a person would be relatively free to choose whatever jurisdiction they
want with little regulatory differences whether or not they choose an onshore
jurisdiction as a fund domicile.
By contrast, Korea provides no safe harbor rules for onshore or offshore
hedge funds. Korea-based hedge funds are directly subject to onerous fund rules
and regulations including registration, reporting, and leveraged position cap
667

What it implicates is that hedge funds and their managers are quite flexible in choosing the
relevant jurisdictions for the funds and their managers, and easily move offshore providing more
regulatory-friendly environment assume that regulatory gap exists between the jurisdictions. See
Azhar & Ullatil, supra note 13.
668
As noted supra, the UK provides no specific hedge fund safe harbor rules, but UK based hedge
fund may be free from the onerous fund investment restrictions relying on the UK private
placement regime until the AIFMD replace it from 2019 and mandatory approval or report is
required. See FSMA, art. 238(5); COBS, art. 4.12.1R. In contrast, the US provides express safe
harbor rules for hedge fund, in addition to the general private offering exemption. See 15 U.S.C.
80a-3(c)(1),(7); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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requirements, while non-Korea-based funds are relatively free from fund related
regulation.669 Thus, it goes without saying that the non-US person is highly likely
to choose the U.S., U.K., or other jurisdiction that provides a more flexible
regulatory regime for fund regulation than to choose Korea for their fund
establishment purposes, unless there are no serious regulatory evasion or fund
jurisdictional shopping concerns raised under the Korean extraterritorial
application regime.670
There is no doubt that Korea is less likely to be considered as an attractive
jurisdiction in terms of fund regulation from both onshore and offshore managers
if they intend to raise capital and invest in assets on a transnational basis. As a
result, Korea is likely to lose its ground as a competitive venue for global hedge
funds when you compare it to other jurisdictions that provide a more flexible
regulatory environment for fund regulation. The regulatory arbitrage problem may
inevitably arise due to the significant regulatory differences between Korea-based
hedge funds and offshore-based hedge funds under the Korean regime.671
The huge regulatory gap that exists between Korea and other jurisdictions
is likely to unintentionally encourage Korea-domiciled managers and offshore
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See FSCMA, art. 249-2.
As explained supra, Korea provides no express safe harbor rules for Korea-domiciled hedge
funds while offshore-based hedge funds are merely required to register with Korean regulator with
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application rule if a Korean person intentionally or recklessly set up the fund offshore merely to
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managers to choose offshore locations to set up their funds.672 This is a problem
for Korean investors and regulators because it is less likely to ensure a level
playing field between onshore funds and offshore funds.673 Accordingly it is likely
to adversely affect the Korean hedge fund market and Korea-domiciled managers
in the long run in that it makes it difficult for Korea-domiciled hedge fund
managers to raise capital from offshore investors and to accommodate investors’
needs.
Based on these observations, it may be strongly inferred that hedge funds
should be left unregulated or minimally regulated if local regulators are unable to
totally bar offshore fund managers from raising capital from local investors.
Instead, it would be more advisable to regulate hedge fund managers to ensure the
regulatory parity between onshore funds and offshore funds.
Suppose that hedge funds (onshore or offshore) were to remain unregulated,
the systemic risk issue could still be handled by imposing registration or
authorization requirements on locally based managers and by mandating
registration and approval obligations in connection with offshore fund promotion
with local investors, regardless of whether the managers are domiciled onshore or
not.674 Also, the investor protection concern under this regime could be handled by
redefining the accredited investor threshold conditions and by prohibiting
unsophisticated-unaccredited investors from directly partaking in the hedge fund
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It should be noted that it is practically impossible for the regulators to prevent hedge fund
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market.675 In this regard, the Korean regulatory approach seems inadvisable in that
some presumably non-professional or unaccredited investors are also permitted to
directly invest in the Korea-domiciled hedge fund.676
Second, in terms of fund manager regulation, all three countries currently
have some type of licensing requirements (such as registration or authorization) in
place, although there are some limited exemptions available under the current U.S.
regime. There also used to be a more general private adviser safe harbor rule
applicable to hedge fund managers before the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted in
2010.677
Concerning this factual scenario, the U.S. regime provides two express safe
harbor rules for start-up companies. One is a small private adviser exemption (i.e.,
less than 25 million dollars in assets under management regardless of the number
of clients or investors in the funds under management), and the other is a foreign
private adviser exemption (namely, fewer than 15 U.S. clients or investors and 25
million dollars in assets under management from the U.S. clients or investors).678
In contrast, the U.K. and Korea impliedly provide safe harbors for offshore
managers and leave them free from advance authorization unless there are special
factual circumstances to indicate that they are domiciled offshore to avoid the
relevant local authorization regimes. 679 The U.K. and Korea provide similar
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offshore fund promotion regimes; under the regimes offshore hedge funds and
their managers are subject to approval and registration requirements when they sell
or offer fund interests to U.K. or Korean investors. Also, the target investors are
strictly restricted to certain professional investors only.680
Based on the facts and the relevant rules and regulations illustrated above,
the U.S. person is more likely to choose the U.S. as a jurisdiction for their fund
management business because they have no legal barriers to doing business by
relying on the (foreign) private adviser exemptions. There is no incentive for them
to apply for a license in the U.K. or Korea either, because those jurisdictions
provide less favorable regulatory environments compared to the U.S., and because
they can raise capital from investors in the U.K. and Korean via an offshore fund
marketing regime, even without obtaining local licenses under the U.K. or Korean
regime.681
What the three countries’ regimes implicate for a U.S. person seeking to set
up a company to conduct hedge fund business on a transnational basis is that the
person (namely, the hedge fund manager) will be inclined to choose a more
favorable regulatory jurisdiction to avoid onerous manager regulations to the
extent possible. They can do that by satisfying the safe harbor rules under the U.S.
regime and offshore fund promotion requirements under the U.K. and Korean
regimes.682
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What should be noted, however, is that under the U.K. regime offshore funds and their managers
may be able to avoid the approval requirement for the coming years until the AIFMD will be fully
in force in 2019. See AIFMD, explanatory note 67.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C; Chapter VI, Part C.2(B).
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What is also noteworthy is that, unlike the U.S. or U.K., Korea provides no licensing exemption
for offshore managers who seek to set up an onshore fund to market onshore investors. See FSCMA,
art. 12, 279.
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Overall, in terms of manager regulation, the U.K. and Korean regulatory
models seem more desirable, especially from the macro-prudential regulatory
perspective. Under the U.K. and Korean regimes, all onshore managers are subject
to authorization requirements without exception, regardless of the size of the funds
they manage or the number of investors they have. At the same time, all the
offshore managers are subject to approval and registration requirements under the
U.K. and Korean offshore fund promotion regimes.
What that means is that the UK and Korean regulators would be in the
position to oversee how many funds are active in the local market, how the funds
are operated, and how much potential they have to adversely affect the local
market. The U.S. regime provides insufficient regulatory tools for effectively
monitoring the foreign private adviser’s activity in the U.S. market by allowing the
foreign private adviser exemption and by choosing to impose onerous registration
and reporting requirements on firms who go over the foreign private adviser
threshold conditions.683
The U.K. and Korean regimes also seem more advisable than the U.S.
regime in that the U.K. and Korean regulators are more likely to be able to deter
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This all or nothing approach under the U.S. regime is less advisable because it may inevitably
entail overregulation and regulatory loophole problems. Some offshore managers are subject to
overly burdensome compliance obligations, even if they contemplate carrying on the hedge fund
business on a limited basis in the U.S. and focusing on marketing to U.S. accredited investors only.
By contrast, the U.K. regime seem more effective and efficient in dealing with this overregulation
and regulatory loophole concern by requiring onshore based managers to obtain local licenses with
less stringent compliance obligations, and by imposing an approval and registration obligation in
connection with the sale or offer of the offshore fund interests (in lieu of a more burdensome
licensing obligation). See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.
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regulatory arbitrage efforts while reviewing the offshore fund approval and
registration application, depending on the totality of the factual circumstances.684
In terms of offshore fund marketing regulation, the U.S. and U.K. regimes
seem more desirable and more consistent than the Korean regime. The U.S. and
U.K. regimes treat onshore and offshore funds equally based on a micro-prudential
policy rationale; unless the fund interests are marketed to unaccredited or
unsophisticated investors it allows them to operate free from paternalistic fund
regulation.685 The Korean regime treats onshore hedge funds a lot differently from
offshore hedge funds, and only onshore hedge funds are subject to fund
regulation.686
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The flipside is that, in terms of onshore hedge fund manager regulation in particular, there seems
little difference in principle between the three countries because they all require onshore hedge fund
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that they regulate the onshore hedge fund managers less stringently than they do mutual fund
managers based on the principle of proportionality. The U.S. regime treats them the same as mutual
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regulatory perspective, hedge fund managers should be subject to a lighter regulation than mutual
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they meet the private fund safe harbor conditions. What should be noted, however, is that both
countries basically take the same regulatory position to not regulate hedge funds directly unless
there is an exceptional situation where the regulator believes they may pose systemic risk to the
overall market. See supra Chapter IV, Part C; Chapter V, Part C.
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This may be an inappropriate and disproportionate regulatory approach because under the
Korean regime, Korean institutional investors are exposed to both onshore and offshore hedge
funds. There is no legal barrier for them to choose offshore hedge funds instead of onshore hedge
funds, based on whichever is pursuing a more attractive alternative investment opportunity. In that
sense, the disparate regulatory treatment between the two is unreasonable and is likely to have an
unexpected, and negative effect by driving the fund/managers offshore in the long run. See FSCMA,
art. 249-2, 279.
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2. What if a US Private Adviser raises capital in the US, UK, or Korea?
The second scenario is the situation where a new U.S. based Private
Adviser, who remains unregulated based on the Private Adviser Exemption,
intends to raise capital of more than 150 million dollars from investors in the U.S.,
U.K., and Korea, among other countries.
First of all, from the U.S. fund regulatory perspective, U.S. based private
fund advisers have no legal problem with raising capital from U.S., U.K., and
Korean investors of more than 150 million dollars in assets under management
based on the private offering and private fund exemptions. 687 It also makes no
legal difference whether the U.S. based private adviser chooses an onshore or
offshore fund to raise capital, or if they utilize both funds at the same time.
Onshore and offshore funds are treated the same, allowing funds to avoid
registration requirements by relying on the safe harbor rules under the relevant
securities and fund statutes.688
Thus, under the U.S. regime, both onshore and offshore private fund
information may not be available to the U.S. regulator other than through the Form
D report, unless the manager is required to register with the SEC.689 From the U.K.
fund regulatory perspective, U.S. based private advisers are obligated to be
approved by (or report to) the U.K. regulator before they offer or sell fund interests
to U.K. investors, regardless of whether the fund is based in the U.K. or not.690
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It is because there are no offering size limitations and no limitation on the number of investors if
offered or sold to accredited investors only under Reg D. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R.
§ 230.506.
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The same conclusion may be reached if the U.S. based private adviser
determines to move to the U.K., or to set up a new company for hedge fund
business in the U.K., because under the AIFMD U.K. based private advisers are
also subject to same approval and reporting requirement regardless of whether the
fund is located in the U.K. or not.691
A similar analysis is possible under the Korean regime. That is, the U.S.
based private adviser is required to register the fund with the Korean regulator
before marketing the fund interests to certain Korean professional investors.692 U.S.
private advisers are allowed to market offshore funds only, and it is strictly
prohibited for them to set up onshore funds and to market them to Korean
investors.693
Second, from the manager regulatory standpoint, the three countries
demonstrate differences in some respects. Under the U.S. regime the formerly
unregulated private adviser becomes subject to registration requirements under the
Advisers Act because it no longer satisfies the mid-sized private adviser threshold

private placement exemption. Meanwhile, the U.S. based private adviser is able to freely market the
fund interests to certain U.K. professional investors without being subject to approval requirements
by relying on the existing U.K. private placement safe harbor rule, which is equally available to
U.K. based funds and non-U.K. based funds. See AIFMD, explanatory note 65, 66; art. 37-42.
691
What is noteworthy, though, is that under the new U.K. regime (i.e., the AIFMD), U.K. based
private advisers are subject to authorization requirements in addition to the fund (onshore or
offshore) approval and reporting requirements. Non-U.K. based private advisers are only subject to
fund approval and reporting requirements. See AIFMD, art. 31 et seq.
692
The offshore fund would be exempted from the securities registration requirement under the
Korean private placement regime, but is still subject to fund registration requirements. In that
regard, the Korean regime is uniquely positioned and different from the U.S. and U.K. regimes. See
FSCMA, art. 9(8), 119(1), 279(1).
693
The same conclusion may be reached in a situation where a Korea based private adviser intends
to set up offshore funds to market them to Korean investors, because the offshore fund registration
regime is available only to offshore advisers. Doing so may be viewed as a violation of the
extraterritorial application rule under the Korean regime. See FSCMA, art. 2, 12(1), 279(1).
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conditions. It does not matter whether the funds are domiciled in the U.S. or if the
private adviser is based in the U.S.694
The flipside here is that U.S. based private advisers are likely to think about
setting up affiliated companies offshore to raise capital from the three countries’
investors, so that the U.S. based adviser can remain unregulated. This is unlikely to
be a viable option for them, however, because the foreign private adviser
exemption is by far narrower and a lot more stringent than the mid-sized private
adviser exemption available to U.S. based private advisers.695
Therefore, under these factual circumstances, U.S. based private advisers
are more likely to choose to register with the U.S. regulator, and to market the fund
interests to the investors from the three countries based on the private offering safe
harbor rules available to them under each countries’ regimes.696
In contrast, under the U.K. regime, U.S. based private advisers are required
to be approved by the U.K. regulator before marketing the fund interests to U.K.
investors, and it does not matter whether or not the fund is domiciled in the U.K.
Also, U.S. private advisers are not required to obtain a private adviser license from
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3.
It may provide incentive for U.S. based private advisers to establish an offshore affiliated
company to avoid the onerous U.S. registration requirements if they intend to focus more on
offshore investors, to limit the number of U.S. investors, and to ensure that the amount of capital
raised from U.S. clients complies with the foreign private adviser threshold conditions. See 15
U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30).
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the fund interests to Korean and U.K. investors, because the two countries provide no private fund
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art. 42.
695

238

the U.K. regulator if they meet certain fund promotion requirements.697 Therefore
the U.S. based private adviser should only need to be mindful about the offshore
fund promotion rules under the U.K. regime.698 Korea takes a similar regulatory
approach to the U.K. in that offshore private fund advisers are required to register
with Korean regulators in connection with the purchase or sale of fund interests to
certain Korean professional investors. However, they are exempted from licensing
requirements.699
The only difference between the two countries is that the U.S. private
adviser is not allowed to set up the fund in Korea to raise capital from Korean
investors under the Korean regime, while the U.S. private fund adviser is free to
choose the U.K. as a fund domicile for marketing to U.K. investors.700
In terms of manager regulation, the U.S. regime provides private adviser
safe harbor rules for both onshore and offshore private fund advisers, although
different threshold conditions apply to them. Both the U.K. and Korean regimes
subject onshore advisers to licensing obligations without an exception, while
providing offshore fund promotion regimes and exempting offshore private fund
advisers from licensing requirements. 701 The primary difference, in terms of
private adviser regulation, between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea is that the U.S.
697

As indicated supra, a non-U.K. based private adviser is completely free from licensing and
approval obligations in regards to the offshore fund marketing based on the U.K. private placement
regime (until the AIFMD is fully in force in 2019). See supra Chapter V, Part C.
698
Extraterritorial application issues regarding the U.K. licensing requirement may be ignorable
under this situation provided that the U.S. based private adviser has been doing business in the U.S.
for some period of time, and has some U.S. investors in the funds they manage prior to marketing
the fund interests to U.K. investors. See FSMA, art. 2.
699
Extraterritorial application issues regarding the U.K. licensing requirement may also be
ignorable in this situation because of the reasons mentioned supra in note 624. See FSCMA, art. 2,
279(1).
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excludes certain private advisers (onshore/offshore) from regulatory oversight
while the U.K. and Korea place every private adviser (onshore/offshore) under
their regulatory purview in some way.
As noted supra, the U.K. and Korean regimes (especially the U.K. regime)
seem more appropriate than the U.S. regime in terms of systemic risk and macroprudential regulation because the U.K. and Korean regimes include all the onshore
and offshore managers in one way or another. As a result, the U.K. and Korean are
better positioned to monitor all private adviser activities in the local market while
imposing less burdensome regulatory requirements.
On the other hand, both the U.S. and the U.K. take the regulatory position
not to regulate the fund directly and to let private fund advisers choose onshore or
offshore as a fund domicile. Korea takes a more conservative regulatory approach
to only allow locally licensed private advisers to set up funds onshore to market
fund interests to Korean investors. 702 It is obvious that the U.S. and U.K.
regulatory approach is advisable because hedge fund related regulatory concerns
can be properly controlled through adviser regulation and because the fund itself
can easily move offshore to avoid fund regulation if necessary.703
It is likely that the Korean regime provides less incentive to offshore
advisers to be domiciled in Korea due to their relatively strict fund regulation. At
the same time the Korean regime may even force onshore advisers to move
offshore or to set up offshore based affiliated companies to market offshore funds
to Korean investors by relying on the offshore fund promotion regime. In that
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See id.
See supra Chapter III, Part B.2.
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regard, it is more likely that the Korean regime produces less productive results
than the U.S. or U.K. regimes.

3.

What if an offshore manager raises capital via offshore funds in the
US, UK, or Korea?
The third scenario is the situation where a non-U.S., U.K., or Korea based

hedge fund manager set up a hedge fund offshore to raise capital from U.S., U.K.,
or Korean investors.
First, from the manager regulatory standpoint, offshore managers are in
principle not subject to local regulation, including licensing requirements, if they
satisfy the safe harbor conditions or the offshore fund promotion rules under the
U.S., U.K., and Korean regimes.
Under the Dodd-Frank Act, the U.S. expressly provides a foreign private
adviser exemption for non-U.S. based private advisers, and unlike “exempted
reporting advisers,”704 they are free from the U.S. private adviser regulations (such
as registration, reporting, recordkeeping, and examination requirements) by relying
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This includes U.S. based mid-sized private advisers and venture capital fund advisers exempted
from the registration requirements. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4.
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on the threshold conditions available for foreign private advisers;705 also because
they do not fall within the definition of “exempted reporting adviser.”706
By contrast, the U.K. and Korea take a slightly different approach from the
U.S. by basically relying on their offshore fund promotion regimes. Under the U.K.
and Korean regimes, offshore managers do not need to obtain a license from the
local regulatory authority and as a result are not obligated under the same rules and
regulations as locally licensed entities (as long as they comply with the offshore
fund promotion rules and regulations).707
The U.K. regime (namely, AIFMD) provides a kind of indirect safe harbor
rule for offshore managers and exempts them from licensing and other compliance
requirements if they meet certain threshold conditions under the U.K. private
placement regime (i.e., restricting the investors to certain professional investors or
equivalent). 708 Under the AIFMD offshore managers are subject to disclosure
obligations to investors both before and after investment and have reporting
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To rely on the foreign private adviser exemption, any foreign private adviser need to show that (i)
it has no place of business in the U.S., (ii) it has, in total, fewer than 15 clients and investors in the
U.S. in private funds advised by the investment adviser, (iii) it has less than $25 million in
aggregate assets under management that are attributable to clients in the U.S. and investors in the
U.S. in private funds advised by the investment adviser, and (iv) it neither holds itself out generally
to the public in the U.S. as an investment adviser nor act as an investment adviser to any registered
investment company or business development company. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30).
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204-4. See also Exemptions for Advisers to
Venture Capital Funds, Private Fund Advisers with Less Than $150 Million in Assets under
Management, and Foreign Private Advisers, Release No. IA-3222 (July 2011), at note 5, 21,
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2011/ia-3222.pdf.
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See FSMA, art. 238(5); FSCMA, art. 279; COBS, art. 4.12.1R.
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obligations to the U.K. regulator, even though the offshore fund is strictly limited
to certain professional investors.709
This U.K. regulatory approach is different from the U.S. and Korea, where
there is no express provision to force the managers or the funds to disclose relevant
information to investors before or after investment, although some of the
information in the registration statement may be available to the public under the
U.S. and Korean regimes.710
The regulatory approach in the U.K. seems inconsistent with the rationale
for the private placement exemption. It is likely to cause duplicate regulation and
an overregulation problem because the distinction between public offerings and
private placements becomes blurry due to the mandatory disclosure obligations,
which are supposed to be applied during public offerings. It may also be viewed as
an unnecessary and overly paternalistic regulatory intervention into the private
market, which is presumably available only to accredited and sophisticated
investors.711
709

See id.

710

Under the Korean offshore fund sales regime, periodic (quarterly) performance reports should be
provided to existing investors and offshore fund managers are obligated to supply fund related
information to existing investors upon their request. This is different from the mandatory disclosure
requirement under the U.K. regime in substance and in nature. In addition, under the U.S. regime,
foreign private advisers are completely free from direct mandatory disclosure obligations to
investors if they meet the threshold conditions for the foreign private adviser, private fund, and
private offering exemptions. However, there is an implied obligation to disclose relevant
information to the investors at the time of investment and thereafter based on the general anti-fraud
rules in the securities laws. See FSCMA, art. 280(2), (3); AIFMD, art. 23. See also supra Chapter
IV, Part C.
711

Regardless of the controversy of whether sophisticated investors are really financially savvy
enough to understand every potential risk entailed in the investment and the complex investment
strategy to be utilized by the manager, they are presumed to be sophisticated enough to protect
themselves from the managers. Sophisticated investors are also in a position to request relevant
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Korea takes a similar regulatory position to the U.K. in regulating offshore
fund managers in that they regulate offshore fund managers indirectly through
offshore fund sales regulation. Korea takes a different position from the U.K.,
however, regarding the mandatory disclosure obligation. Like the U.S., Korea
imposes no mandatory disclosure obligation against offshore funds or their
managers if they meet the private offering safe harbor conditions.712
Korea takes a somewhat unique position by putting rules in place regarding
disclosure to investors by imposing a periodic reporting obligation and a fund
information provision on offshore fund managers. 713 In addition, the Korean
regime seeks to deal with the investor protection concern by applying the
suitability and financial product guidance rule to certain non-professional and
unsophisticated investors who are categorized as qualified purchasers under the
hedge fund rule (i.e., some high net-worth individuals not satisfying the threshold
conditions for professional investors), and by eliminating any differential treatment
between the investors when providing relevant fund information.714 However, this
Korean regulatory approach is problematic because it makes it hard to understand
the rationale for the rule and it shows inconsistency in regulating hedge funds (also
known as qualified purchaser funds) despite the fact that hedge funds are supposed
information from the manager if necessary. Considering the fact that the current regime is still in
place based on this rationale, a likely conclusion is that it is a somewhat strange and
disproportionate regulatory intervention into the private market. See supra text accompanying note
612.
712

See supra Chapter VI, Part C.2.

713

See id.

714

See FSCMA, 46, 47, 249-2(1).
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to be treated specially and that only certain qualified purchasers and sophisticated
investors are allowed to directly invest in the fund.715
Second, in terms of the fund regulation, the U.S. exhibits certain
differences when compared to the U.K. and Korea. The U.S. regime provides that
offshore funds are not subject to mandatory registration or disclosure requirements
if they meet the private offering safe harbor conditions and are not subject to fund
regulation if they satisfy the private fund (or qualified fund) exemption.716
In contrast, both the U.K. and Korean regimes provide that the offshore
fund (or its manager) is subject to approval and registration requirements before
selling the fund interests to local investors, although the offering must be made
strictly in compliance with the private placement rules.717 By doing so, the local
regulator is able to gather fund information being used to actively advertise to
investors in the local market.
The primary distinction between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea in terms of
offshore fund marketing regulation is that the U.S. aims to regulate offshore fund
managers directly by mandating that foreign private advisers register with the U.S.
regulator (subject to limited exemptions), while the U.K. and Korea endeavors to
regulate the fund managers indirectly via an offshore fund approval/registration

715

This explanation is what qualified purchaser should mean. It is more in line with the private
offering exemption and the accredited investor definition under the private offering exemption
because it is one of the prerequisites that the hedge fund must satisfy to be entitled to special
treatment under the hedge fund rule. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7).
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regime. Both the U.K. and Korean regimes avoid regulating offshore managers
directly.718
The basic regulatory positions between the U.S. and the U.K./Korea are
totally opposite, and unfortunately, it is not entirely certain which regulatory
approach is more effective or efficient. But, at least from macro-prudential
regulatory perspective, the U.K. and Korean example seems more desirable in that
it is more cost-effective (i.e., less burdensome for offshore managers to comply
with) and it is more likely to minimize regulatory loopholes. The U.K. and Korean
regulators are more likely to be in a position to take regulatory action against
offshore fund managers in a timely manner, if necessary, while the U.S. regulator
has few measures to take against foreign private advisers who meet the safe harbor
conditions. Also, the direct regulation of foreign private advisers is likely to create
an overregulation problem considering the fact that they merely market the funds
on a limited basis to accredited investors (by relying on the private offering or
private fund exemptions).719
Although still debatable, it seems like the offshore fund sale regulatory
regimes in the U.K. and Korea are more reasonable and more cost-efficient than
the approach in the U.S., both from a systemic risk and a macro-prudential
regulatory perspective.
However, the mandatory disclosure requirements in the U.K. offshore fund
promotion regime should be reconsidered. It would be better to let the disclosure

718

See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30), 3; AIFMD, art. 42; FSCMA, art. 279.
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See id. See also Overmyer, supra note 301, at 2211-19.
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issue be resolved between the parties considering the fact that hedge fund investors
are strictly limited to certain professional and sophisticated investors. 720 In this
regard, the U.S. and Korean regulatory approaches seem better.

4. What if an offshore manager raises capital via onshore funds in the
U.S., the U.K., or Korea?
The last scenario is the situation where a non-U.S., -U.K., or -Korea
domiciled hedge fund manager set up a hedge fund in the U.S., the U.K., or Korea
to raise capital from U.S., U.K., or Korean investors.
The U.S. and U.K. regimes do not prohibit offshore managers who do not
obtain relevant licenses in the U.S. or U.K. from establishing locally domiciled
hedge funds to raise capital from local investors. The U.S. regime even provides
several safe harbor rules for offshore managers to establish U.S. domiciled funds
for that purpose.
First, offshore managers can avoid registration requirements under the
Advisers Act by relying on the “foreign private adviser” exemption, allowing them
to raise capital from 14 or fewer U.S. clients and investors, and up to 25 million
dollars in assets under management.721 In addition, offshore managers are able to
avoid registration obligations under the Advisers Act if they satisfy the general
mid-sized private adviser exemption. Under the mid-sized private adviser
exemption they are only permitted to raise capital from U.S. clients and investors
720

See supra Chapter V, Part D.
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(30).
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through “qualifying private fund(s)” of up to 150 million dollars in assets under
management.722 The offshore managers are also able to avoid fund and securities
registration requirements under the Investment Company Act or Securities Act if
they meet the private fund or private offering exemption.723
In short, the offshore managers are allowed to raise capital from U.S.
clients or investors directly or indirectly through qualifying private funds, and to
some extent without worrying about the adviser or fund registration requirements.
This is possible because the U.S. provides clear and express safe harbor rules for
offshore managers and the private funds they manage.
The U.K. regime indirectly removes the legal barriers from offshore
managers who set up U.K. domiciled funds to raise capital from U.K. investors on
a private placement basis. This is done by stipulating that the offshore managers
are required to get approval from the U.K. regulator for the onshore funds they
intend to manage, before they can promote the fund interests to professional
investors.724
Thus, at least from a legal point of view, the offshore managers have full
discretion on whether to choose an onshore or offshore fund jurisdiction. This
regulatory framework may be justified based on the belief that there is no
regulatory difference between onshore funds and offshore funds, because both
What should be noted is that, unlike the “foreign private adviser” exemption, under this midsized adviser exemption the offshore managers have no limitation on the number of the U.S. clients
provided that their clients invest “qualifying private funds.” Only the size of the funds they manage
matters here. See 17 C.F.R. §275.203(m)-1(b).
722
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See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), (7); 17 C.F.R. § 230.506.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C. See also AIFMD, explanatory note 66, art. 42.
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funds are basically free from local fund regulation under the U.K. private
placement regime. Instead, onshore and offshore funds they both are subject to
approval requirements for fund promotion.725
This regulatory approach, however, may have regulatory arbitrage and
regulatory gap problems in that U.K. domiciled private fund managers are required
to get authorization from the U.K. regulator, while offshore managers are not.726
That may create an unintended adverse effect by inducing onshore managers to
move offshore to avoid authorization obligations under the U.K. regime. With this
regulatory concern in mind, the U.K. regime provides general rules that prohibit
any evasive regulatory avoidance, and it may be filtered out or prevented by the
fund approval and offshore manager authorization processes.727
Unlike the U.S. or the U.K. regime, this scenario may be concluded to be
totally infeasible or legally impermissible under the Korean regime, because the
Korean regime provides no rules relevant to this situation. In other words, Korea
domiciled hedge funds must report to the Korean regulator, and the Korea
domiciled fund must be managed by a Korea domiciled and licensed entity. 728
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See AIFMD, explanatory note 10.
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See supra Chapter V, Part C.
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For instance, the local regulator that reviews the relevant fund application documents may be
able to block this regulatory arbitrage attempt, depending on the factual circumstances, by
identifying cases where the offshore manager chose to be based outside the U.K. just to avoid the
authorization process. See FSMA, art. 2.
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See FSCMA, art. 12, 249-2.
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Offshore managers are allowed to market offshore based funds to Korean investors
on a limited basis, but not Korea domiciled funds.729
Other than those two scenarios, there are no other alternatives like this
available under the Korean regime. There is no cross-border or transnational fund
management business is allowed in Korea from the offshore fund manager
perspective. The only thing offshore fund managers can do is to market the
offshore fund to certain Korean institutional investors.730 Otherwise, if they intend
to set up a Korea domiciled fund to raise capital from Korean investors they need
to obtain the relevant fund management business license under the current Korean
regime. Undoubtedly, it is overly burdensome and very difficult for them to choose
to do so because they need to be fully subject to Korean hedge fund regulation for
their limited business in Korea, and there are other options for them to market the
offshore funds to Korean investors without the heavy regulatory burdens under the
offshore fund sales regime.731
The U.S. and U.K. regimes seem more reasonable than the Korean regime
regarding this scenario because they provide both express and implied safe harbor
rules for offshore managers to set up onshore funds to raise capital from onshore
729

See FSCMA, art 279.

730

See FSCMA, art. 279(2).

731

In fact, there is little incentive for them to set up locally licensed entities to engage in hedge fund
business in Korea in that their track record or expertise must be primarily on offshore investments,
not local investments, and they may be more interested in raising capital from certain Korean
institutional investors. Thus the offshore fund sales regime may be the only feasible option for them
to accommodate their business needs in Korea, unless there are significant deregulatory measures
taken by the Korean regulator. In this regard, the Korean regulator’s announcement to deregulate
the licensing regime in the foreseeable future would be positive. See supra text accompanying note
458.
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investors, while the Korean regime provides no safe harbor rules for this scenario.
This regulatory difference between the three countries arises primarily because
hedge funds are subject to direct regulation in Korea while they are not in the U.S.
or the U.K.732
Considering the fact that Korean managers are allowed to set up offshore
funds to raise capital from offshore investors, that offshore managers are
already allowed to market their funds to certain Korean institutional investors
(in accordance with the offshore fund sales regime), and that offshore hedge
fund businesses operating in Korea already focus more on marketing than on
fund investment and management, it would be prudent and reasonable to adopt
the offshore fund sales regime utilized in the U.K.733

732

It is unlikely cause serious regulatory concerns if offshore managers set up onshore funds and
raise capital from Korean investors, assuming that onshore hedge funds are exempted from
registration and reporting requirements (besides having to market the fund interests through a
Korean licensed entity and to obtain the fund distribution license themselves). This inference is
possible because offshore managers likely do not intend to manage onshore funds in Korea (as most
of the investment and management functions are operated offshore), allowing offshore managers to
rely on the private securities offering exemption and the private fund exemption.
733

See AIFMD, explanatory note 13.
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IX.

Conclusion

Five years have elapsed since the global financial crisis struck the financial
markets, and a couple of years have passed since the unprecedented, draconian,
crisis-driven financial regulatory reforms and hedge fund regulations made their
way around the world.
There is no doubt that it is too early to assess whether or not the current
crisis-driven hedge fund regime is necessary (or sufficient) to prevent another high
profile financial market failure in the future. Therefore, it would be prudent to wait
and see how effectively and efficiently the paternalistic hedge fund regimes in the
major jurisdictions deal with the hedge fund problems raised during the crisis.734
It is worth thinking about whether the current hedge fund regulations are
reasonable or if they go too far, because we may not have had enough time to think
about the cumulative scope of the regulations while undergoing the crisis, and
because identifying the appropriate level of regulation will ensure sustainable
growth in the marketplace and will minimize potential negative impacts on local
and global markets.
Consensus has built around the idea that hedge funds provide a positive
effect on the financial markets, but the regulations imposed on hedge funds should
be legally and practically distinct from the other types of funds available to the
investing public.735 However, the policy rationales behind regulating hedge funds,
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See supra Chapter III, Part A.

735

See supra Chapter II, Part B, C.1.
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i.e., investor protection, deterrence of market fraud, and ensuring financial market
stability, are still valid and should be fully respected.
The question now is whether those rationales are appropriately reflected in
the current hedge fund regulatory regimes. It appears, in terms of micro-prudential
regulation, that the regimes in the U.S., the U.K., and Korea have overregulation
problems. All three countries were overly responsive to investor protection and/or
market fraud concerns by subjecting hedge funds managers (and hedge funds in
Korea) to a broad array of mandatory regulations that used to only be applicable to
mutual fund managers.736
The autonomy of the accredited investor hedge fund market should be
respected to the extent possible, assuming that all the participants in this market
are sufficiently sophisticated to make informed investment decisions and to protect
their own interests. Redefining accredited investor threshold conditions, mandating
that hedge funds comply with broad principles of business conduct, and enforcing
regulations in cases where fraudulent or deceptive practices take place should
serve the minimize the need for regulatory intervention.737
From a macro-prudential regulatory perspective, there is little doubt that
hedge funds should be subject to stronger regulatory oversight than ever. It seems
reasonable and desirable to subject hedge fund managers to licensing/registration
and reporting requirements, because it is hardly deniable that they have the
potential to pose systemic risk during extreme market situations; regulators should
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See supra Chapter III, Part C.

737

See id.
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be able to take appropriate corrective measures in a timely manner when
necessary.738
The problem under the current hedge fund regimes though is that detailed,
paternalistic, line-by-line rules and regulations have been implemented and
justified under the policy rationale of preventing systemic risk and ensuring market
stability. There are other more delicate, more responsive, and more flexible
regulatory alternatives available739 that should be pursued if we can agree that the
hedge fund market should exist as a private market, clearly distinct from the public
market. The hedge fund market would also be more likely to survive and to stay
financially innovative if lighter regulatory oversight is allowed.740
It should be noted that, in this dissertation, I do not take into consideration
such other hedge fund related issues as hedge fund activism,741 money laundering,
insider trading or market manipulation, and unethical or illegal investments,
among other things. Instead, what I have endeavored to cover is how to efficiently
and effectively deal with hedge fund problems from the securities or fund
regulatory perspective, and how to regulate the hedge fund market accordingly
under the relevant local securities and/or fund regimes.

738

See id.
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As briefly mentioned in supra note 163, the Volcker Rule may be a good example of an indirect
regulatory alternative that may be utilized as a powerful and effective regulatory tool to control the
hedge fund market, because the Volcker Rule directly and significantly limits the banking
industries’ exposure to private funds. As a consequence it may also adversely affect the growth of
the hedge fund market. See supra Chapter III, Part B.
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See supra Chapter VIII, Part A.
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See e.g., ATHANASSIOU, supra note 79, at 84-90.
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Therefore, I do not believe my arguments or recommendations in this
dissertation are absolutely correct or infallible in every situation. Undoubtedly the
aforementioned issues need to be dealt with separately and from different
regulatory perspectives. Some regulatory issues and concerns have already been
touched on by the regimes covered here, and others may be dealt with through
statutes or by regulators not included in this dissertation.
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